University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1988

The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9
Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to
Leases
Charles W. Mooney Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Commercial Law Commons,
Finance Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Secured Transactions Commons

Repository Citation
Mooney, Charles W. Jr., "The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique
of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases" (1988). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 822.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/822

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

oF

THE MYSTERY AND MYTH
OWNERSHIP" AND ARTICLE

"OsTENSIBLE

9 FILING: A CRITIQUE OF

PROPOSALS TO ExTEND FILING REQUIREMENTS TO
LEASES

Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*

l.
II.

INTRODUCTION . . . .

. . . . . .

LEASES oF GooDs: RELEVANT BAcKGROUND AND BAsrc
ISSUES . .

III.

PRIORITY

RULES,

A.

B.

FILING

696

THE

EFFECTS

OF

706

. . . . . .

"OsTENSIBLE OwNERSHIP" AND THE ARTICLE
~m~

9

. . . . . .

INCLUDING

NoNFILING: CosTs

v.

689

. . . . . . .

RECENT PROPOSALS TO EXTEND ARTICLE
REQUIREMENTS TO LEASES . .

IV.

684

. . . . . . . . .

....

9

FILING

..
......
. . . ... .. ... . .. .
History, Mystery , and 1\lfyth .
. . ... ... .
I. Some history: Fraud and filing .
2. Ostensible ownership: A closer look . ...
Benefits of Article 9 Filing Rules for Secured
Transactions and Leases: A Comparison

725
725
726

738
744

Copyright 1988 by Charles W. Mooney, Jr.
* B.A. 1969, University of Oklahoma; J.D . 1972, Harvard Universi ty. Associate Profes-

~

sor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. American Bar Association LiaisonAdvisor to the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
I would like to thank John Ayer, Douglas Baird, David Carlson, Ronald Cuming, John
Dolan, Steven Harris, Edwin Huddl eson, Homer Kripke, Fairfax Leary, Jr., Frederick
Miller, Curtis Reitz, Paul Shupack, and Elizabeth Warren for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article, and Mark Goshko, University of Pennsylvan ia Law School class
of 1988, for valuable research assistance. I also wish to acknowledge the late Peter Coogan
for providing me with fifteen years of nurture, criticism, inspiration, guidance, challenge,
insight, and friendship. Because of Peter's death in June, 1985, I did not have the benefit of
his wonderful conceptual and practical input in my efforts to develop this article. But, like
many others who are wiser for having known him, I surely benefited greatly from his influence. Of course, I must take sole responsibility for any errors in my ways demonstrated by
this article.

683

ll
684

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

Information: Reduction of discovery costs 749
Other, greater benefits for secured
751
transactions
762
3. Conclusions
Code Treatment of Consignments and Sales of
C.
Accounts and Chattel Paper: Analogues,
763
Exceptions, or Red Herrings ? .
1. Consignments
763
2. Sales of receivables
768
773
3. Summary
773
D. Sale- Leaseback Transactions
775
CoNCLUSION: CosTs AND BENEFITS CoMPARED
775
A. The Approach
778
B. The Benefits
780
C.
The Costs
783
D. The Balance
788
E. Denouement
1.
2.

VI.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code 1 was promulgated
in August, 1987. 2 During the seven years of study and drafting
which culminated in Article 2A,3 the wisdom of imposing a
1. ALI, NAT'L CoNF. oF CoMM'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAws. UNIFORM CoMMER CIAL
CoDE: 1987 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS. The Uniform Comme rcial Code will be hereina fter referred to as the Code; all citations to the Code are to the 1987 Official Text with
Comments unless otherwise noted, and all citations to the Code are by section numbers
only. Article 2A began its life as the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act. See genera lly
Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practi ti oner and Scholar Alike, ;39 ALA. L.
REv 575 (1988) (this Symposium).
2. The American Law Institute approved Article 2A at its Annual Meeting in May,
1987, and The National Conference of Commissioners on Unifo rm State Laws gave its final
approval to certain changes at its Annual M eeting in August, 1987 (the Conferen ce had
previously approved an earlier version of Article 2A in August, 1986). 1d. at 59:3 -94.
3. The commencement of the s tudy process began with the creat ion of the Subcommittee on Personal Property Leasing , Committee on Uniform Comme rcial Cod e, American
Bar Association Section of Corporation, Bank ing, and Busin ess Law (here inafter ABA UCC
Committee). Boss, supra note 1, at 584-85 & n .57. Earlier, more general suggestions were
made to the effect that leasin g wou ld benefit from uniform statutory treatment. DeKoven,
Proceedings After Default by the L essee U nder a True Lea se of Equipment, in l C P CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D. VAGTs & J. M cDoNNELL, SEcURED TRAN::>ACTroNs UN DER THE iJN rF ORM
CoMMERCIAL CoDE (MB) § 29B.06[4][e] (1987); Heism an & Mooney, Drafting, Ner;utiating,
and Construing the Equipm ent Lease - An Overview, in EquiPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED
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mandatory public notice (filing) requirement for leases of goods
often was debated. 4 The debate reflected earlier proposals and inspired new proposals that a filing requirement for leases of goods
be adopted. Indeed, the debate continues in the pages of this journal.~ With one exception, 6 however, Article 2A does not impose a
filing requirement for leases. 7
Provisions for the public filing or recordation of leases of
goods have been quite rare in the United States. 8 Most recent commentators, however, have urged the adoption of a public notice
requirement. 9 Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, for example,
have argued that, subject to various exceptions, the Article 9 filing
rules should be extended not only to leases of goods, but also to all
other separations of ownership and possession. 10 Although the
drafters and sponsors of Article 2A did not opt for a filing requirement for leases, that decision was reached without the benefit of
thorough commentary by those who deny or question the wisdom
of such a filing rule. The Article 2A process, therefore, has not
marked a clear path for future treatment of other, nonlease separations of possession and ownership of goods. 11
LEASING 185-86 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman eds. 2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter EQUIPMENT LEASING- LEVERAGED LEASING].
4. Whether a filing requirement should be imposed for leases was the subject of spirited debate by participants in programs on equipment leasing sponsored by the Practising
Law Institute in 1981, 1983, and 1985; a program sponsored by the ABA UCC Committee in
1981; and an invitational symposium sponsored by the American Law Institute- American
Bar Association Committee (ALI-ABA) on Continuing Professional Education in 1983. It
was also the subject of much discussion during meetings of the Subcommittee on Personal
Property Leasing of the ABA UCC Committee and, of course, by the Draftin g Com mittee
for Article 2A. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
5. See Huddleson , Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A - Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv.
672-77 (1988) (this Symposium); Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2.4, 39 ALA.
L. REv. 798-801 (1988) (this Symposium).
6. See U.C.C. § 2A-309 (1987) (providing for fixture filings).
7. See id. § 2A-101 comment para. 5; id. § 2A-301 comment para. 3.
8. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
9. See ge nerally infra Part III.
10. Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of th e Scope of
Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 189-94 (1983).
11. See Scott, A R elational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 970
(1986) ("Frequently, insight comes only through the accreting effects of successive scholarly
efforts."). The "successive scholarly efforts" dealing with a filing requirement for leases of
goods reached similar conclusions based on similar reasoning and have not been subjected to
any searching criticism.
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The principal goal of this article is to explore the appropriateness of a filing rule for leases in view of the justifications for and
functions and effects of the public notice (filing) rules under Article 9 and earlier codifications of personal property law. 12 This
article will address the important challenge posed so well by Baird
and Jackson: "At the very least ... those who question the usefulness of a filing requirement in the case of leases should explain
why there should be a filing requirement in the case of secured
transactions that are identical from the point of view of third parties." 13 There are cogent reasons for treating leases and secured
transactions differently in the context of public notice. The principal feature common to leases and many secured transactions is the
possession of goods by a debtor or lessee. Concerns for third parties based on the ostensible ownership by a possessor of goods,
however, provide an incomplete explanation for the Article 9 filing
rules. The historical development of chattel security law was not
an inexorable march toward requiring public notice of separations
of possession and ownership in order to reduce ostensible ownership concerns. The judicial and legislative developments also were
12. Much of this article deals with the identification of various "costs" and "benefits"
of a tiiing requirement for leases. Those terms are used here in a broad sense. Although
costs and benefits are sometimes dealt with in the context of arguments based (or stated to
be based) on economic analysis, in general the reader may substitute freely such terms as
"pros" and "cons" or "advantages" and "disadvantages."
Part II of this article provides some background concerning the treatment of leases of
goods under prevailing common law and Article 2A and distinguishes such treatment from
that afforded secured transactions under Article 9. It also deals with the process which resulted in the absence of a filing requirement in Article 2A. Part III summarizes the
substance and reasoning of several proposals for the adoption of a filing requirement for
leases. Part IV deals with the range of sanctions and effects (i.e., "priority rules") which
might be imposed as a result of the failure of a lessor to comply with a filing requirement for
leases. Part V considers the historical and current justifications and explanations for the
doctrine of "ostensible ownership" and various filing and other public notice requirements .
Part V also compares the functions and effects of the existing Code's public notice requirements for secured transactions, including sales of accounts and chat tel paper, and
consignments with the functions and effects which might result from a filing rule for leases.
Part VI draws on the preceding Parts and compares the costs and benefl.ts which might
result from imposing, or not impos ing, a filing rule for leases.
13. Baird & .Jackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46. Ronald Cuming has asked a similar
question: "If the [filing] system works reasonably well for secured transactions, why should
it not be employed in the context of certain types of commercially important, non-security
transactions such as chattel leases and consignments?" Cuming, Canadian Developments in
Personal Property Security Law, in 1 P CooGAN. W. HoGAN, D VAGTS & J McDONNELL,
supra note 3, § 5D.05[l][a][ii], at 5D-10. Although Cuming may have intended his question
to be rhetorical, this article does not treat it as such.
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influenced by concerns for fraud and fairness apart from misleading appearances of ownership. The Article 9 filing rules serve a
variety of functions which are unrelated, or only tenuously connected, to curing perceived problems of ostensible ownership. The
Article 9 filing regime provides information about potential secured claims so as to permit the ordering of priorities based
generally on the principle of first-in-time. The filing regime also
responds to concerns about fraud and collusion by enhancing the
veracity of claims to security and the timing of those claims for
priority purposes. Because of inherent conceptual and contextual
differences between leases and secured transactions, a filing requirement for leases would result in fewer and smaller benefits
than are provided for many secured transactions under current
law. If the effect of noncompliance with a filing rule for leases were
similar to t hat which exists for secured transactions, a filing rule
for leases also would result in greater costs than those resulting
from the filing rules for secured transactions. Proponents of a filing
rule for leases have not given adequate consideration to such costs
or to the range of possible effects and sanctions for noncompliance
with a filing rule.
This article also addresses three additional goals. First, it
identifies various empirical, behaviorial, and economic hypotheses
and assumptions upon which proponents of a filing rule for leases
(and advocates for the existing Article 9 notice filing rules applicable to secured transactions) have relied as well as those upon which
I have relied. It thereby reveals matters in need of further research
and investigation by exposing weaknesses in the arguments of such
proponents as well as weaknesses in the arguments made here. No
firm conclusion is reached as to whether a filing requirement for
leases is warranted, largely because an adequate informat ion base
iS illlSSmg.

Second, this article demonstrates that the wisdom of a
mandatory filing requirement for leases is not a simple problem
susceptible to a simple solution based on a simple principle, as suggested by some of the proponents of such a rule. 14 The issue is, like
14. Two proponents of a mandatory filing requirement have argued:
[O]nce one realizes that these [ostensible ownership] p ro blems have a common
source, si mple solutions to them become apparen t. In proposing th ese simple solutions to problems th at have consum ed hundreds of pages of law review comm entary,
we are not advoca ting a radical departure fr om establish ed wisdom. Rat her , we are
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most matters of public policy, a complex one which demands an
investigation and analysis of numerous factual, behaviorial, and economic considerations. Previous proposals for a filing rule have
been incomplete or deficient in methodology or both. H>
Finally, this article may encourage a more thorough rethinking
of the role of possession of personal property, particularly goods,
and public notice requirements in our legal regime. Others have
explored the role of possession in a variety of commercial law contexts and found the existing rules to be deficient. 16 The specific
debate over the need for a filing rule for leases may be quieted by
the promulgation and eventual widespread enactment of Article
2A. But the explanations and justifications for attributing legal significance to possession and requiring public notice of interests in
personal property should continue to be the focus of study. Courts
and commentators alike continue to be perplexed by bailments of
goods, such as bailments for processing, which are neither leases
urging only that rulemakers apply more generally the principle that has shaped the
law of security interests in personal property for four hundred years: A party who
wishes to acquire or retain a nonpossessory interest in property that is effective
against others must, as a general matter, make it possible for others to discover that
interest .
. . . An ostensible ownership problem ... exists whenever there is a separation of
ownership and possession. Article 9's treatment of the ostensible ownership problem
created by secured credit naturally leads one to ask whether the ostensible ownership
problem created by leases or other bailments is different. We believe the answer is
simple: The two ostensible ownership problems are not different in any relevant respect. They impose the same costs on third parties, and if a filing system is an
appropriate response to the first problem, it is an equally appropriate response to the
second.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 178, 186 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The
arguments developed by Baird and Jackson are discussed in more detail in Part III. See
infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
15. These shortcomings may result, in part, from the overly narrow conceptualization
of the issue as essentially a "secured transaction" or "Article 9" matter. Rather, such proposals necessarily involve very basic, important, and longstanding principles of personal
property law generally. See Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A
Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 987, 988 (1985) ("The lesson is that wisdom in
result is unlikely to derive from error in method.").
16. See, e.g., Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012
(1978); Dolan, The UCC's Consignment Rule Needs an Exception for Consumers, 44 OHio
ST. L.J. 21 (1983); Helman, Ostensible Ownership and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83
CoM. LJ. 25 (1978); Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing Under Article 9
(pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 209 (1979).
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nor consignments. 17 There is a reasonable prospect that in the forseeable future Article 2 will be subjected to study for the purpose
of considering amendments. 18 Moreover, sooner or later, the sponsors of the Code may consider amending Article 9 as well. 19 A
richer store of literature examining these issues no doubt will enhance significantly the quality of any future Code drafting
projects.

II.

LEAsEs oF GooDs: RELEVANT BAcKGROUND AND BAsic IssuEs

As a result of the "boom" in equipment leasing during the last
twenty-five to thirty years, the leasing of goods has become an extremely important commercial device. 20 At common law, a lease of
17. E.g., Wesgo Div. of GTE Prods. Corp. v. Harrison (In re Sitkin Smelting & Ref.,
In c.), 648 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (delivery of scrap material for extraction of metals held a
secured transaction subject to Article 9 perfection requirements); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Harrison (In re Sitken Smelting & Ref., Inc.), 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1981) (delivery of
waste film for extraction of metals held a true bailment not subject to Article 9 perfection
requirements); General Motors Corp. v. Bristol Indus. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (delivery of raw materials for processing held a secured
transaction subject to Article 9 perfection requirements) , reu'd on other grounds , 690 F .2d
26 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Medomak Canning Co., 25 U .C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 437
(Bankr. D. Me. 1978) (delivery of raw ingredients and packaging supplies for processing and
packaging held a true bailment not subject to Article 9 perfection requirements), aff'd, 588
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978); Harrington, A Caueat for Commodity Processing Industries: Insolvent Processors' Credit ors us. Putative Owners of Raw Mat erials, 16 D.C. C. L.J. 322 (1984);
Comment, "Bailment for Processing": Article Nine Security Interest or Title Retention
Contract, 61 OR L. REv. 441 (1982). The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code ("PEB") now has under consideration a draft PEB Commentary dealing with
such non lease , nonconsignment bailments. The scope of this article is confined essentially to
bailments that are leases, however. As to consignments, see infra Part V.D.
18. The ABA UCC Committee studied the prevailing problems under Article 2 and
issued a consensus report in March, 1987, which does not represent any official ABA position, calling for a formal study by t he sponsors of the Code, the National Conference of
Com missioners on Uniform State Laws and The American Law Institute, to consider the
need for revisions to Article 2. That recommendation was discussed in a meeting of the PEB
on September 19, 1987. At that m eeting the PEB approved in principle a formal study of
Article 2; the details and timing of the project remain on the PEB agenda.
19. At the time of this writin g neither the Code sponsors nor the PEB contemplate a
project relating to revision of Article 9. However, a review and revision of Article 2, to the
extent it would deal with issues relating to possession of goods, good faith purchase and the
like, cou ld involve reconsideration of related issues under Article 9. Cf. Dolan, Good Faith
Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Int erplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the
UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1978); ,Jackson & Peters , Qu est for Uncertainty: A Proposal for
Flexible Resolut ion of Inh erent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform
Comme rcial Code, 87 YA LE L.J. 907 (1977).
20. The current volume of eq uipment leasing is impressive:
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goods was, and remains, a form of "bailment for hire." 21 The bailment consists of a delivery of goods by the lessor (bailor) to the
lessee (bailee), for use by the lessee during the term of the lease, in
exchange for a consideration to be paid by the lessee to the lessor,
and pursuant to which the lessee is to redeliver the goods to the
lessor at the expiration of the term. 22 The concept might seem simple. Yet, the courts and commentators have struggled for many
years to discover the essential distinctions between a lease (often
referred to as a "true" lease, for purposes of contrast) and a transaction denominated a lease but which, in legal effect, is a secured
transaction. 23 In recent years many reported decisions and much
commentary have grappled with the true lease-security interest dichotomy under the pre-1987 section 1-201(37) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which defines the term "security interest." 24
Today equipment leasing accounts for over 20% of all capital investment each year in
the United States. Over $310 billion in lease receivables are estimated to be outstanding in this country. Well over $90 billion worth of equipment was financed through
leasing in the United States in 1986 alone.
Huddleson, supra note 5, at 616 n.1 (citations omitted); see also Boss, supra note 1, at 57677. The increased popularity of leasing as a means of acquiring the use of capital assets has
resulted in large part from advantages based on the federal income tax treatment of lessors
and lessees and the perceived advantages for financial accounting purposes. See generally
Macan, Tax Aspects of Equipment Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING,
supra note 3, ch. 4; Dieter, Stewart & Underwood, Accounting for Leases, in EQUIPMENT
LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING, supra note 3, ch. 5.
21. See, e.g., 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 8a (1962 & Supp. 1987); J . STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON
THE LAw OF BAILMENTS, §§ 368, 372, 323 -24 & 327 (9th ed. 1878); see also DeKoven, supra
note 3.
22. See, e.g., J. STORY, supra note 21, §§ 383-420, at 335-80; see also DeKoven, supra
note 3.
23. See, e.g., 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.6, at 75-81
(1965); 3 L. JoNES, THE LAw OF CHATTEL MoRTGAGES AND CoNDITIONAL SALES, §§ 952-59, at
59-67 (6th ed. 1933 & Supp. 1956); S. WILLISTON, THE LAw GovERNING SALES OF Goons, §§
336-37, at 296-302 (rev. ed. 1948).
24. Most of the commentary considered infra Part IV deals in some detail with the
true lease-security interest issue. See also Boss, supra note 1, at 579-80; Mooney, True
Lease or Lease "Intended as Security"-Treatment by the Courts, in 1C P. CooGAN, W.
HoGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, supra note 3, ch. 29A (1987) [hereinafter Mooney, True
Lease]; Reisman & Mooney, supra note 3, at 9-41. A conforming amendment to the Code,
promulgated in connection v:ith Article 2A, substantially revises the language of§ 1-201(37)
as it relates to leases. There is case law support under the pre-1987 § 1-201(37) for virtually
every change made by the revised § 1-201(37). The revisions were necessary, however, because of the large volume of other case law typified by mindless opinions citing other
mindless opinions. Hopefully, courts will begin to rely on the concepts illuminated by the
revised § 1-201 (37) even before its enactment. Both the statutory language of the pre-1987 §
1-201(37) and much of the case law dealing with this issue have been subjected to stern
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Many leasing transactions have taken the form of a so-called "finance lease." That term generally is used to denote a transaction
wherein the lessor, at the request of a customer, acquires goods
from a supplier selected by the customer and for the purpose of
leasing the goods to the customer. 25 Such transactions might appear to be the functional equivalents of secured purchase money
financings. There are, however, important differences which bear
on the wisdom of imposing a filing requirement for leases.
The essence of a true lease is the existence, as reasonably anticipated at the inception of the lease, of a meaningful residual
interest for the lessor at the expiration of the lease term. 26 When a
criticism over the years. See, e.g., Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Som e Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201 (37) and Article 9, 1973
DuKE L.J. 909, reprint ed and revised in 1 P. CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL,
supra note 3, ch. 4A. The uncertainty and confusion surrounding the true lease -security
interest issue was an important element in the decision to codify the law relating to leases of
goods which has resulted in Article 2A. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) comment para. 2 (1987); see
Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1610-15, 1625 (1981)
[hereinafter Mooney, Challenge]. The revised § 1-201(37) should reduce th is uncertainty
and provide a more conceptually sound framework for parties, counsel and courts to address
the issue, but it does not purport to deal expressly with all possible circumstances. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) comment para. 11 (1987). The infinite variety of factual situations and
the inherent uncertainty of any economic analysis or valuation process will continue to result in gray areas at the margin. For a thorough analysis of the true lease-security interest
issue under the revised § 1-201(37) , see Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease
Under the UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (1988).
25. See Leary, The Procrustean Bed of Financ e Leasing, 56 N.YU. L. REv. 1061, 106162 & n.2 (1981); Reisman & Mooney, supra note 3, at 29-35; see also Boss, Panacea or
Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. REv. 39, 67-68 (1984) . Article 2A has cod ified the
"finance lease" concept.
"Finance lease" means a lease in which (i) the lessor does not select, manufacture or
supply the goods, (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use
of the goods in connection with the lease, and (iii) either the lessee receives a copy of
the contract evidencing the lessor 's purchase of the goods on or before signing the
lease contract, or the lessee's approval of the contract evidencing the lessor's purchase
of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract.
U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(g) (1987).
26. See, e.g., Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 357, 363-65; Burns, Uniform Commercial Code, Public Filing and Personal
Property Leases: Questions of Definition and Doctrine, 22 WAKE FoREST L. REv 425, 46973 (1987); Coogan, supra note 24, at 954, 972-73; Mooney, Tru e Lease, supra note 24, §
29A.02[2J[c], at 2958-59. For example, if a lessee will be entitled to become the owner of the
goods or to purchase the goods for a nominal consideration upon compliance with the terms
of the lease, the transaction will not be a true lease. U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(d) (1987). Similarly,
if the lease term, including any renewal term for a nominal consideration, extends to or
beyond the remaining economic life of the goods, the transaction will be legal ly recharacterized as a secured transaction. !d. § 1-201(37)(a) & (c). On the other hand, when a lessee is
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lessee complies with its obligations under a true lease, a meaningful residual value of the leased goods is left for the lessor at the
end of t he term. When a debtor in a secured transaction satisfies
its secured obligat ions, the collateral remains the property of the
debtor alone , and t he secured party's security interest expires. The
existence, at the end of the term, of a meaningful residual value of
t he leased goods that is retaine d by a lessor and not transferred to
t he lessee represents a fu ndamental conceptual distinction between
true leases and secured transactions under current law.
Both H omer Kripke and John Ayer have argued, incisively
and elegantly, that no meaningful distinction exists between a true
lease and a secured t ransaction. 2 7 Rather, they argue , there is a
continuum comprised of an infinite variety of transactions. 28 They
view an attempt t o force transactions into one of only two possible
categories--lease or security interest-as an artificial and senseless
exercise .29 Kripke explains that a lease is a transfer of a temporal
property right of use to a lessee with a property right in the
resid ual value retained by t he lessor. 30 Ayer persuasively demonstrates t hat when property is divided into separate bundles of
rights, each representing some combination of upside and downside benefits and risks, t here is an infinite variety of possible
clivisions.31 Viewed in this context, current law employs a crude approach: If a putative lessor's retained bundle of rights is material,
t he transaction is a t rue lease, and if t he put ative lessor's retained
interest is expected t o be nonexistent or immaterial at the end of
the t errn, a secured t ransaction exists.
vVhether it makes sense for the law to maintain the true leasesecuri ty interest dichotorny is it self a senseless inquiry unless anfree to term inate th e lease at

3

t ime when it is n ot en t it led to a bargain purchase option or

t he lik e, t hen th e tra nsaction should be a tr ue lease even th ough the lessee might be entitled
to a bargai n purchase opti on if it we re t o elect to con tinue with t h e t ransa ction for an addi o!!a l p eriod . S ee icf . § l - 201( ~n) (secon d par agraph ) (" [A] tra nsaction creates a security
in tei'e;:t. if t h e cons id e ra t ion t he lessee is t o pay t he lessor for t he right t o possession and use
uf the goo d:.; i:J an ob ligati on for lh e t erm of th e leas e not subj ect t o termination by the
!e.-..·...?e . .. .'· ~ e n1phasis ad ded)).
:r; ,-\yH . On t he Vacu ity of th e S aie/Lea se Dist inction , 68 IowA L. REv. 667 (1983);
Kr ipke . Ew'k Rf:\'iew, 37 Bus. L AW 723 ( 1982) (rev iewing EQUIPMENT L EASI NG-LEVERA GED
L K\:;l !\ G, su prn note 3) ; see ais o K r ipke , supra note 5, at 797 -98.
~8 ,~, ye;-, sup.ra not e 27 , at 667 p assim; K ri pke, supra n ote 27, at 727- 29.
29. Ayer, sup ra n ot e 2/ , at 67 3-84; Kr ipke, supra n ote 27 , at 727 -29.
:10 . Kripke, supra no te 27 , a t 729.
:n. Ay 2r , supra note 27, at n7 3-84 ; K ri pke, supra n ote 27, at 726 -29.
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other question is asked and answered: If the legal distinction were
abolished, how would transactions that are leases under current
law be treated? It has been argued that the distinction is one
which must be made, at least for some purposes. 3 2 One such purpose under current law is the difference between the applicable
remedies of, and damages recoverable by, a lessor when compared
to the enforcement rights available to an Article 9 secured party.
When a debtor defaults and a secured party takes possession of
collateral, the secured party generally will be required to dispose of
the collateral in a "commercially reasonable" manner and to give
the debtor prior notice of the intended disposition. 33 After the disposition, the secured party will be entitled to recover from the
debtor any deficiency (i.e., remaining unpaid balance of secured
obligation less net proceeds of the disposition) or will be required
to pay over to the debtor any surplus (i. e ., net proceeds of disposition less remaining unpaid balance of the secured obligation). 34
These rules underscore the significance of a lessor's residual
interest and the inappropriateness of Article 9 remedies for parties
to a lease. A secured party is required to credit t he debtor with the
entire net proceeds of a disposit ion. Were a lessor required to
credit a lessee with the entire net proceeds from a disposition,
however, the lessee would receive the benefit of the lessor's
residual value-a stick in the bundle which was not transferred to
32. See , e.g., Boss, sup ra note 26, at 357 ; Coogan, Is There a Difference Be twee n a
Long-Term Lease and an In stall m en t Sale of Personal Propert y?, 56 N .Y.U. L. REv. 103 6
(1981). The true lease -security interest dist inction is det erminative of many issues outside
of the Article 9 perfection, pri ority, and enforcement context. For example, leases generally
are not su bject to usury laws, but a lease recas t as a secured t ransaction often would be
subject thereto. See , e.g., McGalliard v. Liberty Leasing Co., 534 P .2d 528 (Alaska 1975 );
Hill v. Bentco Leasing , Inc. , 288 Ark . 623 , 708 S. W.2d 608 (1 986); Reisman & Mooney, supra
note 3, at 12 & n.28. The issue also may be det erminitive for purposes of ad valorem t axes,
sales and use taxes, applicabili ty of ce rtain consumer protection laws, and treatment for a
variety of purposes under the Bankru ptcy Code. See, e.g. , Mooney, T ru e L ease , supra note
24, § 29A.03 [3]-[ll], at 2929- 37; Reisman & Mooney, supra note 3, at 12-14, 123-34, 164-76.
Eliminating t he distinction under t he Code certainly would not end the need to make the
determination in many other circumstances. Cu ming has asserted, however , in addressing
the registration (fi li ng) requ irement fo r leases under Sas katchewan law, t hat " [o ]nee the
issue of registration is rem oved, the problem of characterization becomes com mercially insignificant." Cuming, su pra note 13, § 5D. 05[1 J[ a ][iv], at 5A- ll ; see a lso in fra note 40
(di scussing Saskatchewan law) . Insofar as the quoted state ment is in ten ded to en compass
circumstances in the United States (an d the conte xt suggests that it is), the statement is
inaccurate.
33. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987) .
34. Jd. § 9-504(2 ).
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the lessee and for which the lessee was not obliged to pay. 35 It follows that abolishing the true lease-security interest distinction
should not eliminate the necessity of taking into account the
residual interest of a lessor in transactions which constitute true
leases under current law. 36
Abolishing the true lease-security interest distinction also
might subject leases to the perfection and priority regime of Article 9. As a general matter, a secured party must perfect its security
interest in order to achieve protection against most conflicting
creditor and purchaser claims to collateral. 37 Perfection in goods
intended for use, such as equipment, 38 is normally achieved by filing a financing statement. 39 In most jurisdictions in the United
States and Canada, as well as in England, however, no filing or
other public notice requirement is imposed on the parties to true
leases, and the interest of a lessor generally is immune from attack
on ostensible ownership grounds. 40 Most proponents of imposing a
35. Ronald DeKoven has stated an appropriate measure of damages applicable to a
lessee default: "[T]he present value of the difference between the rent reserved for the balance of the term less the market value of the use of the repossessed equipment for the
balance of the term .... " DeKoven, supra note 3, § 29B.05[3], at 3012; see also DeKoven,
Leases of Equipment: Puritan Leasing Co. v. August, A Dange rous Decision, 12 U.S.F. L.
REv 257 (1978). This measure would credit the lessee only with t he value of its own property interest- the use value of the goods for the remainder of the term-for which it is
required to pay rentals. Mr. DeKoven was the Reporter for Article 2A and the basic lessor
measure of damages upon a lessee default provided by Article 2A is patterned closely on Mr.
DeKoven's modeL See generally Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in L ess ors ' Remedies Under Article 2A: Using Offi.cal Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute , 39 ALA. L.
REv. 875 (1988) (this Symposium).
36. Kripke acknowledges this point. Kripke , supra note 27, at 729 ("It should not be
too difficult for Mr. Mooney's subcommittee to work out a formula by which the proceeds of
such a sale would be divided in proportion to the present values of the term and the
residual useful life, with the former applied against the present value of the lessee's liability
for rent.") .
37. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(b) to 9-312(5)(a) (1987); see also Bankruptcy Code §
544(a) . As used in this article, " Bankruptcy Code" refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 &
Supp. VI 1986).
38. See U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1987) (defining "equipment" as "goods .. . if they are used
or bought for use primarily in business").
39. Id. § 9-302(1).
40. There are exceptions, however. South Carolina 's " bailment statute" has long provided that unless a lease of goods is recorded (or is for "temporary use" or qualifies under
certain other minor exceptions) it is "null and void as to subsequent creditors .. . or purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice. " S.C. CoDE ANN.§ 27-23-80 (Law Co-op.
1976); see Note, Mandatory Recording of Personal Property Leases in South Carolina, 30
S.C.L. REv. 557 (1979); see also IDAHO CoDE § 25-2001 (Supp. 1987) (recording of " [!] eases of
more than ten (10) head of livestock must be in writing ... acknowledged ... and recorded .
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filing requirement for leases of goods have failed to consider, much
less grapple with, the effect of a lessor's noncompliance on the lessor's residual interest in the goods. It is central to the thesis of this
article that an analysis of the merits of a filing rule for leases must
take seriously the accompanying priority rules, including the effect
of noncompliance on a lessor's residual interest. This issue is addressed in Part IV.
Article 2A does not mandate filing or any other form of public
notice for leases, with the exception of leases of goods which become fixtures. 41 The Official Comments to Article 2A offer little
insight into the drafters' decision to reject the nearly uniform call
of the commentators for a filing requirement. 42 Although the matter was one which was intensely discussed and debated prior to
.. and the failure to comply ... renders the interest of the lessor ... subject ... to the
claims of creditors ... and of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers ... in good faith
and for value").
Saskatchewan has adopted a filing requirement for certain leases by including such
leases within the definition of "security interest" under The Personal Property Security Act.
SASK. STAT. 1979-80, ch. P-6.1. A "security interest" includes "the interest of a lessor under
a lease for a term of more than one year," but such leases are defined to exclude "a lease
transaction involving a lessor who is not regularly engaged in the business of leasing goods."
!d. § 2(nn), (y). Thus, only leases by "professional" lessors are subjected to the filing requirements. Moreover, leases are excluded from the Act in respect of issues of enforcement
upon a lessee's default. ld. § 55(1). See generally, Cuming, supra note 13, § 5D.05, at 5D-9
to -13; Cuming, True Leases and Security Leases Under Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 7 CAN. Bus. L.J. 251 (1982-1983); Shanker, The Past and Future of True Leases
and Disguised Security Agreements, 7 CAN. Bus. L.J. 288 (1982-1983).
41. See U.C.C. § 2A-309 (1987). As a general matter a lessee cannot transfer leased
goods to a third party purchaser or creditor free of the lessor's claim and interest. See, e.g.,
McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. App. 1978); Crest Inv. Trust,
Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969); Cooperider v. Myre, 37
Ohio App. 502, 175 N.E. 235 (1930). But a lease to a lessee who is a "merchant who deals in
goods of that kind" would empower the merchant-lessee to transfer the lessor's rights to a
"buyer in ordinary course of business." U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 2-403(2) & (3) (1987). Similarly,
a lessor's rights might be cut off under circumstances where theories of apparent authority
or estoppel would apply. See id. § 1-103. The most the lessee could transfer is its own leasehold interest-the right to use the goods during the term of the lease. See id. § 2A-303(l)(a)
(lease contract can prohibit voluntary transfer of interest by lessor or lessee); cf. id. § 9-311
(debtor may transfer rights in collateral notwithstanding prohibition in security agreement).
42. The Comments provide:
The lessor was not required to file a financing statement against the lessee or take
any other action to protect the lessor's interest in the goods (Section 2A-301). The
refined definition of security interest will more clearly signal the need to file to potential lessors of goods. Those lessors who are concerned will file a protective financing
statement (Section 9-408).
U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment para. 5 (1987); see also id. § 2A-301 comment para. 3. I do not
contend that the drafters should have been more explicit. If my conjecture is correct that
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43

and during the drafting process, there may be a good reason for
the paucity of elaboration. Although there was a general consensus
of the drafting committee in result-not to adopt a filing requirement-it is doubtful that there was a consensus on the reasoning
or the weight afforded to the several arguments made for and
against a filing requirement. 44
III.

RECENT PROPOSALS TO EXTEND ARTICLE

9

II
~

I

FILING

REQUIREMENTS TO LEASES

Undoubtedly influenced by the leasing "boom," 45 recent years
have witnessed a contemporaneous "boom" in legal writing dealing
with the leasing of goods, usually denominated "equipment leasing." During the 1960s and 1970s several commentators proposed
that true leases of goods be subjected to the Article 9 or similar
filing requirements. 46 The commencement in 1980 of a formal con-

I
I

there was no clear consensus as to t he reasoning, it is doubtful that any attempt to elaborate
would have been fruitful.
43. See generally infra Part III.
44. The speculation in the text is based on discussions of the filing issue with the
Reporter , Mr. DeKoven, and many of the members of the drafting committee both during
and subsequent to the drafting process.
There is a lesson here for future scholars looking back on the Article 2A process as well
as for scholars today engaged in drawing inferences from the past in other contexts. It would
be a serious mistake to attribute any particular analysis, motive, or reason ing to t he drafters' decision t o eschew a filing requirement for leases. There is no basis to infer that the
drafters concluded that filing would not be useful, that the ostensible ownership of a possessor of goods is not misleading to third party creditors or purchasers, or that any si ngle,
overriding consideration represented a consensus position of the drafters. Moreover , it certainly would be a mistake to conclude that the result was largely dictated by the strong
expressions of opposition to a filing requirement voiced during the process by representatives of the leasing industry. See generally Huddleson, supra note 5, at 672-77; Kripke,
supra note 5, at 798-801. As with any legislative process, the end result speaks with one
voice, but the basis for the result may be difficult to identify. On balance, the drafters chose
not to adopt a filing rule.
45. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
46. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part 5: Consignments and Eq uipment Leases, 77 CoM. L.J. 108, 112-15 (1972) (filing requirement for leases
would solve problems of ostensible ownership as well as fraud issues arising out of saleleaseback transactions); Leary, Leasing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment
Under the U. C.C. , 42 TEMPLE LQ. 217, 252-53 (1969) (leases for "substa ntial term" should
be "fully subj ected to Article 9" in order to "disclose all claims against t he assets of a business"); Levie, Security Inter ests in Chattel Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935, 941 (1969) (unaware of
any argument defending current law distinguishing between true lease and secured transactions for "security purposes"); Peden, The Treatment of Equipment Leases as Security
Agreements Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv . llO, 156-58
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sideration of the need and prospects for a uniform statutory
treatment of personal property leasing presented a new agenda for
the erstwhile and future essayists on the subject. The uniform law
project that resulted in Article 2A provided a motivation and a medium for further exploration of the filing requirement issue. 47
Kripke offered some advice and raised even more questions for
the drafters of the new law in a scintillating book review written in
1981. 48 Kripke argued that notice of a lessor's interest should be
filed in order to be "perfected. " 49 Coogan and Leary reacted to
Kripke's book review. 5° Coogan allowed that "it may not be too
(1971) (filing for long term n oncancelable leases should be required based on concerns for
apparent ownership); Note, Leases as Security: Some Problems of Id entificati on, 8 B.C. IND.
& CoMM. L. REv. 764, 770 (1967) (filing requirem en t for leases may bt: necessary as a result
of inability of courts to properly make true lease-security interest distinction); Note, 49
CoRNELL L.Q. 672 (1964) (Article 9 filing requirements should be applied to leases so as to
reduce potential litigation and abolish "secret lien"); Note, Recording of Equipment L eases:
A Proposed Amendment to the Uniform Comm ercial Code, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw 993, 1008
(1972) (Article 9 filing and priority rules should be applied to leases of more than four
months to give notice to creditors and reduce judicial difficulties with true lease-security
interest distinction) ; Comment, Equipment Leasing Under the UCC , 13 UCLA L. REv. 125,
136-37 (1965) (leases other than "short term rental agreements" should be subjected to Article 9 filing rules to eliminate " secret lien").
William Hawkland, speaking in May 1971 on the floor of the American Law Institute,
proposed that Article 9 be amended to require filing for leases so as to deal with the "problem ... of ostensible ownership." 48 A.L.L PROC. 298-99 (1971). Hawkland also expressed
concern that a precautionary filing by a lessor might create a risk that the filing itself would
be viewed as an indication that the transaction was not a true lease. Hawkland's proposal
apparently came too late for any serious consideration by the Article 9 Review Committee.
Telephone interview with Homer Kripke (June 18, 1987); see 48 A.L.I. PRoc. 299-301 (1971);
Hawkland, supra, at 115 & n .37. Hawkland's comments do appear to have sparked some
action by the Review Committee, however. Responding to Hawkland 's proposal, Peter Coogan suggested that the Official Comments might be revised to include a statement to the
effect "that a filing does not necessarily indicate that the parties consider that they have a
security agreement or that they have created a security interest. " 48 A.L.I. PROC. 300 (1971).
The Review Committee subsequently proposed a new § 9-408 which accomplished precisely
what Coogan had suggested and which became a part of the 1972 Official Text of the Code.
Hawkland , however, was disappointed that a filing rule had not been promulgated. Hawkland, supra, at 115.
47. See generally Boss, su pra note 1; Mooney, Chall enge, supra note 24, at 1623-29.
48. Kripke, supra note 27.
49. Id. at 728. Kripke provided some gloss on his view in materials he prepared for an
invitational symposium held in February 1983. ALI-ABA Invitational Symposium, Perso nal
Property Leasing: Prospects and Proposals for a Uniform Statut e , ALI-ABA COMM. ON
CONTINUING PROF. Enuc. 40 (1983). Neither Kripke 's book review nor his symposium materials explicitly identify his rationale for urging a filing requirement. It appears, however, that
his principal concern relates to the ostensible ownership of a lessee in possess ion of goods.
Se e also Kripke, supra note 5, at 798-801.
50. Coogan , supra note 32 ; Leary , supra note 25.
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difficult to fit the filing ... and priority provisions of the UCC to
most true leases." 51 A filing requirement would "eliminate uncertainty" in situations where it is difficult to characterize a
transaction as a true lease or a secured transaction. 52 As to the issue of priorities, Coogan thought that the Article 9 priority rules
had worked well for non-security transactions, such as consignments and sales of accounts and chattel paper, and similarly would
work for leases. 53
Leary's new filing proposals were more refined than those he
had formulated a dozen years earlier. 54 Leary still viewed a filing
requirement as a means to "protect" creditors of and purchasers
from a lessee. 5 5 He argued, however, that a strict application of the
Article 9 "race-to-the-record" priority rules would be "punitive,"
at least if applied to provide creditors, as opposed to purchasers,
with priority over a lessor's interest. 56 He urged adoption of a
"pure notice" system, coupled with a "purchase money priority"

•

lI
f
)

I
,l

I
;

I
j

I

I
5L Coogan, supra note 32, at 1047-48 (footnotes omitted). His reasoning, to t he limited extent that he shared it, was relegated to a footnote. Id . at 1047 n.6L
52. Id. Of course, such "burdensome" filing requirements should not be applicable to
certain leases; he suggested that leases of one year or less by excepted. I d. Coogan based his
one-year exception suggestion on the Saskatchewan model. Id.; see supra note 40. Coogan
did not explain why he had changed his position from that expressed in an earlier article
where he concluded t hat a filing requirement for leases "not only is of questionable wisdom
but also is unlikely t o be adopted in the foreseeable future ." Coogan, supra note 24, at 96061 ; see Coogan , Leasing and the Uniform Commercial Code, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING, supra note 3, ch. 7. Coogan's earlier article attempted to distinguish
consignments and sales of accounts and chattel paper, which are subject to the public notice
requirements under the Code, from leases, which are not. He appears to ha ve been influenced primarily by a di staste for the complexity of drawing lines to exclude certain leases
and his belief that § 9-408 would result in filings being made for most leases even in the
absence of a requirement for filing. See Coogan, supra note 24, at 959-61.
53. Coogan, supra note 32, at 1047-48 & n.62; see also Coogan & Boss, Uniform Com mercial Code Treatmen t for All Leases, in 1 P. CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D. VAGTS & J.
McDoNNELL, supra note 3, ch. 4.3; infra Parts IV, V.D. & V.G.
54. See Leary, supra note 46.
55. Leary, supra note 25, at 1066, 1086-89.
56. Id. at 1086-87 & n.10L
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similar to that in section 9-312(4). 67 Leary limited the scope of his
proposals to "finance leases" of "equipment." 58
Four significant and relevant articles were published in 1983. 59
Amelia Boss and Coogan co-authored an article which urged that
true leases be included within the scope of Article 9. 60 Their rationale was based squarely on the policy of protecting third parties
from a lessee's apparent ownership. 61
57. !d. at 1087-89. Under the proposed "pure notice" system a creditor would not
achieve priority over a lessor if the creditor had "actual notice" of the lessor's interest. Such
notice could result from an Article 9 filing, general knowledge "in the relevant market area
that equipment of the type involved is generally leased or bailed rather than sold to users,"
or from financial accounting information available to a creditor. !d. at 1087. It is not clear
whether Leary would extend this rule to purchasers as well as credit·)rs or, if he would so
extend it, whether he would consider a secured party to be a purchaser for this purpose.
Normally a secured party would be a "purchaser." U.C.C. § 1-201(32) & (33) (1987).
58. See Leary, supra note 25, at 1061 & n.2. As to "finance leases," see generally supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
59. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 341; Baird & Jackson, supra note 10; Boss, supra note 26; Coogan & Boss, supra note 53.
60. Coogan & Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[ 4][a], at 4.3-44 to -46. They described their
conclusions as "tentative." !d. at 4.3 -44. They acknowledged the necessity of special rules
for a lessor's remedies after a lessee's default. !d. § 4.3.04[3], at 4.3-28 to -44. Their proposal
would except leases for terms of less than one year from compliance with the perfection (§§
9-302, 9-303, 9-305) and statute of frauds (§ 9-203(1)) requirements. !d. § 4. 3.04[2][b], at
4.3-26 to -28.
61.

[T]he public policy of protecting third parties which is exemplified in the public notice perfection requirements of Article 9 applies equally to any situation where the
person in possession of goods-whether denominated the debtor, consignee, or
lessee- has less than full ownership of the goods. He is not now the owner and even if
he is to become the owner, goods in which another has an interest are on hi s premises. Thus, the perfection requirements (in [Article 9] Parts 3 and 4) should apply to
leases.
!d. § 4.3.04[2][a], at 4.3-24 (footnote omitted). Their efforts to justify the proposed filing
rule, however, were largely devoted to a listing of the acceptance of similar rules in other
contexts. "A requirement of public notice as to chattel leases is a natural next step- from
the real estate mortgage to the chattel mortgage, to conditional sales, to accounts and other
intangibles, to consignments, to leases of chattels." I d. § 4.3.04[ 4][a], at 4.:3-45. The authors
also refer to the Canadian experience and discuss the UNIDROIT draft convention on international financial leasing. As to developments in Canada, see supra note 40. The current
draft of the UNIDROIT draft convention does not require public notice of financial leases
within its scope, but only requires compliance with applicable local rules as to public notice,
if any. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Summary
Report on the Committee of Governmental Experts for the Preparation of a Draft Convention on International Financial Leasing, Study LIX, Doc. 46, App . II , Art. 5, 1111 2, 3 (3d Sess.
Apr. 27-30, 1987). Coogan and Boss have stated elsewhere that "[i)t is contemplated that
most countries who adopt the UNIDROIT Leasing Rules will provide some sort of a public
notice system to give local creditors of and purchasers from the lessee the type of protection
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Prompted in large part by his participation in a 1983 invitational symposium, 62 John Ayer also addressed the issue of public
notice for leases. 63 Ayer had "discovered one case that [threw] a
wrench into" the argument that filing should be mandated for
leases. 64 Ayer posed a hypothetical which assumed a filing requirement for perfection against creditors of the lessee. Ayer concluded
that the hypothetical lessor of a widget with a 1,000,000 dollar
value, for a twenty-month lease term with aggregate rentals of
200,000 dollars, would, if it neglected to file, lose a 1,000,000 dollar
widget and be left with only a 200,000 dollar unsecured claim in
the lessee's bankruptcy proceedings. 65 Ayer thus raised an issue
which had not been addressed squarely by earlier commentators:
the effect of nonfiling under a mandatory filing requirement. 66 He
also recognized that an understanding of the function and effect of
filing requirements for secured transactions is essential to any
analysis of the need for, and application of, a similar filing rule for
leases. 67
such a system can provide." Coogan & Boss, Recent Developments in Chattel Security
Law-1985, The United States, Canada and the World, in 1 P. CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D.
VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL, supra note 3, § 5C.04(3][d][iv), at 5C-106. I served as the United
States representative to the Second and Third Meetings of Governmental Experts for the
UNIDROIT convention on international financial leasing, in April 1986 and April 1987 in
Rome, Italy. My impressions are precisely the opposite, at least insofar as true leases within
the convention's scope are concerned. The convention is now scheduled to be finalized at a
diplomatic conference to be held in Ottawa, Canada, in May 1988.
As to the priority rules, Coogan and Boss were satisfied to allow the rules of Article 9,
Part 3, to control. Coogan & Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[4], at 4.3-46. They proposed that
Article 9 be clarified to ensure the applicability of § 9-312(3) and (4) to leases, presumably
depending on the use of the leased goods.
62. Ayer, supra note 59, at 342-43. Ayer gained "new perceptions" at an invitational
symposium sponsored by the ALI-ABA Committee on Professional Education, held in New
York, February 17-18, 1983. See ALI-ABA Invitational Symposium, supra note 49. Ayer
endeavored to elaborate on the analysis and conclusions he advanced in an earlier article.
See Ayer, supra note 27 (arguing that there is no rational and consistent borderline between
true leases and sales); see also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
63 . Ayer, supra note 59, at 345-51.
64. !d. at 345.
65. !d.
66. My recollection is that this "penal effect" on the interest of a nonfiling lessor was
the subject of much discussion before and during the invitational symposium mentioned by
Ayer (for which I served as Planning Chairman and moderator of the plenary panel discussions). See supra 10te 62. Several proponents of a filing rule for leases were perplexed by
this analysis of the effect of nonfiling.
67 . Ayer, supra note 59, at 347-49. Ayer observed that the traditional notion that public notice rules are intended to address the problem of ostensible ownership does not
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Boss responded to Ayer. 68 She took quite seriously Ayer's concern with the effect of nonfiling under a rule requiring filing for
leases, an issue which she and Coogan did not treat in their thenrecent proposal. 69 She continued to defend the policy of requiring
filing for leases based on the ostensible ownership rationale. 70 She
argued that Ayer's concerns did not impugn the policy of a filing
requirement, but merely suggested that "the consequences of a
failure to file as currently formulated may impose disproportionate
penalties on the true lessor who fails to perfect. " 71 She concluded
that leases may justify "special treatment" for the effect of nonfiling and that if there were to be uniform treatment of a failure to
file for leases and secured transactions, "the entire scheme of consequences flowing from a failure to file would have to be
reexamined." 72 She did not propose, however, any resolution of
this issue or suggest any new priority scheme.
Baird and Jackson offer the most elaborate . argument in support of a rule requiring filing for leases of goods. 73 They argue for a
more general acceptance in the Code of the principle that if a nonpossessory interest is to be acquired or retained in property the
holder of the interest must "make it possible for others to discover
that interest," i.e., cure the problem of ostensible ownership. 74 A
conceptual cornerstone of their argument is that "metaphysical"
notions of the location of "title" and divisions of property rights
account for all cases under existing law. !d . at 348-49. Ayer concluded that his analysis may
have added only confusion, but he did take a "step forward" from earlier discussions of the
filing issue by identifying t he source of his confusion. Id. at 351.
68. Boss, supra note 26, at 381-86.
69. Coogan & Boss, supra note 53.
70. Boss, supra note 26, at 382-85. Boss explained that there should be a "de minimus" exception from a filing requirement when the risks posed by nonfiling will not exceed
the costs of imposing a filing requirement. !d. at 385 & nn.109-10. The de minimus exception might be based on the length of the lease term, the value of the goods, or the nature of
the goods (such as consumer goods). Id.
71. Id . at 385 (footnote omitted).
72. !d. at 386.
73. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10. Baird and Jackson do not limit their proposal
to leases, however. They argue that the filing requirement should logically be extended to
other separations of possession and ownership such as other bailments generally, subject to
exceptions. !d. at 186, 190-94. Various portions of this article dwell on the Baird and Jackson arguments, largely as a result of their elaborate and articulate analysis. The value of this
critique has benefited greatly from their work. Indeed, this critique relies materially on
other efforts by both Baird and Jackson writing together, separately, or with others.
74. !d. at 178.
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that may not be discovered easily by third parties, such as an unfiled lessor's interest in leased goods, impose costs on third
parties. 75 Whether the costs should be borne by such third parties
or by the holder of the property interest, such as by imposing a
filing requirement on lessors, Baird and Jackson argue, should depend on a cost-benefit analysis: "whether the duty to give notice
imposes costs without producing corresponding benefits." 76 The
determination should not turn on the characterization of the transaction as between the parties, since the costs imposed on third
parties are the same in each case. 77 Baird and Jackson recognize
that both the imposition of a filing requirement on a lessor and the
acquisition of information by a third party involve costs, but they
argue that the burden generally should be placed on the lessor because the lessor is the party who can solve the ostensible
ownership problem in the least costly way-i.e., by filing. 78
Although Baird and Jackson's cost-benefit analysis purports to
encompass third parties generally, their rationale and discussion
focuses primarily on costs to secured parties resulting from the secret interest of a lessor or bailor. They argue that the Article 9
filing system is more important to secured creditors than to unsecured creditors because secured creditors rely more on specific
property of a debtor. 79 The information provided by filing is especially important to secured creditors because of Article 9's general
75. Id. Baird and Jackson perce ive that these costs result from the possession by a
lessee-debtor of the property in question- the historical basis for the ostensible ownership
doctrine. Id. at 180.
76. I d. at 179, 186.
77. I d. at 186-90.
78. !d. at 188-89. Their proposal would merely extend the ex isting notice filing rules of
Article 9 to le ases and other bailments. Id . at 188-89 & n.46. The costs relating to filing and
searching public records are the only costs identified by Baird and Jackson. See id. at 18586.
79. Id . at 183-84. Baird and Jackson acknowledge that their argument " ultimately
rests on empirical assumptions about the need parties have for information and the ability
of a filing system to provide it cheaply." !d. at 183. Baird has furth er articulated the argument th at the Article 9 filing system serves mainly to sort out conflicting claims among
secu red creditors. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 64-66 (1983); see also Baird & Jackson, Informatio n, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property , 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984). Secured creditors, they argue, charge
lower interest rates because they rely on specific assets of a debtor rather than "solely on
the debtor's honesty and general financial health." Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 183.
Therefore, secured creditors desire reliable information as to competing claims against such
assets. !d. at 184. By redu cing risks for secured parties, the advantages of secured
credit-p rincipally, priority over un secured creditors-are enhanced. !d. at 189.
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priority rule of "first-in-time, first-in-right" 8 0 and "because of the
possibility of debtor misbehavior, it is undesirable to rely on the
debtor for information about claims to his own assets." 81 As to the
effect of a lessor's failure to file, Baird and Jackson offer little elaboration. Apparently they would allow a lessor who failed t o file , or
whose filing was in some way defective , t o be subject to the priority
rules of Article 9, Part 3. 82
Baird and Jackson, like most of the earlier proponents of a
lease filing rule, conclude that some leases and other bailments
should be excepted from the general filing rule. 83 They acknowledge that, in constructing and applying such exceptions, " one may
have t o balance the virtues of clear rules against those of flexible
standards as well as balance competing equities of two innocent
parties. " 84 Yet, they prefer such line-drawing, coupled with a pos80. Baird & Jackson, sup ra note 10, ::>.t 179, 185 ; see Baird, supra note 79, at 64- 65
(" The Code's filing system fo llows from its fir st -to-fi le rule .. . . [A]rticle 9's notice-fi ling
system meshes perfectly with its first-to-file rule. It cl early est ablishes t he pri ority of each
secured creditor and littl e else.").
81. Ba ird & Jackson, sup ra not e 10, at 179. But cf. Bai rd , supra not e 79, at 61 (" If
de btor misbehavior is a problem that notice fi ling is intend ed to cure, it is a bad rule.").
82. Baird & J ac kson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46 ("O ur proposal goes no furt her t han to
incorporate leases, bailm ents, an d the like into Article 9's fi ling rules and other thi rd -party
orie n te d rules ." (emphasis added )). Baird and J ackso n, however, have argued t hat a lessor
should be subject to a purchase money priority rule similar to the one in § 9-312(3), whi ch
would require notice to p rior- fi led claimants to over come t he generally applicable fi rst- tofile rul e. Id . at 194-96. Alth ough Baird and Jackson ex press doubt as to the wisd om of a
non -notice " purchase money" pri ority rule, such as t hat provided by § 9-312(4) , t hey d o
note that such a rule m igh t be j ustified "on aggregat e cost-reduction grounds- for example,
if reliance by earlier secured claimants were consid ered unlikely." ! d . at 196 (footnote om itted; see infra notes 296 -97.
83. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 190-94, 201. S uch exce pt ions should take into
account fac tors such as whether (i) " another legal regime," such as cert ificate of ti tle laws
fo r automobiles, " solves the oste nsible ownership problem ," id. at 190; (ii) propert y of ce rtain types is generally known not to be the property of the possessor (such as te lephone
equipm ent, in a previ ous era), id. at 191; (iii) certain possessors (such as pawn brokers ) are
generally known to possess propert y of oth ers, id.; (iv) a t ransfer of possession occurs fo r
such a short t ime, such as t he loan of a lawnmowe r to a ne ighbor , t hat t he cost of compli ance wit h a filin g rule wou ld be in effici ent, id . at 191-92; (v) a fil ing ru le wou ld be
inconsistent wi t h rul es of negotiability of certain property, such as in struments, id. at 192;
a nd (v i) automatic perfec t ion without fi ling, as in th e case of consumer good s, would be cost
effective, id . at 193 .
84.

Id. at 194 (foo tnote omitted ).
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sessiOn trigger, to attempts to determine Issues of ownership and
title. 85
An additional filing proposal deserves mention. In April 1985
the National Commercial Finance Association (NCF A) suggested
that the Article 2A drafting committee adopt a filing requirement
for leases. 86 Their rationale for requiring filing for leases, by and
large , is based on ostensible ownership concerns. 87 Their proposal
differs significantly from earlier proposals, however, in that the effect of nonfiling would be limited to providing priority to a priorfiled Article 9 secured party and then only to the extent of advances made by such secured party subsequent to the lessee's
receipt of possession of the leased goods. 88 Presumably, this limitation is intended to be a rough substitute for favoring only those
third parties who rely directly on the lessee's possession as evidence of ownership.
Most of the commentators mentioned above relied substantially on the ostensible or apparent ownership rationale as a
justification for adopting a filing rule for leases. None subjected
the factual assumptions underlying this notion to rigorous analysis.
Some also argued that a filing rule would reduce litigation over
whether a purported lease was a true lease or a secured transaction. Most of the commentators conceded that some leases, such as
"short term" and consumer leases, should be excluded from any
filing requirement. Most of the commentators also recognized that,
even with a filing rule for leases, the true lease-secured transaction
distinction still must be made for some purposes (principally, remedies and damages on a lessee's default). Of those who mentioned
85. Nevertheless, Baird and Jackson apparently would retain t he "thief rule," pursuant to which secured creditors and other purchasers rem ain subject to t he risk t hat t here is
a thief in the debtor's chain of title. I d. at 176 n.4.
86. Letter from Donald Schwartz to Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (Apr. 22, 1985) (enclosing
undated memorandum entitled Proposal for a Filing R equireme nt Under the Personal
Prop erty Leasing Act and draft proposed § 305(d) to the Uniform Personal Property Leas ing Act) (on file with the Alabama Law R eview).
87. "The basis for the proposal is that leases present at least t he same ostensible ownersh ip or secret lien dangers t hat liens or security interests do ." Id., memorandum , at 2.
88. ! d., draft § 305(d). Consumer goods and leases for terms of less than 21 days would
be excepted from the NCFA filing requirement. Moreover, lessors would be required to fi le
within 10 days after a lessee received possession of the leased goods-essentially t he same
rule as is now provided for purchase money security inte rests under§ 9-312(4). NCFA is a
trade assoc iation whose membership is comprised primarily of organizations that extend
secured credit.
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priorities and the effect of nonfiling, only Leary proposed a rule
that would differ from the existing Article 9 scheme, 89 although
Boss, as a result of Ayer's questions, acknowledged that a different
rule for leases and secured transactions might be appropriate. 90
But Leary, Boss, and Ayer did not consider priority rules and the
effect of nonfiling for leases beyond the immediate effect of subordination of the lessor to some creditors of and purchasers from the
lessee. 91
The commentary has not been uniformly supportive of a filing
requirement for leases. 92 At the time Article 2A was promulgated,
however, the literature contained no comprehensive response to
the arguments made . by proponents of such a filing requirement.
Baird and Jackson's important challenge, which bears repeating,
essentially remained unanswered: "[T]hose who question the usefulness of a filing requirement in the case of leases should explain
why there should be a filing requirement in the case of secured
transactions that are identical from the point of view of third
parties. " 93
In a recently published article, Maryellen Burns endeavors to
explain why a filing requirement should not be adopted for leases
89.

See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.

90.

See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.

91. See generally infra text accompanying note 134 (discussing effects of nonfiling after expiration of lease term) .
92. For example, Richard Speidel, Robert Summers, and James White reject as "outrageous" the notion that all nonpossessory owners of personal property should be required
to file in order to prevail as against creditors of the possessor. R. SPEIDEL, R. SuMMERS & J.
WHITE, CoMMERCIAL LAw, TEACHING MATERIALS 300 (4th ed. 1987). Interestingly, they derive
their position from the concept of ostensible ownership. In their view a lessee's possess ion of
equipment does not create expectations in third parties that the lessee is an owner, but a
bailee's possession of inventory does convey the appearan ce of ownership. !d. at 300-01; see
also White, Dancing on the Edge of Article 9, 91 CoMM. L.J. 385, 397 (1986). Jeffrey Helman
has argued that ostensible ownership concerns should be disregarded as vestiges of an obsolete doctrine and that a filing requirement for leases is, therefore, unnecessary. Helman,
supra note 16, at 2728. Edwin Huddleson also has argued in defense of the omiss ion of a
filing requirement in Article 2A. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 672-77. I, also, have questioned the need for a filing requirement for leases. See Mooney, Recent Cases R elating to
Equipment Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING 1983 (PLI) 74 (R. Bayer & A. Reisman co-chairmen) ("the benefits which might be achieved from a mandatory filing system for true leases
would not outweigh the detriments"); Mooney, Challenge, supra note 24, at 1626 (questioning the need for mandatory public noti ce requirement for leases of goods).
93. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46.

706

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

but is appropriate for secured transactions. 94 Burns argues, as have
others, that the doctrine of ostensible ownership has become obsolete.95 More persuasively, she also argues that the Article 9 filing
rules provide benefits, such as discouraging fraud and collusion, in
addition to curing problems of ostensible ownership. 96 These issues
are addressed in Part V of this article. 97 Burns fails, as have other
commentators, to appreciate the significant extent to which choices
as to priority rules bear on whether a filing rule for leases should
be adopted. 98
IV.

PRIORITY RuLES , INCLUDING THE EFFECTS oF NoNFILING:

CosTs

This Part addresses the priority rules, including the effects of
nonfiling, which might be applied under a regime which would
mandate filing for leases of goods. Legal rules which give one person's property to another, or which command compliance with
formalities such as fi ling as a condition to enforcing transfers and
divisions of property against third parties, should to be adopted
only if there are good reasons for doing so. 99 Various Code rules,
including the Article 9 perfection and priority provisions, produce
such results. 100 The proponents of a filing rule for leases generally
have assumed or concluded that the adoption of a filing rule would
expose the property rights of a noncomplying lessor of goods to
third party claims. Such risks of noncompliance represent costs
94. Burns, supra note 26. I obtained the Burns article after the initial draft of this
article had been submitted to the Alabama Law Review .
95. ld. at 428-29, 462. For reasons explai ned in Part VI.A.2., that argument is not an
adequate response to the issue posed by Baird and Jackson.
96. ld. at 443-67. However , her explanation of why a filing requirement for leases
would be less beneficial than filing under Article 9 is not persuasive. See infra note 265.
97. See infra Part V.A. to V.C.
98. Burns recognizes that one appropriate consideration is "the opportunity cost imposed on those who mistakenly fail to tile and lose their otherwise rightful interest in the
subject [leased] property." Burns, supra note 26, at 461. But she generally fails to incorporate such costs into her analysis.
99. See Gilmore, Th e Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 612 (1981) ("In a society that
recognizes property as something more t han theft, you do not go around lightly destroying
property rights; you must have a compelling reason for awarding A's property to C.") .
100. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403 , 9-301(1) & 9-312 (1987).
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that would be imposed on lessors by a filing requirement. 101 A filing requirement for leases probably would impose greater costs on
lessors, lessees, and third parties than the corresponding costs imposed on secured parties, debtors, and third parties by the existing
Article 9 perfection and priority regime. It is impossible to evaluate the wisdom of a filing requirement for leases without
considering the effects of compliance and noncompliance. 102
The following examples may aid the discussion. First, assume
that applicable law provides that a financing statement must be
filed in order to perfect a lessor's interest in the leased goods. Second, assume, as most of the commentators proposing a lease filing
requirement have proposed or assumed, that the Article 9 perfection and priority rules would be applied to leases as well as to
secured transactions, with leases treated as purchase money security interests for such purposes pursuant to section 9-312( 4). 103
101. The aggregate benefits might outweigh such costs, and the benefits provided by a
filing requirement for leases might be different in magnitude and quality than those provided by the Article 9 perfection and priority regime for secured transactions. The costs
imposed on the players by the existing regime for leases of goods (no filing requirement)
also are relevant. The possible similarities and differences in the benefits and the costs imposed under the existing regime are discussed in Parts V and VI.
102. Conclusions as to the wisdom or utility of a filing requirement under a scheme
where the only sanction for failing to file would be a ten dollar fine would be quite different
than a scheme where a lessor who failed to file would lose all its rights in the leased goods
and forfeit any right to claim damages from the lessee. Contract law provides an apt analogy. For example, whether the law provides a remedy will determine whether a promise will
be annointed with "contract" status. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 1 (1981)
(stating that" [a] contract is a promise ... for the breach of which the law gives a remedy").
Just as public notice of a lessor's interest in leased goods may be a good id ea as a gene ral
matter, observance by a promisor of its promises generally may be a good id ea. Yet, the law
does not enforce all promises. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. l, 2-6
(1979). The consideration of the costs to lessors of a filing scheme generally has been limited
to compliance costs associated with making filings, searching records, and the like. See, e.g.,
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 185-86. Obviously, a lessor could avoid the risk and costs
of noncompliance by complying (i.e., filing) , and general compliance, at least by professionals, is not an unreasonable expectation. But a filing rule for leases shifts the risk of
noncompliance from the lessee's creditors and purchasers to the lessor and its creditors and
purchasers. This additional risk to lessors is a cost of a filing rule that is in addition to
fi ling -related costs of com pliance. Measuring and balancing such costs against costs imposed
on a lessee's purchasers and creditors, however, are substantially more problematic than
merely identifying the existence and nature of such costs. See gen erally infra Part VI. Yet,
it is difficult to measure and balance anything unless it is first identified and taken into
account.
103. The proper purchase money priority provision also could be § 9-312 (:3), dealing
with purchase money security interests in inventory. Although leases of goods to lessees who
hold them for sale may be unusual, lessees who hold goods for lease (i.e., sublease) may be
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Example A 104
Lessor leases equipment to Lessee for a term of two years, at
which time Lessee is to redeliver the equipment to Lessor. The
value of the equipment at the beginning of the lease term is
1,100,000 dollars. A reasonable estimation of the value of the equipment at the end of two years is 800,000 dollars. Lessee is obligated
to pay rent in twenty-four monthly installments of 20,000 dollars
each, for a total of 480,000 dollars. For some reason, Lessor fails to
file a financing statement or files a defective statement. Six months
later, Lessee files a petition seeking relief as a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code. On that date the value of the equipment is
1,000,000 dollars.

What are the rights of Lessee's trustee in bankruptcy? 105 The
trustee in bankruptcy may exercise the rights and powers of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor .106 Those rights include the rights
of a lien creditor/ 07 and because Lessor's interest is unperfected,
the trustee's rights are superior to Lessor's interest in the equipment.108 Presumably, the trustee in bankruptcy may recover the
equipment valued at 1,000,000 dollars for the benefit of the unsecured creditors. 109
This result troubled Ayer and Boss.U 0 But Ayer concluded (or
assumed) that Lessor's unsecured claim in Lessee's bankruptcy
would be no more than the unpaid rentals under the leasing agreement-here, 360,000 dollars assuming six monthly payments had
more common. See U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1987) (defining "inventory" as "goods ... held by a
person who holds them for sale or lease") (emphasis added)).
104. Example A is similar to, and is intended to raise the issues raised by, Ayer's Example 1. See Ayer, supra note 59, at 345; see also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
105. The ramifications of nonperfection explored here would be the same whether or
not a trustee in bankruptcy were appointed. For example, under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor in possession could utilize the avoidance powers of a trustee in
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code § 1107(a).
106. Bankruptcy Code § 544(a).
107. See U.C.C. § 9-301(:3) (1987) (defining "lien creditor").
108. Id. § 9-301(l)(b).
109. If the example were varied by assuming a prior-filed and perfected secured lender
to the lessee, the secured lender also would have priority over the lessor to the extent of the
secured loans. !d. § 9-312(5)(a). The trustee in bankruptcy, then, would be entitled to any
excess value of the equipment over the secured lender's secured claim. See Bankruptcy
Code § 506(a).
llO. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72.
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been made prior to bankrupcty. 111 Ayer's conclusion is incorrect.
Lessee is in breach of a fundamental obligation under the
lease-namely, the obligation to return the equipment at the end
of the term or earlier in the event of Lessee's default. If the equipment has been "appropriated" for the payment of Lessee's other
creditors, then Lessor should recover damages, which, presumably,
would include an amount approximately equal to the present value
of the anticipated residual value of the equipment. 112 In order to
111.
This case differs from most of the bankruptcy cases because the [lessor's] claim does
not correspond to the value of the property. In this example, no one ever intended
that the [lessee] make payments approximating the value of the widget. To give the
palm to the trustee here is certainly to award him a bonanza of some sort.
I confess that I am not sure how the law should deal with this case.
Ayer, supra note 59 , at 345.
112. SeeR. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 11.7, at 282-84, § 11.9, at 30002 (3d ed. 1975); J. STORY, supra note 21, § 414, at 374-75. The statement in the text is
somewhat incomplete and oversimplified. Applying the damages rules of Article 2A, Lessor
would be entitled to recover, upon Lessee's default, the present value of future rentals less
the market rental value of the equipment for the remainder of the term. U.C.C. § 2A-528(1)
(1987). Nothing in existing law or Article 2A, however, should prevent Lessor from recovering, in addition, damages for Lessee's failure to return the leased equipment. See id. § 2A 525 comment para. 3 (explaining that Article 2A does not displace the common law of bail ment in regard to, inter alia, "refusal of the lessee to return goods to the lessor after
termination or cancellation of the lease"). Presumably, Lessor's damage claim for loss of its
residual would be approximately equal to the present value of $800,000.
The Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the State Bar of California is concerned
about Article 2A's statutory silence on this point. That comm it tee has made a preliminary
recommendation that Article 2A be changed to make it clear that the lessor's damage recovery for the lessee's failure to return leased goods includes the value of the lessor's
anticipated post-lease residual interest. REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE COMMITTEE OF THE BUSINESS LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ON PROPOSED
CALIFORNIA CoMMERCIAL CoDE DIVISION 10 (ARTICLE 2A), PRELIMINARY DiscussiON DRAFT 5859 (Apr. 7, 1987). That report recommends the addition of a new § 2A-532 to provide as
follows:
In addition to any other recovery permitted by this article , the lessor shall be
entitled to recover from the lessee an amount that will fully compensate the lessor for
any loss of or damage to the lessor's residual interest in the goods caused by the
default of the lessee.
!d. at 59; see also Rapson, supra note 35, at 895 n.67. Similar concerns have been rai~ed in
connection with draft personal property security legislation in British Columbia, which, like
the Saskatchewan law, would treat certain leases as secured transactions for purposes of
perfection and priority. See Draft British Columbia Personal Property Security Act§§ 1, 21
(quoted in letter from Ronald Cuming to Charles W. Moon ey, Jr. (Oct. 7, 1987) (on file with
Alabama Law Reuiew)).
Where the interest of a iessor . . . is subordinated to a trustee in bankruptcy . . . the
lessor ... is deemed as against the lessee ... to have suffered ... damages in an
amount equal to

l
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avoid a trial on the issue of damages, the leasing contract might
well contain a liquidated damages provision covering Lessee's failure to redeliver the equipment. 113
The foregoing example and discussion illustrate several important points. Lessor has lost its residual interest in the goods, 114
even though the residual interest never was transferred to Lessee
and Lessee never agreed to pay for it. 115 An Article 9 secured party
has no residual interest to lose in the event of its failure to perfect.
However, this comparison, standing alone, does not show that the
costs imposed on unperfected lessors necessarily would be greater
than the costs imposed on unperfected secured parties. An unperfected secured party also stands to lose a property
interest-namely, a security interest with a value equal to the
lesser of the value of the collateral and the amount of the secured
obligation. Moreover, in Example A Lessor lost its residual interest
(valued at the present value of 800,000 dollars), but received a
claim, albeit unsecured, against Lessee of an approximately equal
amount. 116 This simple arithmetic suggests that the unperfected
lessor and an unperfected secured party stand to suffer equally.
But the problem is not so simple. "Simple arithmetic" notwith(a) the value of the leased . . . goods at the date of bankruptcy, and
(b) the amount of loss resulting from the termination of the lease .. ..
!d . § 21; see supra note 40. The issue of the amount and nature of an unperfected lessor's
claim does not appear to have been the subject of any reported case under the Saskatchewan or South Carolina filing provisions . .See generally supra note 40.
A policy argument could be made, in support of Ayer's conclusion as to the amount of a
lessor's claim, that the lessor should bear the risk of nonfiling or defective filing because the
lessor is in the best position to avoid such errors. That argument is not persuasive. First, it
would result in a substantial windfall to lessees and their creditors. Second, its premise
would, in many cases, be false . For example, the filing might be defective as a result of the
lessee's wrongful or negligent removal of the equipment to another jurisdiction or the
lessee's change in its own location. See U. C. C. § 9-103(1)(d)(i) & (3)(e) (1987). Third, to the
extent that custom is of any guidance, the risk of non perfection, as between a debtor and a
secured party, normally is borne contract'-1ally by a debtor as a result of representations and
warranties and events of default contained in conventional documentation.
113. See , e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-504 & Cumment (1987).
114. A priority rule could be fashioned to provide that an unperfected lessor's residual
interest is not subject to third party clain!s. Under such a rule, third party claims would be
confined to the lessee's property interest-----the use value during the term. This possibility is
discussed infra at notes 136-38 and acco:rnpanying text.
115. Lessor transfered to Lessee only the right to use the equipment for two years. At
the inception of the transaction , Lessee's \Jse rights were valued by Lessor and Lessee at the
present value of $480,000 payable over hvo years in equal monthly installments.
116. See supra note 112.
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standing, an unperfected lessor may be exposed to greater costs
arising out of the loss of its residual value than that incurred by an
unperfected secured party. In order to understand why, it is necessary to consider the differences between leases and secured
transactions in the commercial context of the transactions. 117
It is fair to assume that a principal goal of lenders, whether
secured or unsecured, is that debtors satisfy their obligations. 118
Viewed in this context, security interests are merely incidental to
the obligations secured. If the obligation is satisfied, the corresponding security interest is terminated.
Since a creditor's primary desire is to be paid or otherwise satisfied, it might be useful to ask why creditors sometimes are not
paid. Although I am not aware of any empirical study precisely on
point, it is probable that the failure of secured creditors to obtain
their intended priority with respect to collateral would rank quite
low on any list of such reasons. 119 Stated differently, creditors normally do not view recovery from the debtor's collateral as their
117. There may be normative concerns about the fairness of the potential elimination
of lessor's property rights beyond the property rights transferred to lessee (i. e., lessee's
leasehold interest). Cf. Ayer, supra note 59, at 342-43; Boss, supra note 26, at 382-87; supra
notes 62-72 and accompanying text. Ultimately, such arguments that any particular effect of
lesso r noncompliance would be a sanction that " does not fit the crime," that is "penal," or
that otherwise is "unfair" are merely claims that the disparity is too great between the
sanction imposed and the benefits provided by a filing requirement. It is more useful to
fo cus on the relative costs and benefits.
118. Creditors also may desire to engage in profitable repeat business with debtors and
to observe norms essential to maintenance of their status in the community. For a discussion of the Article 9 coverage of transactions that do not secure obligations in the
conventional sense, such as a consignment deemed a "sale or return" and a sale of accounts
or chattel paper, see generally infra Part V.C.
The following discussion depends on the assumption in the text and several other assumptions based on literature dealing with the credit process and the author's personal
observations and experience.
119. See Phillips, supra note 16, at 6:
[W]hat [a secured creditor] wants is repayment of the debt, not ownership of [the
debtor's) assets. A "security interest" may be viewed as a property right, but its function is understood by the participants to be limited; the aim is to salvage more for
this creditor in the event [the debtor's] enterprise fails.
!d . (footnotes omitted). Phillips cites statistics (from Bankruptcy Act Revision, Hearings on
H.R. 31 and H .R. 32, before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, No. 27, Pt. 1) demonstrating that secured
creditors often recover less than their secured claims in bankruptcy proceedings. ld . at n .26.
The point is that even perfected secured creditors often, perhaps usually, fail to fully recover the amount of their claims when a debtor is financially distressed .
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principal "way out. " 12 ° Collateral is only one of many factors affecting whether secured creditors decide to extend credit and
whether secured obligations will be repaid. 121
To be sure, contemporary equipment leases normally involve
substantial elements of credit extension. A lessor expects and
desires payment of the rentals, and particularly in the case of a
long-term lease, the credit analysis undertaken and the other decision-making behavior of lessors may bear substantial similarities to
that of lenders generally. 122 But some important differences exist.
A lessor expects to keep one foot outside of the credit market. As
an investor in and owner of the equipment, a lessor 's interest, unlike a security interest, is not measured by the amount of credit
extended. An analysis of the economic substance of leases makes
this clear. The value of the lessor 's residual interest in the leased
120. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH & J. HoNNOLD, Co MMERCIAL LAw 774 (4th ed . 1985):
A lawyer who t hinks t hat the securi ty device is the most important pa rt of a credit
t ransaction will be qui ckl y correct ed by a banker or m erchant. F ro m the point of view
of seller or lender, the most important safeguard for the loan is the lik elihood t hat
t he borrower will voluntarily repay. Evaluation of this likelihood calls for mature
judgment of the borrower's character , ability and financi al sta t us , and of the b usi ness
outlook. R ecourse t o the most ironclad security is sure t o be cos tly .. .. F oreclosing on
securi ty indeed involves a serious breakdown of t he lending opera ti on, whi ch depe nds
for profi t on a rapid and routine fl ow of mon ey in and out th roug h t he hands of
cl erks.
S ee also Scot t, su pra not e 11, at 944-49.
121. See, e. g., Bryan, The Bank er and th e Cre d it Decisio n, in BA!'l K CREDIT 2-4 (H .
Prochnow ed. 1981) (discussing " the t hree C's of credi t .. . char acter , capac ity a nd capital " ).
There is much to say in favor of legal rules which force players t o confront the actual transactiona l risks that t hey face in any given context. F or exa m ple, it is not necessarily cos t
effective to insulate creditors from risks of debtor misbehavior and dishonesty, such as attempts t o deceive creditors as t o the nature of a deb tor -lessee's in te rest in eq uipment.
Gilm ore made a similar point in connecti on wit h his cr iticism of t he Code's re peal of the
rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S . 353 (1 925). H e stated :
The fi n ancing assignee, who serves a usefu l fun ction in provid in g working -cap it al
loans , is not an ign orant stranger. H e is in a positi on to fin d out-and , before p utt ing
up his money , does fi nd out-all t here is to know a bout t he ope rations of his borrowers. He has a close and continuing relati onship with t hem. He ca n , if he chooses,
require t he strictest accoun t ing from them. H e d oes not need to be ins ula ted , as a
matter of law, fr om t he ris ks of th e t ransactions in which t hey engage . Beca use he can
inves t iga te , supervise , and cont ro l, he should be encouraged to do so and penalized if
he has not done so.
Gilmore, su p ra not e 99, at 627.
122. See Ahlstrom & Bole, E co nom ics of Leueraged Leas ing, in EQU IPMENT LEASIN G- LEVERA GED LEASING, supra note 3, at 627, 645-47; Bayer, Equip ment Lease
Doc umentati on Hand book , in EQ UIP MENT LEASING 1985 (PLI ) 79-8 1 (R. Bayer & C. Moon ey
co-chairmen) .
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goods normally will exceed the amount of the lessee 's rental obligations.123 A lessor, then, does not rely on the lessee 's satisfaction of
its obligations as the lessor's "way out. " 124 A lessor necessarily relies on the leased equipment itself to be made whole for its
investment. This may be contrasted with a typical secured creditor
that expects to receive satisfaction from t he disposition of the
debtor's collateral as a last resort. Viewed ex ante, the effects of
nonperfection for lessors, therefore, would be more costly than for
secured creditors because lessors rely more on the leased equipment. 125 This disparity in costs of noncompliance would exist even
123. Since the sticks in the bundle representing the entire value of the equipment are
comprised of the use value during the lease term plus the residual value at the expiration of
the lease, the market value of equipment at any point in time during th e lease term necessa rily would exceed the use value. It follows that a lessor's interest, assuming it could recover
possession of the equipment free of the lessee's interest as in the case of a default, would
normally exceed the amount of a lessee's obligations to pay rent under the lease, assuming
also that the lease rental obligations approximate the market value of the use of the equipment during the lease term. Circumstances such as the destruction of uninsured leased
equipment, obsolescence, or depreciation at a more than the anticipated rate could affect
the actual value of equipment.
124. A lessee's contingent obligation to respond in damages in the event the goods are
not returned to the lessor, however, would approximate the entire value of the goods. See
supra note 112 and accompanying text. But the central point here is that the nature of the
bargain and the expectations of a lessee and a lessor are that the obli gation of the lessee for
failure to return the goods would normally arise only in the event of a contingen cy such as a
casualty loss, which can be insured against. A lessor's "way out" necessarily involves recovery from its residual interest in the leased goods.
In response, it can be argued that the imposition of a filing rul e would mean that a
lessor could continue to rely on its residual interest in the goods to be made whole only by
being exposed to risks of noncompliance. Stated otherwise, the legal rule would change the
expectations of the lessor. Imposing such risks would impose costs on lessors. Experience
with secured transactions indicates that if a filing requirement were imposed for leases,
some percentage of leases necessarily would involve the failure to file or defective filings .
The risk of noncompliance may be substantial even fo r professionals. See Baird & Jackson,
supra note 79, at 312 ("Defective filings ... are an everyday affair when at issue are security
interests in personal property .... ");see also Harris, The In teraction of Articles 6 and 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpreta tion, 39 VAND. L. REv. 179, 212-13, 220 (1986); Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REv. 725, 734 n.26, 764 n.ll7 (1984). Such noncompliance losses thus incurred by
lessors as a class would represent costs imposed on lessors as a direct result of the filing
requirement. And because reliance on the goods generally is more significant to lessors than
to secured creditors, such costs would be greater for lessors.
125. This increased noncompliance pain (i. e., cost) to lessors might be compared to
the pleasure (i.e., benefit) experienced by a secured creditor who becomes senior as a resu lt
of lessor noncompliance. Assume the situation in which a secured party claiming a security
interest in all existing and after -acquired equipment of a debtor-lessee and an eq uipm ent
lessor which inadvertently fails to file or files in t he wrong filing office. If a debtor -lessee
default were to occur, the secured party would be pieased to discover that it could look to
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as between a lessor and a secured purchase money seller of equipment, the closest Article 9 analogue of an equipment lessor. 126
The foregoing discussion of lessor costs does not suggest that
the "metaphysical" distinction between a true lease and a secured
transaction necessarily affects the costs imposed on third parties,
such as a lessee's creditors and purchasers, as a result of ostensible
ownership concerns. The location of title or ownership alone
should not drive the consideration of the wisdom of public notice
requirements for various types of transactions or relationships. 127
Example A illustrates another category of costs that would result from a lease filing requirement that incorporates the Article 9
priority rules. Recall that Lessor will be entitled to a claim against
Lessee for damages arising out of Lessor's loss of its residual interest in the leased goods. 128 Lessor's property rights would be cut off
by the trustee in bankruptcy, but Lessor's contract rights would
not be. This distinguishes the treatment of a lease from that of a
secured transaction, even if the the same perfection and priority
rules are applied to each. The total amount of a lessor's claim will
vary depending on whether a lessor's interest is perfected. The tothe leased equipm ent as a possible source of recovery. But secured creditors often do not
rely on the collateral as the principal source of repayment and normally do not expect any
default t o occur. The lessor, however, relies on the existence of the res idual value of the
equipment as an essential component of its recovery of its investment. In other words, the
value placed on the equipment by the lessor exceeds that placed on the same equipment by
the secured creditor; the lessor's pain outweighs the secured creditor's pleasure. Posner cites
Holmes for a similar point in a different context.
Oliver W endall Holmes long ago suggested an interesting economic explanation for
adverse possession. Over time, a person becomes attached to property that he regards
as his own, and the deprivation of the property would be wrenching. Over the same
time, a person loses attachment to property that he regards as no longer his own, and
the restoration of the property would cause only moderate pleasure. This is a point
about diminishing marginal utility of income.

R. PosNER,

LAw§ 3.10, at 70 (3d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (citing
Holmes, Th e Path of th e Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897)).
EcoNOMI C ANALYSIS OF

126. This statement depends on the accuracy of the assumptions made about the nature of credit extensions. Douglas Baird has obse rved correctly that the case for a filing
requirement may be stronger for some secured transactions than others and that the costs
and benefi ts of a filing requirement for leases must be compared with those of the filing
requirement for purchase money sec urity interests. Letter from Douglas Baird to Charles W.
Mooney, k (Dec. 30, 1987) (on file with the Alabama Law R eview ).
127. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 179-79, 186.
128. See supra note 112.
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tal amount of the claim of a secured party, however, would be the
same whether or not the secured party's interest were perfected. 129
It follows that if an "unperfected" lease were avoided, a determination of the amount of a lessor's damages for failure to return
the leased goods would be necessary; such a determination would
not be necessary in the case of an unperfected secured transaction.
The necessity of this determination, whether provided for in the
leasing agreement or made the subject of post-default negotiation
or litigation, imposes costs on a lessor and a lessee. Moreover, the
only way that the parties and a court will know whether this determination is necessary is by first determining whether the transaction involved is a lease or a secured transaction. 130
Example A suggests still other costs which would be imposed
on lessees. By forcing the appropriation of Lessor's property rights
in order to satisfy other claims against Lessee, at once a new,
greater obligation of Lessee has surfaced. Presumably, Lessee did
not desire or intend to obligate itself to pay for the entire value of
the equipment. Rather, it only desired and intended to "purchase"
a portion of the value: the right to use the equipment for two
years. Thus, Lessee has been forced to incur a debt that it otherwise would not have incurred. 131 In response, one might argue that
the increase in Lessee's debt, resulting from Lessor's damage claim
on account of its loss of the residual value, normally would be offset by a corresponding increase in Lessee's estate or reduction of
debt owed to another creditor. But this often may not be the case.
The amount of Lessor's claim, under the leasing agreement and
129. A security interest also can secure a contingent obligation, but security interests
granted in connection with extensions of credit normally secure liquidated obligations.
130. Several proponents of a lease filing rule have recognized that this determination
also involves costs and have touted a filing rule for the very reason that it would reduce
costly determinations of the lease-security interest issue. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra
note 10, at 200; Coogan & Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[ 4][a], at 4.3-45; Coogan, su pra note
32, at 1047 & n.61; Hawkland, supra note 46, at 114; Peden, supra note 46, at 1.58; Note,
supra note 46, at 1006; see also Ziegel, The New Canadian Personal Property S ec urity
Legislation, 1986 LLOYD's MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 160, 173.
131. This conclusion might not follow if the lessee is conceptualized as voluntarily assuming a contingent obligation to pay damages in the event of nonp erfection . The statement
in the text assumes that the lessee desires only to purchase and pay for the temporary use of
the equipment and to incur additional obligations only in the event of a casualty loss (which
normally can be insured against) or the lessee's voluntary actions. Whether the policy rationale for a lease filing rule justifies imposing this addition al nonperfection risk on the
lessee is, of course, a subject of this article. The point here is that the exposure of the lessee
to additional obligations as a result of nonperfection is a factor, and a cost, to be considered.
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applicable law, may exceed the amount actually realized from the
equipment. 132 For example, assume the existence of a prior-filed
secured party who has the benefit of an after-acquired property
clause. The secured party's disposition of the equipment may produce less than the amount of Lessor's damage claim against
Lessee. It is likely that the amount recovered by a lien creditor,
who sells at a sheriff's sale outside of bankruptcy, would produce
even less than a sale by a secured party, who sells m a commercially reasonable manner.' 33

Example B
Assume the same facts and assumptions as in Example A, except that Lessee completed all payments under the lease and did
not file a bankruptcy petition. At all pertinent times there existed a
perfected secured lender (SP 1 ) to Lessee. SP 1 's security agreement
contained an after-acquired property clause that covered all equipment acquired by Lessee at any time. Lessee did not default and, at
the expiration of the lease, the equipment was turned over to Lessor. Lessor then sold the equipment to B 1 , a wholesaler, and B 1
resold the equipment to B 2 • B 2 borrowed the purchase price from
SP 2 and granted a security interest in the equipment to SP 2 • SP 2
properly and timely perfected by filing. Two years later, Lessee defaulted on its obligations to SP 1 • SP 1 then learned of the earlier
lease, traced the equipment, and sued B 1 for conversion, B 2 for conversion and possession of the equipment, and SP 2 for a
determination of the priority of SP /s security interest.

What result? SP 1 probably will prevail in all of its claims, but
may receive only one satisfaction. Under the Article 9 perfection
and priority rules, SP 1 's security interest in the equipment "continues . . . notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
132. This lessee cost is not pronounced in the case of avoidance and disposition by a
lessee 's trustee in bankruptcy. Because on ly a fracti on of a lessor's unsecured claim normally would be paid in a bankruptcy proceeding, a lessee 's estate (and the gen eral creditors)
still would be better off after avoiding the unperfected lease even if a lessor's claim exceeded
the amount actually recovered from the eq uipment by the estate.
133. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987) (requiring secu red party's disposition of collateral
after default to be made in a commercially reasonable manner). T he procedures for jud icial
sales by judgment creditors generally do not afford a judgment debtor with such procedural
protections designed to enhance the sales pri ce. S ee, e.g., N.Y CIV. PRAC. LAw § 5233 (McKinney 1978) (providing for sale at public auction and posting of notice or adve rti sement at
least six days prior to sale).
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thereof unless the disposition was authorized by [SP 1 ] in the security agreement or otherwise." 134
Bu B 2 , and SP 2 could have protected themselves by investigating the past history of the equipment, determining that at some
point it had been leased to Lessee, searching the records for filings
against Lessee, and discovering SP /s filed financing statement.
Each transferor, including Lessor, could have produced documentation demonstrating its acquisition of the equipment, but Lessor's
documentation would not have affirmatively demonstrated a negative-the absence of any lease at any time. Under existing law,
without a filing rule for leases, SP 1 's security interest would have
attached only to Lessee's leasehold interest, and upon expiration of
the lease, SP 1 's security interest also would have expired.
Example B illustrates that a filing requirement for leases
probably would impose greater costs on third parties than the costs
imposed on those parties by the existing Article 9 regime in the
same context. Assuming no third party had asserted prior rights,
134. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987). The mere expiration of the lease and the delivery of the
equipment to lessor may not constitute a disposition . Cf. In re Jermoo's Inc., 38 Bankr. 197
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (termination of franchise agreements pursuant to terms of agreements not a "transfer" under Bankruptcy Code§§ 101(50) (then§ 101(40)), 548). But cf. In
re Queen City Grain, Inc., 51 Bankr. 722 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (termination of lease by
lessor for lessee's default is a "transfer" under Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(50) (then §
101(40)), 548); In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (termination of lease by
lessor for lessee's breach of covenant is a " transfer" under Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(30) , 67d, 11
U.S.C. §§ 1(30), 107(d) (1898) (repealed 1978)). The absence of a disposition would not help
Lessor 's cause in any event. Absent a disposition, there is nothing in Article 9 which would
give rise to any claim that SP 1 's security interest became ineffective. Lessor 's taking possession of the equipment following expiration of the lease would have perfected its interest if §
9-305 were applied. But, since Lessor's interest was not perfected at the time that Lessee
received possession of the equipment or within ten days thereafter, Lessor would not
achieve priority over SP 1 under the purchase money priority rule of either§ 9-312(3) or (4) .
SP 2 might argue that it is prior to SP 1 by operation of the§ 9-312(4) purchase money priority rule, or the facts of Example B could be changed by positing that SP 2 claims under an
after-acquired property clause and that SP 2 filed against B 2 earlier than SP 1 filed against
Lessee. SP 2 might then argue that it is prior pursuant to the § 9-312(5)(a) first-to-file rule.
SP 2 should not prevail in either case, although a literal reading of the cited priority provisions would seem to favor SP 2 • Barkley Clark has explained correctly that the first-to-file
rule "presupposes only a single debtor ." B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE~ 3.8[4], 353 -54 (1980 & Supp. 1987). B 2 purchased
the equipment subject to SP 1 's security interest and there is no basis for SP 2 to acquire
greater rights in the equipment than SP.'s debtor , B 2 , acquired. See id. ~ 3.8 (4], at 54 ("The
principle of limited ownership might well be read into § 9-312 as a supplementary principle
of law via § 1-103."); se e also Harris, supra note 124, at 225 & n.l 82 (generally agreeing
with Clark's conclusion).
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upon expiration of a lease a lessor, even if unperfected, could recover the goods and place them in the stream of commerce. Upon
satisfaction of a debtor's obligations to an unperfected secured
party, however, the goods would remain with the debtor. Under a
filing scheme for leases incorporating the Article 9 perfection and
priority rules, "negotiability" of the equipment in Example B
would be diminished after the expiration of the lease. A filing rule
designed to provide information for Lessee's purchasers and creditors would serve to create additional, long-term clouds on an
unperfected Lessor's title to the potential detriment of Lessor's
purchasers and creditors. 135
In the foregoing discussion of costs that would result from the
adoption of a filing rule for leases, the applicability of the Article 9
priority rules was assumed. Some of these costs could be reduced
by varying the priority rules to fit the special case of leasing. One
possible variance would serve to reduce the additional lessor costs
arising out of lessor reliance on the residual interest. 136 The adjusted priority rule might provide that an unperfected lessor's
residual interest would not be subject to claims of lien creditors of
and purchasers, including secured creditors, from the lessee. The
lessor's unperfected interest, then, would result in an unsecured
claim of the lessor for rentals and other damages attributable to
the lease term only. This approach would be problematic in several
respects. First, it would introduce substantial complexity both in
formulation and operation. 137 Second, even if a conceptually neat
135. This result might suggest a weakness in Article 9 rather than a reason for not
imposing a filing requirement or. leases. Arguably, Article 9 should require secured parties
to be more diligent when filings become seriously misleading. See U.C. C. § 9-402(7) (1987)
(refiling required only for collateral acquired more than four months after change results in
seriously misleading financing statement; refi ling not required when collateral transferred by
debtor). See generally Burke, The Duty To R efile Under Section 9-402(7) of the Revised
Artil e 9, 35 Bu s. LAw. 1083 (1980).
136. See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text.
137. Assume a lessee of equipment is in default under an unperfected lease and rights
prior to those of the lessor are asserted by either the lessee 's trustee in bankruptcy or a
secu red cred itor of the lessee. The trustee or secured creditor may desire to dispose of the
leased goods. The rule might permit the disposition of only the lessee's leasehold interest,
but that interest might not be marketable as a practical matter. Or, the rule might permit
disposition of all intere sts in the goods accompanied by a vnluation and division of proceeds
between the trustee or secur ed creditor (proceeds attributable to the lease hold interest) and
the lessor (proceeds attributable to the resi dual interest) .
Next assume that the lessee is a debtor in possession in a case brought under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor may desire to continue to use the equipment during
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rule were to be devised, it would not be fully protective of a lessor's residual interest to the extent that a lessor, upon a lessee's
default, would be deprived of its ability to claim the benefit of its
residual interest prior to the end of the lease term. 138 Third, such a
priority rule would not be responsive to the principal rationale that
most proponents of a lease filing requirement have relied upon: ostensible ownership. If the purpose of a lease filing requirement is
perceived to be the elimination of misleading appearances, a priority rule that permits third parties to recover less than the full
value of the goods and respects a lessor's "secret" residual interest
would not be strictly faithful to that goal. Notwit hstanding these
deficiencies, such a priority rule might be a useful compromise.
The third party costs illustrated by Example B could be addressed by requiring a creditor of or a purchaser from a lessee to
assert its rights in the leased goods against an unperfected lessor
prior to the expiration of the lease term. Again, such a rule would
introduce complexity 1 39 and would not be fully responsive to ostensible ownership concerns.
One possible modification to the Article 9 priority scheme relates to another cost. The cost of a filing requirement for leases
would be most harsh in the case of amateur, casual, nonprofessional lessors. Filing might be required only for leases by
the lease term. Presumably, t he debtor could do so without making any rental payments
because the lessor is merely an unsecured creditor for purposes of its claim for rents. And,
presumably, the lessor would be treated as an owner or secured creditor as to its residual
interest. It is un ciear, however, how application of this priority rule (or even the Article 9
perfection and priority rules, if applied to leases) would mesh with Bankruptcy Code § 365
in the case of a lessee bankruptcy. Section 365 provides a framework for the assumption or
rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases. If the unperfected lessor's interest
were avoid ed pursu ant to § 544 (a), would the lease nevertheless be treated as a lease for
purposes of§ 365? Could t he trustee in bankruptcy use or dispose of t he leased goods without assuming the lease pursuant to § ::165? Would § 365 overr id e § 544(a)? Cf. In re Air
Vermont, Inc., 761 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1985) (unperfected sec ured creditor held entitl ed to
protection of Bankruptcy Code § 1110 notwithstanding otherwise applicable avoidance
power under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)). But cf. In re Bazen. 425 F. Supp. 1184 (D.S.C.
1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1978) (lessor's interest not avoidable under Bankruptcy Act § 70, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1898) (repealed 1978), because lessor comp lied with
recording requirement of South Carol ina bailment statute).
138. T his result might occ ur if' a lessee-debtor in possession sought to retain use of the
leased goods during the lease term. S ee supra note 137.
139. For example, such a rule would necessar ily have to deal with what constitutes
"assertion."
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"professional" lessors. 140 Essentially, the Article 9 rules are
designed for use by professional creditors. 141 Perhaps Article 9 secured transactions involving nonprofessional secured parties are
quite rare, with the possible exception of possessory pledges. Extending these rules to casual, nonroutine leasing transactions
entered into by nonprofessionals, who are unfamiliar with the rules
and who might not be expected to obtain advice of counsel, could
impose unreasonable and substantial risks and costs on such
lessors. 142
Priority rules applicable to a lease filing requirement also
might be varied from the Article 9 rules by narrowing and refining
the class of beneficiaries to those who warrant special protection. 143
This approach would reduce the additional costs that a filing requirement would create by restricting the circumstances in which a
third party could assert priority. The NCFA proposal provides an
example. 144 That proposal would eliminate the possibility of a su140. This is the approach taken in Saskatchewan, where the filing requirement for
leases does not apply to "a lease transaction involving a lessor which is not regularly engaged in the business of leasing goods." SASK. STAT. 1979-80, ch. P-6.1, § 2(y); se e supra note
40; cf. Leary, supra note 25, at 1061 & n.2 (proposed filing requirement limited t o "finance
leases") .
141. This is, no doubt, what the Article 9 drafters had in mind when only sales of
certain kinds of receivables, accounts and chattel paper, were included within the scope of
Article 9. S ee 1 G. GILMORE , supra note 23, § 10.5, at 309; infra note 330.
142. It may be that such casual leases are frequent occurrences, even if not usual for
any particular lessor. The burden of complying with Article 9's public notice requirements
might impose substantially greater costs for nonprofessionals than the costs imposed on
professional extenders of credit presently affected by the rules.
14 3. Se e, e.g. , Peden, supra note 46, at 155-58 (explaining that the Article 9 perfection
rules are "designed to protect" the persons who obtain priority over unperfected security
interests- i.e., the sanctions flowing from nonperfection reflect the persons intended to be
prot ected by perfection) ; cf. U.C. C. § 7-404 (May 1949 Draft) (certain good faith buyers of
leased equipment, but not lessee's creditors, take fr ee of interest of equipment lessor who
fails to comply with "sign posting" requirem ent).
144. S ee supra text accompanying notes 86-88. The "pure notice" priority rule proposed by Leary would be a more modest variation fr om the existing Article 9 scheme. S ee
su pra text accompanying notes 55-56. Sanctions for nonfiling or defective filin g might be
de vised that would not involve defeating the lessor 's property rights , such as civil or criminal fi nes for lessors. Or, similar sanctions on lessees who deceive creditors or purchasers
concerning the status of leased goods could be constructed. Cf. Baird, su p ra note 79, at 61 ;
Helman, supra note 16, at 31. The sanctions might even be so mild as merely shifting, in all
cases, the burden of persuasion to an unperfected lessor as to the true lease character of the
transaction. However, it is generally assumed in this article that the sanctions which would
be imposed for noncompliance with a filin g requirement for leases would impair a lessor's
property rights as against some class of beneficiari es.
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perior claim by a lien creditor or trustee in bankruptcy and would
expose a lessor's interest only to certain secured parties.
The Code itself provides other possible analogues for priority
rules that might accompany a filing requirement for leases. One is
the rule of section 2-403(1) which permits a good faith purchaser
for value to obtain "good title" to goods purchased from a transferor having only "voidable title" to the goods. 145 Such a purchaser
need not be a buyer in ordinary course of business, 146 but often
may be a reliance party that expects the goods to be free of unknown, conflicting avoidance claims. 147 Unsecured creditors,
including lien creditors, do not benefit directly from the voidable
title rule of section 2-403(1). 148
145. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1987). A buyer obtains voidable title when, for example, he
buys goods and induces the sale by fraud. S ee generally R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 9.6, at
197-202; J. VAINES, PERSON AL PROPERTY 170-72 (4th ed. 1967); 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note
23, § 348, at 348-50; Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
LJ. 1057, 1059-60 (1954); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform
Comm ercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 475-78 (1963).
146. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business").
147. A purchase r who is a buyer normally will be aware that the purchase is being
made, and a buyer's reliance, by virtue of the voidable title rule of§ 2-403(1), presumably
will include an element of reliance on the absence of any "secret" avoidance claims held by
the seller's predecessors in interest. But the degree of reliance by a purchaser will depend on
the context. A secured creditor of a debtor holding voidable title to goods is a "purchaser"
that may benefit from the § 2-403(1) rule, even if the secured creditor is claiming under an
after-acquired property clause in circumstances where the secured creditor has no subjective
awareness of the particular goods in question. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1987) (defining
"purchase"); id. § 1-201(33) (defining "purchaser"); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Mills Oil Co.,
717 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wyoming Nat'! Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (lOth
Cir. 1974); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P .2d
354 (1974) (en bane ); Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, 236 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1975). Any
"reliance" by such a secured creditor might be only a general expectation as to rights to be
obtained in after-acq uired collateral.
In the absence of the voidable title rule, disgruntled sellers might be encouraged to cry
"fraud " in the face of conflicting claims of good faith purchasers, thereby creating difficult
factual issues and, perhaps, facilitating straw grasping, strike suits, and even perjury. However, in priority contests between lessors and good faith purchasers from lessees, it is likely
that lessors generally would possess more verifiable and concrete evidence (i.e., the leasing
contract) that would demonstrate that the lessee obtained the goods under a lease rather
than as a buyer.
148. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32) (1987) (defining "purchase"); id. § 1-201(33) (defining
"purchaser"); id. § 2-403(1) (one with voidable title can transfer good title to good faith
purchase r for value). Because the interest in property obtained by a lien creditor does not
arise out of a voluntary transaction (at least on the part of the debtor-transferor), a lien
creditor is not a purchaser. !d.; see id. § 9-301(3) (defining " lien creditor"); see also Mazer v.
Williams Bros., 337 A.2d 559 (Pa. 1975).
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Another potential analogue is provided by the entrustment
rule of section 2-403(2). An "entrusting of possession of goods to a
merchant who deals in goods of that kind" empowers the merchant
"to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course
of business." 149 The beneficiaries of section 2-403(2) represent a
still more limited class-buyers in ordinary course of business-than the beneficiaries of the voidable title rule of section 2403(1) or the beneficiaries of nonperfection under the Article 9
rules.
A consideration and comparison of these analogues may reveal
which, if any, might offer an appropriate model for the effect of
nonperfection under a filing rule for leases. Although the spectrum
presented by the Article 9 rules, the voidable title rule and the
entrustment rule reveals an increasingly narrowing universe of
beneficiaries, the impact and significance of the interests that are
cut off by third parties, and the consequences to the party that is
deprived of its interest, reveal an opposite pattern. 150 It also appears that the progression from the Article 9 rules to the voidable
title rule to the entrustment rule illustrates an increasingly significant role of possession of goods. 151
149. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) & (3) (1987). See generally R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 9.7, at
202-06; Leary & Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. REv. 50 (1981).
150. The unperfected secured creditor loses only its collateral in the context of a
credit transaction in which the collateral often may not be the primary anticipated source of
repayment. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text. Although the transferor of a
voidable title loses its rights in the goods as against a good faith purchaser for value from
the transferee , such a transferor nevertheless intends to sell the goods to the transferee and,
presumably, often delivers to the transferee the goods together with documentary evidence
of such transferee's acquisition of title. Such transferors normally do not expect to retain
any interest in the goods after the transfer is consummated. Moreover, the entruster to a
merchant loses its rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business even though it contemplated only a temporary bailment for safekeeping, repair, or the like and, presumably,
provides the merchant with no documentary evidence of title.
151. The unperfected secured creditor, who has not filed , taken possession of the
goods, or notified a third party bailee of its security interest, see U.C.C. § 9-305 (1987), will
be subordinated to third parties whether or not the debtor is in possession of the goods.
Although the transferee of a voidable title will not necessarily be in possession of goods and
the good faith purchaser from such a transferee need not take possession in order to benefit
from the rule of § 2-403(1) (delivery of goods is not an essential element of a "purchase"
under § 1-201(32)), the transferee of the voidable title usually would be in possession of the
goods and the good faith purchaser who is a buyer usually would take possession. Cf. id. § 9301(1)(c). Finally, the applicability of the entrustment rule of§ 2-403(2) depends entirely on
the possession entrusted to a merchant.
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It is true that no filing regime is provided under current law to
protect the defrauded seller from the holder of voidable title or the
entruster from the merchant dealer. Yet, there is no reason why
the drafters of a filing requirement for leases could not consider
these non-Article 9 property rules in the context of determining
the appropriate beneficiaries of such a filing requirement. A comparison of these priority rules (the Article 9 rules, the section 2403(1) voidable title rule, and the section 2-403(2) entrustment
rule) suggests an important point: The different protected classes
or beneficiaries of these rules and the different circumstances in
which the rules operate indicate an attempt to adjust the results
(i.e., subordinating or cutting off the rights of one party in favor of
another party) to the particular circumstances and contexts involved. u;z Whether analyzed in terminology and by methodology
intended to estimate costs and benefits or efficiency, to determine
which of two innocent parties is best situated to withstand or protect against the risks, or to allocate risks based on normative
notions of fairness, such rules reflect an effort to match the sanctions with the circumstances. This crucial exercise has been given
scant attention by the proponents of a filing rule for leases. 153 The
mere demonstration that a filing requirement for leases of goods
would be useful does not necessarily lead to the conclusion or as152. Baird and Jackson have argued that the first-in-time principle should not be
modified to incorporate an actual reliance standard. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 79, at
318-20. Yet, they apparently believe that reliance by a protected class is a central component of an appropriate priority rule, even if it is not applied on a case-by-case basis. See
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 208 n.96. The protected cla.ss that would benefit from
lessor nonperfection might be limited to those who would norm ally be expe cted to rely on
the absence of public notice and/or a lessee's possession of goods. See generally Dolan, Th e
UC.C. Framework: Conveya ncing Principles and Property Int erests, 59 B.U.L. REv. 811
(1979) (discussing the Code as a "single construct resting on four basic property interests
and three basic conveyancing principles").
153. Any such consideration must take into acco unt the relationship between the desired function of a filing rule and the parties that vmuld benefit from compliance or
noncompliance as well as the costs and benefits arising out of its application. Baird and
Jackson have art iculated the point well in the context of consider ing what separations of
ownership and possession should be excluded from a filing requirement: "As in other commercial law problems, one may have to balance the virtues of clear rules against those of
flexible standards as well as balance competing equities of two innocent parties." Baird &
Jackson, supra note 10, at 194. It is not sufficient to stop with a considerat ion of candidates
for exclusion from the rule. The effects of nonfiling in transactions subject to a filing rule
also must be considered.

724

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

sumption that the Article 9 priority rules would be equally
appropriate for leases.
Finally, any perceived virtues of tailoring priority rules to the
particular context of leasing transactions should be balanced
against the inherent costs of special rules for leases. Some commentators have argued that requiring filing for leases would reduce
the need to grapple with the troublesome true lease-security interest issue. 154 To the extent that special priority rules for leases,
whether perfected or unperfected, were adopted, this goal would be
undercut. For example, if the NCF A proposaP~>~> were adopted, a
trustee in bankruptcy would remain motivated to attempt to characterize a lease as a secured transaction whenever the equipment is
not completely encumbered by a valid, prior security interest. ~>
More generally, in many cases it would be necessary to make the
true lease-security interest determination in order to know which
priority rule would apply. 167
The discussion in this Part provides some of the responses to
the challenge posed by Baird and Jackson-that critics of a filing
rule for leases ought to explain why filing nevertheless should be
imposed for secured transactions. ~> Depending on the applicable
priority rules, there may be costs imposed by a filing requirement
for leases that are of a different character and that exceed those
which result in the case of secured transactions. It is not sufficient
simply to note t hat in each case there is a separation of possession
and property rights. However, other important distinctions lie not
in the relative costs, but in the relative benefits.
1

1

6

8

154. See supra note 130.
155. Se e supra notes 86-88, 144.
156. Unless t he putative lease were so recast, the trustee could not recover the "equity" in the leased goods under the NCFA proposal, which would provide only a limited
benefit for certain secured creditors.
157. Although the examples deal with nonfiling or defective filing, the structure of a
priority scheme dealing with proper fi lings also could undercut the goal of simplification if
the ru les applied to leases differed from those applied to security interest. Moreover, even if
the Article 9 priority rules, without change, were applied to a lease filing requirement, the
true lease-security interest issue would not go away. See supra note 130 and accompanying
text (necessity of true lease- security interest characterization for purposes of determining
amount of unperfected lessor's claim). The true lease-security interest distinction also would
continue to play a role in many other contexts unrelated to perfection and priority. See
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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"OsTENSIBLE OwNERSHIP" AND THE ARTICLE

9

FILING REGIME

This Part of the article explains t hat a filing requirement for
leases would provide smaller and fewer benefits than are provided
by the filing requirements of the Article 9 perfection and priority
regime. It addresses some history and endeavors to explain some of
the mystery and expose some of the myths surrounding the doctrine of ostensible ownership and the Article 9 filing rules.
Subpart A explains that t he historical development of chattel
security public notice systems and the doctrine of ostensible ownership provide little, if any, support for the imposition of a filing
requirement for leases of goods. Subpart B explains that the benefits of the Article 9 filing rules are not limit ed to curing problems
of ostensible ownership. Rather, filing under Article 9 enhances the
benefits of secured credit by providing readily available information necessary to the ordering of priorities, generally on a first-intime basis. Filing provides this information in a manner that is less
costly than other alternatives and is verifiable and certain as to
time, thus discouraging fraud and collusion. These functions of filing are less significant, and therefore provide less benefit, in the
case of leases. Subpart C explains why the existing p ublic notice
requirements for certain non-security transactions-consignments
and sales of accounts and chattel paper-are not apt analogues for
imposing a filing requirement on leases. Finally, Subpart D addresses the special case of sale-leaseback transactions.
A.

Hi story, M y stery , and M y th

Proponents of a filing requirement for leases consistently have
relied on the doctrine of ostensible ownership as t he principal policy justification for such a rule. 1 5 9 When a lessor puts a lessee in
possession 160 of goods, the argument goes, t he lessee's possession
creates the appearance of ownership by the lessee and may mislead
159. See generally supra P ar t III.
160. What const it utes possession for purposes of any part icular legal rule is, itself, a
di ffic ult enoug h issue. See, e.g., 1 G. GI LMORE , supra note 23, § 14.2 , at 440-4 1; Shartel,
M ea nings of Possess ion , 16 MINN L. REv. 611 (1932); T ay, T he Co ncept of Possession in t he
Com mon Law: Fo undat ions for a New A ppro ach, 4 M ELB. U.L. REv 476 (1 964 ); Thayer,
Possess ion and Own ership, 23 L AW Q. R Ev. 175 (1907 ); T hayer , Possession, 18 HARV. L. REv.
196 (1905 ). For present purposes, it is assumed that possession is somethi ng u pon which all
would agree.
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third party creditors and purchasers, including secured creditors.
Therefore, the lessor should be required to cure this ostensible
ownership problem by giving notice (i.e., filing) of its otherwise secret interest at the pain of having its interest subordinated to a
third party upon failure to file. The proponents either explicitly or
implicitly have assumed or argued that the same policy justification underlies the filing and other perfection and priority rules of
Article 9 and also underlay the development of pre-Code chattel
security law. This Subpart explores some flaws in these arguments.
1. Some history: Fraud and filing.-The development of chattel security devices, including related public notice requirements,
does not clearly reflect an engine fueled by an underlying policy of
curing perceived problems of ostensible ownership. An adequate
explication and critique of these historical developments would require, at the least, another article. It is sufficient here to
demonstrate only that the "history" reflects an essentially ambivalent, inconsistent approach and is not likely to offer a clear signal
as to the wisdom of adopting a filing requirement for leases. 161
The common thread running through the development of
chattel security law was a pervasive judicial and legislative concern
about fraud. This fraud concern is separable from the ostensible
ownership concern that possession of personal property begets misleading appearances of ownership upon which creditors and
purchasers may rely. Unfortunately, the failure of many courts and
commentators to make this distinction has led to much confusion
and mystery. For example, the so-called "vendor-in-possession"
doctrine, epitomized by the celebrated Twyne's Case/ 62 often has
161. This is not to say that the history is irrelevant or that it does not offer valuable
insight as well as support for arguments on both sides of the issue. The value of such insight
woul d depend on the " history" to be considered and the intensity of the study. For a criticism of most legal scholarship because of its failure to come to grips with critical
historicism, see Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981). The
following brief glan ce at the history succumbs to much of Gordon's critique. It mentions
mostly reported judicial decisions and legal commentary and omits consideration of other
evidence wh ich might bear on the relevant social conditions or contexts. S ee id. at 1034-35
& n.65. Other comm entators who have addressed the issue of a filing requirement for leases
are vu lnerable to the same criticism.
162. 3 Coke 80b , 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601). The case was based on the Statute
of 13 Elizabeth which provided that transfers with the "intent[] to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors and others" were void , provided for recovery of the "whole value of ... goods and
chattels" transfered, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties (such as creditors) ,
and provided for criminal sanctions against the parties to the transfer. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
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been associated closely with the development of chattel security
law generally, including the evolution of systems of public filing or
recordation. 163 The rule, as it has developed, may be stated simply
to require that when A transfers an interest in A's property which
is in A's possession, but A nevertheless retains possession of the
property, the transfer is, or is presumed to be, fraudulent and void
as against A's creditors and purchasers. 164 Curiously, Twyne's Case
often is accepted as a principal source of the doctrine of ostensible
ownership. 165 As others have pointed out, Twyne's Case was a
criminal action involving imputed fraud, not ostensible ownership.166 Although the transfer was made "pending the writ" 167 of
The statute was intended in large part as a revenue measure. 1 G. Gu::·m, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940). It has been observed that
Twyne 's Case, "inextricably mixed though it may be with Lord Coke's gloss, has become
practically a part of the statute itself." A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, A TREATISE ON SECRET LIENS
AND REPUTED OwNERSHIP 3 (1910).
163. See, e.g., 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 2.1, at 24-25, § 2.5, at 40-41, § 14.1, at
438-39, § 15.1, at 462-63; see also G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 350-53, at 609-11; 2 L. JoNES,
supra note 23, §§ 324-26, at 10-13. English law took a more direct approach. The English
Bills of Sale Acts sought to avoid disputes as to fraudulent intentions of vendors who remained in possession by requiring public recordation of outright sales as well as security
sales (i.e., mortgages) . See Diamond, Hire-Purcha se Agreements as Bills of Sale (pt. 1), 23
Moo. L. REv. 399 (1960).
164. The statement in the text fails to consider various issues considered by courts
and legislatures over the years, such as the effect of goods being in the possession of a third
party bailee rather than the transferor, and whether subsequent creditors are enti tled to
benefit from the rule. For an excellent modern treatment of the "vendor-in-possess ion" doctrine, see 1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 341-63, at 591-624; see also A. ELKUS & G. GLENN,
supra note 162, §§ 1-118, at 1-85; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, §§ 351-404, at 364-502;
Coogan, supra note 24, § 4A.07A[1], at 4A-182 to -192.
165.
The thesis of the statute [of 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5] ... is that the possession of property
is a good indication of ownership . . . . Twy ne's case judicially established the
proposition.
As the possession of property is, to the judicial mind a fair indication of its ownership, it is equally true, as a proposition founded upon human experience, that the
possession of property presumptively begets credit.
A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 6, 9, at 3, 5 (footnote omitted).
166. See Dolan, supra note 16, at 30-33 (arguing that rule of Twyne's Case grounded
in fraud rather than ostensible ownership concerns); see also Clark, The Duties of a Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 514 (1977) (Twyne's Case may be
characterized as one "which involved actual, detrimental deception"); Dolan, supra note
152, at 819 ("Twyne itself rests not on ostensible ownership reasoning , but rather applies
absent any showing of reliance. Twyne protects the concept of conveyancing by refusing to
divorce it completely from notions of possession or seisin."). Twyne, the transferee , was
convicted because there was found to exist an intent "to delay, hinder or defraud cred itors."
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another creditor of Pierce, the transferor who remained in possession, that creditor in no way was misled by the transfer and
Pierce's continued possession. 168 The court simply did not believe
that the transfer was legitimate and executed in good faith. 169
Some of the confusion and imprecision surrounding the nexus
between ostensible ownership concerns and antifraud concerns in
the context of the vendor-in-possession doctrine is traceable to the
"reputed ownership" provision, which was enacted as part of the
English bankruptcy law. 170 Garrard Glenn explained that the relationship between the reputed ownership doctrine, which never was
widely adopted by statute in the United States, and the avoidance
of fraudulent conveyances based on the vendor-in-possession doctrine, is grounded in estoppel. 171 Yet, some examples of how the
vendor-in-possession doctrine was applied by the courts indicate
that the doctrine's relation to notions of reputed (i.e., ostensible)
ownership is not as direct as Glenn perceived. First, in a majority
of the states the effect of a seller's retention of possession is merely
3 Coke at S2a, 76 Eng. Rep. at S16. Indeed, the transfer in question was made to Twyne in
satisfaction of a valid claim of Twyne against Pierce, the transferor, "pending the writ" of
another creditor. 3 Coke at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at S11. Pierce's retention of the property
transferred was only one of six badges of fraud relied upon by the court. That the transfer
was made "in secret" and was "general" appeared to be of no less concern to the court than
Pierce's retention of possession. 3 Coke at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at S10-11.
167. 3 Coke at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at S11.
16S. The same can be said of an early and important case adopting the rule of
Twyne's Case in the United States. Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1812).
169. Steven Harris, noting the generality of the transfer condemned by the court, has
made the point to the author as follows: "The court simply refused to believe that Pierce
had transferred his underwear to Twyne." Telephone interview with Steven Harris, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law (June 22, 1987).
170. 21 Jac. I, ch. 19, § 11 (1623). That provision, carried forward in later enactments,
provided generally that goods in the possession of a bankrupt would be available for the
satisfaction of creditors' claims. The reputed ownership rule never was a part of the English
Companies Acts which govern most business insolvencies. Moreover, the most recent version
of the English reputed ownership provision, § 38(2)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1914, has
been repealed by the Insolvency Act 1985, on the basis that the doctrine has become obsolete. 2 Eliz., ch. 65, § 235(3), sched. 10, pt. III ( 1985); see A Revised Framework for
Insolvency Law, 1984, Cmnd. No. 9175, at 40: Insolvency Law and Practice, 19S2, Cmnd.
No. 855S, at 248-50. For a discussion of the relationship of the reputed ownership and
fraudulent conveyance aspects of the vendor-in-possession doctrine, see 1 G. GLENN, supra
note 162, §§ 344-63, at 602-24.
171. 1 G GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 346-48, at 606-07. Thus, present creditors may
forbear from pursuing their claims and subsequent creditors may extend credit "on the faith
of the vendor's apparent ownership." ld. § 347, at 606; see also A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, supra
note 162, § 12, at 8-9 (quoting Todd v. Nelson, 109 N.Y . 316, 327, 16 N.E. 360, 364 (1S88)).
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evidence of, or creates only a rebuttable presumption of, fraud. 172
Where an inference of fraud can be satisfactorily explained away,
the retention of possession is not fraudulent even though the ostensible ownership concerns would be the same in either case.
Second, it generally was held that a vendee, who takes possession
of the goods prior to the time the goods are seized by legal process
instituted by a creditor, will prevail over the creditor. Insofar as
the vendor-in-possession doctrine is based on notions of reputed
ownership, Glenn conceded that "[t]he logic of the rule breaks
down" at this point. 173 Finally, the vendor-in-possession doctrine
was applied in cases in which the goods were not in the possession
of the vendor but, rather, were in the possession of a third party
bailee, with the requirement that the vendee notify the bailee in
order to defeat subsequently levying creditors. 174 Again, this rule,
or exception, is less than faithful to the ostensible ownership
rationale.
172. Writing in 1980, Coogan found only five states in which a seller's retention of
possession was fraudulent per se. Coogan, supra note 24, § 4A.07A[1][a][i), at 4A-184 to
-185. One of the states he identified, Oklahoma, repealed its vendor-in-possession statute in
1986 when it enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6
(West 1987) (repealed 1986); see also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 351, 354, at 609-12; 2
L. JONES, supra note 23, §§ 320-21, at 6-8. That a vendor's retention of possession of goods
is merely evidence of fraud which can be overcome by evidence of good faith has been the
law in England for many years. See Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Ad. 498, 110 Eng. Rep. 180
(1832). The Code overrides the vendor-in-possession doctrine only to a limited extent and
otherwise leaves non-Code law intact. See U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1987) ("retention of possession
in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable
time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent"); id. § 2A-308(1) (similar rule); id. § 2A308(3) (seller-lessee's retention of possession in sale, for value and in good faith, to buyerlessor in sale-leaseback transaction not fraudulent).
173. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 349, at 607. Glenn strongly criticized this rule:
This result seems wholly illogical. ... These subsequent creditors should be entitled to the benefit of the rule of reputed ownership ...
Nor is there much logic in the reasoning by which the courts attempt to justify
their rule .... [I]t is a real sale, but it is tainted, from the beginning, by the fact that
the vendee does not take possession. Thus the ostensible ownership, which is misleading to creditors. How that can be cured by a last minute snatch on the buyer's part, is
quite beyond the writer.
Id. at 608-09 (footnotes omitted). Responses to Glenn's criticism are that the ultimate delivery by the vendor to the vendee is some evidence of the existence of good faith all along
(i.e., possession would not be delivered if a transaction were a sham) and, further, when the
absence of fraud is established, the reputed ownership concerns must give way.
174. !d. § 358, at 615-16. In the case of a bailee that had issued a non-negotiable
document of title, the rule was codified in § 34 of the Uniform Sales Act. UNIF. SALES AcT, §
34, 1 U.L.A. 402 (1906) (superseded). Section 7 -504(2) now contains a similar rule. See
U.C.C. § 7-504(2) (1987).

730

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

The common law courts traditionally viewed a transfer for security purposes, such as a mortgage, as merely one species of sale
which could be subjected to scrutiny under the vendor-in-possession doctrine. Claw v. Woods ~ illustrates an early attempt to
create a nonpossessory chattel mortgage. 176 In that case, a mortgage of all of a tanner's equipment and inventory was held
"fraudulent and void" where the debtor was to remain in possession, in the absence of default, pursuant to the terms of the
mortgage. 177 In so ruling, the court recognized the perceived risks
imposed on creditors by virtue of the debtor's continued appearance of ownership. 178 The debtor's retention of possession and the
concurrent appearance of ownership, however, was only a part of
the court's rationale for ruling as it did. 179 The court was concerned, in the main, with the potential for such a transaction to be
used as a means of deception and as a means to effectuate dishonest purposes. 180 The concern was fraud, actual or potential, and not
17

175. 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).
176. Chattel mortgages eventually were legitimated in the United States by statutes,
enacted in most states during the nineteenth century, that generally required public filing or
recordation as a condition to validation. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 2.1-.2, at 25-26.
The common law pledge was not so burdened by the fraud concerns because an essential
component of the pledge was the bailment (i.e., delivery) of the pledged property to the
pledgee, which reduced both the fraud and ostensible ownership concerns. See, e.g., J.
STORY, supra note 21, §§ 286, 297, at 265-66; see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 14.4, at
445-49 (discussing "equitable pledge"). For discussions of the distinction between the pledge
and the chattel mortgage at common law, see 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 1.1, at 5-91; L.
JoNES, supra note 23, § 4, at 10-12.
177. Claw, 5 Serg. & Rawle. at 288. The court relied on the rule of the Statute of 13
Elizabeth. Id. at 278, 288. See generally supra note 162.
178. "In every case where possession is not given, the parties must leave nothing unperformed, within the compass of their power, to secure third persons from the
consequences of the apparent ownership of the vendor." Claw, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 282 (Gibson, J.) (emphasis in original). "There is no way of coming at the knowledge of who is the
owner of goods, but by seeing in whose possession they are." Id. at 284 (Duncan, J.).
179. Much emphasis also was placed on the absence of any attempt to do what was
possible to effect a delivery of possession to the mortgagee, such as a symbolic delivery, id.
at 281-82 (Gibson, J.); id. at 284-86 (Duncan, J.); the generality of the conveyance of all of
the debtors stock in trade, including the failure to include a specific inventory, id. at 282
(Gibson, J.); id. at 286-87 (Duncan, J.); and the absence of any good reason, aside from the
parties' convenience, for the debtor's retention of possession, id. at 279, 281-82 (Gibson, J.J;
id. at 285 (Duncan, J.).
180. Id. at 282 (Gibson, J.) ("I do not suppose the parties had in fact a fraudulent
view, but as such a transaction might be turned to a dishonest use, it was their duty, as far
as in their power, to secure the public against it."). It is interesting that the court appeared
to bless an alternative structure whereby the mortgagee would have purchased the goods at
the outset and leased them to the mortgagor:
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merely an estoppel-like reliance on the debtor's ostensible
ownership. 181
The common law treatment of the conditional sale, unlike that
afforded the chattel mortgage, demonstrated tolerance for the separation of possession and ownership. 182 At common law, the
conditional seller's rights in the goods generally were held to be
valid as against creditors of and purchasers from the conditional
buyer in possession. 183 That result is difficult to reconcile with the
notion that the common law abhored "secret liens" and sought to
protect third parties from the risks of misleading appearances. 184
The object of the parties might have been attained without any (at least with less)
risque to the public, by the landlord himself becoming the purchw;er in the first instance, and permitting the tenant to have the use of the property: in which case, the
transaction would have been a safe and fair one; and that course should have been
pursued.
!d. at 280 (Gibson, J.). Baird and Jackson suggest that perhaps "Justice Gibson, in 1819,
could imagine a world without nonpossessory security interests, but he could not imagine a
world without personal property leases." D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON. SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 30 (2d ed. 1987). Their suggestion is plausible, although we will never
know exactly what kind of world Justice Gibson might have imagined. It is clear enough,
however, that because the outward appearances would be the same in the case of either the
lease or the mortgage approach, what was perceived as "fair" and "safe," as opposed to a
"fraud," turned on some considerations other than mere concern for the possessor's ostensible ownership. Had the possessor first acquired possession as a bailee (i.e., lessee), no issue
of converting assets available to creditors into assets unavailable to creditors ever would
have arisen. The appearance would have been the same, but the potential for defrauding
creditors out of something to which they were otherwise entitled would not have existed.
181. This judicial hostility and mistrust of nonpossessory chattel security arrangements was not particularly slowed by the enactment of the chattel mortgage statutes,
notwithstanding provisions for public filing in those statutes. S'ee supra note 176. The
courts generally construed the statutes as strictly as possible against the mortgagees; chattel
mortgages continued to be viewed as fraudulent conveyances. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note
23, § 2.2, at 26-27. The unfriendly reception by the courts was exemplified as well by the
failure of many courts to give effect to after-acquired property provisions, especially those
arrangements which left a debtor free to deal with its mortgaged stock in trade. See generally id. §§ 2.3-2.6, at 27-47.
182. The conditional sale was an arrangement that evolved into a financing device in
which the conditional seller of goods retained (reserved) title until the conditional buyer
paid the purchase price, notwithstanding delivery of the goods to the conditional buyer. For
discussions of the development of the conditional sale in theory and practice, see generally 1
G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 3.1-3.3, at 62-73; 2 G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 506a-515, at
869-91; 3 L. JoNES, supra note 23, §§ 900-08, at 1-14.
183. 3 L. JONES, supra note 23, § 1004, at 107; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, §§ 324,
326, at 265-68, 270-73.
184. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.2, at 67 (" [T]he result achieved by conditional sale theory ran directly counter to one of the most firmly rooted doctrines of the
common law: the protection of creditors against undisclosed interests in property.").
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Yet, from the standpoint of concerns arising from the risk of fraud,
such as that involved in Twyne's Case/ 85 an obvious factual distinction appears: the conditional sale involved a delivery of goods
to the conditional buyer, rather than a transfer by an existing
owner in possession not accompanied by a delivery. 186 During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the conditional
sale emerged in the United States as an important secured financing device, a majority of the states responded legislatively by
enacting conditional sale acts. 187 These statutes generally required
some form of public filing or recordation as a condition to a conditional seller's priority over good faith purchasers from and, in most
cases, creditors of a conditional buyer .188
185. 3 Coke SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601).
186. Glenn severely criticized the minority rule championed by Pennsylvania courts
which subordinated a conditional seller's rights to those of a conditional buyer's creditors
based on the reasoning of Twyne's Case as applied in mortgage cases such as Clow v.
Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). See, e.g., Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Rawle 214
(Pa. 1826). Glenn stated:
The mistake lies in the idea that the conditional sale is really a sale with a condition
subsequent, whereas in truth there is no sale at all, but merely a contract to sell. The
fact that this contract is accompanied by a bailment for use cannot make out a case
of reputed ownership unless we are to say that every bailment is void against creditors of the bailee. No court in its senses ever said that.
2 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 509, at 876. Glenn concluded that the Pennsylvania courts
were misled by the English Reputed Ownership provision (discussed supra note 168) which
generally was not embraced in the United States. Id. at 874; see also Harkness v. Russell,
118 U.S. 663 (1886) (canvassing United States authorities and discussing inapplicability, in
most, of reputed ownership doctrine derived from English bankruptcy law). Ironically,
Pennsylvania courts accepted the "bailment lease," a surrogate for the conditional sale
which was functionally and economically indistinguishible, although no public filing or recordation requirements were applicable to bailment leases. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23,
§ 3.6, at 77 -78; 2 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 509, at 875-76; Montgomery, The Pennsylvania Bailment Lease, 79 U PA. L. REv. 920 (1931).
187. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.2, at 67-68; 3 L. JoNES, supra note 23, § 1004, at
107-08.
188. See, e.g., UNIF. CoNDITIONAL SALES AcT § 5, 2 U.L.A. 6-9 (1918) (superseded). It
has generally been accepted that the principal motivation for such public notice requirements was the protection of innocent purchasers and creditors from reliance on the
conditional buyer's apparent ownership. See UNIF. CoNDITIONAL SALES AcT § 5 Commissioners' Note, 2 U.L.A. 7 (1918) (superseded) ("To prevent injury to innocent persons who may
rely on the buyer's apparent ownership, it seems desirable to insert this filing requirement
in the Uniform Act. The burden on the seller is slight, and the benefit to the public is
great."); see also 3 L. JoNES, supra note 23, § 1004, at 107. But Gilmore's observation best
captures this development: "Now that the conditional sale was being used as a security
device, it should be treated like a security device. That is to say, it should be treated like a
chattel mortgage." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.3, at 68.

I
(
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Judicial concerns about fraud were not limited to security devices relating to goods, such as chattel mortgages and conditional
sales. Benedict v. Ratner 189 exemplified judicial hostility to security devices and the continued significance of fraud (unrelated to
ostensible ownership concerns). Benedict involved a financing arrangement whereunder a debtor-assignor assigned its present and
future accounts receivable to a lender-assignee to secure advances
made by the lender-assignee. 190 The account debtors were not notified of the assignment, and the debtor-assignor was permitted to
use collections of proceeds of the receivables in the usual course of
its business without accounting for the collections to the lenderassignee.191 Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, held
the arrangement to be "fraudulent in law and void" under New
York law. 192 According to the Court, this result was dictated by the
failure of the lender-assignee to reserve and exercise dominion over
the assigned accounts consistent with an assignment. 193 The fraudulent nature of allowing the debtor unfettered and unpoliced
dominion over its receivables was considered to be inherent, as it
had been viewed in decisions relating to chattel mortgages covering
a debtor's stock in trade. 194 The opinion expressly eschewed reliance on the concept of ostensible ownership. 195 Certainly, the fraud
In England a different tack was taken. The Factors Act, 1889, was interpreted to permit
innocent good faith purchasers to obtain good title from a conditional buyer. Factors Act,
1889, 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 45, § 9; see Lee v. Butler, 2 Q.B. 318 (1893). The hire-purchase
transaction, which was not subjected to the rule of the Factors Act, thus emerged as the
English functional equivalent of the conditional sale which flourished in the United States.
See Helby v. Matthews , 1895 A.C . 471 (P.C.). See generally R. GooDE & J . ZIEGEL, HIREPuRCHASE AND CoNDITIONAL SALE 9-11 (1965); A. GuEST, THE LAw OF HIRE PuRCHASE 15-16
(1966).
189. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
190. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 357-58.
191. Jd. at 359. The eventual emergence of " non-notification" accounts receivable financing was influenced by Benedict, which was d ecided prior to the widespread use of such
financin g. See gen erally 1 G. GILMORE , supra note 23, cbs. 7 & 8.
192. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 360.
193. I d. at 361-64.
194. Jd. at 362-63; see Gilmore, supra note 99, at 622-23 (criticizing the Co urt's application of authorities relating to chattel mortgages on stock in trade to the assignment of
receivables).
195. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 262-63.
[I]t is not true that the rule .. . is either based upon or delimited by th e doctrine of
oste nsible ownership. It rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession retained, but upon a lack of own ership because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a
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concerns involving inherently unobservable intangibles were unrelated to misleading appearances, or ostensible ownership.
The legislative approach to accounts receivable financing
demonstrated most clearly that the purpose of public notice (i.e.,
filing) requirements was not limited to the ostensible ownership rationale. During the 1940s and 1950s most states enacted accounts
receivable statutes. 196 Notwithstanding much controversy and debate, eventually most of these statutes required public notice by
filing as a condition for protection against subsequent assignees
and creditors of the assignor. 197 But, it could not be clearer that
the doctrine of ostensible ownership was not applicable to inherently unobservable intangibles. Other benefits, or the elimination
of other perceived evils, were at the root of arguments in favor of a
filing requirement for assignments of these intangibles. Gilmore attributes the eventual adoption of such filing requirements to the
reassertion of "the traditional bias in favor of publicity and against
'secret liens.' " 198
presumption of fraud. It imputes fraud conslusively because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien.
!d.; see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.4, at 262 ("[I]t was entirely clear that 'secrecy'
was not a determinitive factor in the case.").
Although the rule of Benedict was widely followed and non-notification receivables
financers apparently learned to live with it, it was rejected by Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-205
comment 1 (1987); see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.5, at 265-71. Gilmore later
criticized the approach taken in Article 9 and defended the policy justifications (if not the
jurisprudential approach) for the result in Benedict. Gilmore, supra note 99, at 625-27.
196. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.6, at 271. See generally id. § 8.6-8.8, at 27486. The principal impetus for such enactment was the decision of the Supreme Court in
Corn Exch. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), which, in the absence of
such curative statutes, left non-notification accounts financing vulnerable in bankruptcy
proceedings of a debtor-assignor under the common law of most states. See 1 G. GILMORE,
supra note 23, § 8.6, at 271-74. The holding of Klauder exposed non-notification accounts
financing to invalidation as a voidable preference under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act which,
at the time, deemed a transfer to occur at the time it was so far perfected so as to be
superior to a good faith purchaser from the assignor-debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1898) (repealed 1950). Thus, the assignments were vulnerable in states which adhered to the rule
that a subsequent assignee would take priority over a previous assignee who had not notified
the account debtor of the assignment.
197. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 274-76. For an argument that public
notice requirements should not be extended to assignments of accounts receivable and trust
receipt financings, see Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 617
(1931).
198. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 275. For the most part the statutes were
drafted so as to encompass only the types of business receivables which typically served as
collateral for the extension of business credit. I d. at 276-78. The common law rules dealing
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The foregoing indicates that much of the judicial hostility directed toward nonpossessory security interests was rooted in
concerns about fraud. 199 It also shows that filing requirements were
intended to address problems, including fraud, other than thenperceived ostensible ownership, resulting from nonpossessory security devices. 200 Even the early pre-Code filing systems were not
well-designed to address ostensible ownership concerns. 201 The Article 9 filing requirements also serve purposes other than reducing
concerns about ostensible ownership. 202
with assignments of other choses in action were essentially left in place; public notice by
means such as filing was not generally required. I d. at 277-78. Some courts held that the
enactment of accounts receivable statutes effectively overruled Benedict u. Ratner. !d. § 8.8,
at 281 -86.
199. The reference to "fraud" is intended to include the distrust and suspicion of the
motives of the parties, and the fear that such devi ces could be used to obtain unfair advan tages over other creditors. See Clark, supra note 166, at 506-1 7 (discussing fraudulent
conveyances in terms of principles of "Truth, Respect and Evenhandedness" and the connection between the "Evenhandedness" principle with the law of voidable preferences in
bankruptcy).
200. Glenn made the point well in the related context of recording acts for sales
transactions:
One thing which Coke recommended . . . was publicity, and so it was felt in
England, and in some of our States, that there must be a hard and fast method of
settling at the outset the question whether there was good reason for the transaction
taking the form which it did , or whether in truth it was a mere sham. In that way
belated explanations, after thoughts, and perjury, would be avoided. Thus come the
recording acts relating to the sale of goods. They were intended to provide a modern
substitute for the notoriety which Coke advised in Twyne 's Case.
1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 352, at 610 (footnotes omitted); see 2 G. GLENN, supra note
162, § 497, at 853.
Under the registry laws the filin g or recording of a mortgage has the same effect as a
delivery of the property in relieving the mortgagee of the onus of proving the honesty
and good faith of the transaction. Either of these acts is sufficient to compel anyone
assailing the mortgage to prove affirmatively that it is fraudulent in fact .
2 L. JoNES, supra note 23, §§ 329, at 15 (footnotes omitted); see also Harris, supra note 124,
at 190-94.
201. See Baird, supra note 79, at 48:
[T]he nineteenth-century filing systems did little to address the ostensible ownership
problem, the costs that arise when parties divide ownership interests in personal
property. Secured parties . .. had to engage in elaborate and complicated filing rituals
that not only were costly .. . but often did not provide ... information about the
prospective debtor 's assets at low cos t, because [third parties often] could not easily
determine which filing system he had to check.
Baird's description is consistent with the argument that the filing systems to which he refers
were, essentially, grounded in the rebuttal of fraud rather than solving problems of ostensible ownership. See Hanna , supra note 197, at 622.
202. See infra Part V.B.

736

Alab-ama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

Gilmore sumed it up best with his observation that "(i]n the
history of our security law there has been one constant factor:
whenever a common law device has been covered by a statute,
some form of public recordation or filing has been required as a
condition of perfection of the security interest. " 203 Yet, some of the
drafters of Article 9 thought that filing ought to be abandoned. 204
Moreover, Gilmore's statement is as striking for its narrowness as
for its breadth. It addresses only statutory treatment of security
devices. Certainly it does not encompass the survival of nemo dat
guod non habet (one cannot give what one does not have) 205 under
the common law and under the Code. 206
203. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 274. Pre-Code public notice requirements
have been mentioned in connection with chattel mortgages, see supra note 176, conditional
sales, see supra notes 187-88, and accounts receivable, se e supra notes 196-97. Other preCode chattel security devices also were subject to some form of public notice requirement.
For example:
(1) Traders' Acts. See generally Burns, supra note 26, at 436-37; Skilton, The Factor's
Lien on Merchandise, 1955 WIS. L. REV. 356.
(2) Factor 's Lien Acts. See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 5.3-5.6, at 13345.
(3) Trust Receipts. UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS AcT § 13, 9 U.L.A. 263-65 (1933) (superseded). See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 4.4-4.11, at 99 -124.
204. Early in the process the Article 9 Reporters proposed that filing systems be
scrapped in favor of imposing a duty on secured creditors to ensure that debtors' financial
statements fully disclosed their security interests. This proposal was abandoned because of
opposition by secured creditors who apparently realized that a unified , simplified notice
filing system would provide them with more protection. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 15.1,
at 463-65.
205. See, e.g., J. VAINES , supra note 145, at 153-55; 2 S. WILLISTON , su pra note 23, §
311, at 241-42; see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 7.10, at 229 n.1 ("It appears to have
become fashionable to quote the rule in one of its Latin versions only in the nineteenth
century.").
206. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1987) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his
transferor had or had power to transfer .... "). One is expected to know that the phrase "all
title which" must be read to include "only such title as." The nemo dat principle has been
referred to, aptly, as a " derivation rule," since the rights of a transferee derive from those of
a transferor. E.g., D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 180, at 3-8; Harris, supra note 124, at
192 n.55. Section 2-403(1) states the obverse of nemo dat, which is "the shelter, or umbrella,
principle: the taker receives everything the transferor had to convey." Dolan, supra note
152, at 812 (footnote omitted) . The treatment of theft is a classic example; a thief can transfer no better title to stolen goods than he has, which is none. R. BROWN, supra note 112, §
9.3, at 193-94; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, § 311. For an economic analysis of the thief
rule, see Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and Negotiability of Goods, 9 .J LEGAL STUD. 569
(1980). Of course, the thief rule does not apply in the case of negotiab le instruments and
certain other intangibles. See , e.g. , R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 9.5, a t 195-97; Warren,
supra note 145, at 478-79. A variety of exceptions to the rule of nemo dat were evolved at
common law. SeeR. BROWN, supra note 112, §§ 9.6-9.7, at 197-206; J. VAINES, supra note
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The treatment afforded leases and other bailments 1s a striking example of the survival of the nemo dat principle. Bailments
generally have remained unburdened by public notice requirements and, absent estoppel or the like, essentially have been
unimpaired by the doctrine of ostensible ownership. Possession is
not and, at least for several hundred years, 207 has not been a general requirement for the protection of property interests in goods.
Indeed, an early draft of Article 9 contained a public notice requirement for certain leases, which ultimately was rejected. 208
If "history" has anything to say about whether there ought to
be a filing requirement for leases, it tells us that there ought not to
be one. Yet, some proponents of a lease filing requirement suggest
that "history" reflects a march toward requiring public notice of all
separations of possession and ownership. 209 I disagree with those
proponents. The enactment of a filing requirement for leases would
be as much a departure from historical trends as it would be a
natural progression. Hundreds of years of respect for the "secret"
interest of a lessor, which survived intact during periods of intense
judicial and legislative hostility toward nonpossessory security devices, cannot be dismissed easily as "an accident of history . ..
145, at 154-72, 187-88; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, §§ 312-17, 348, at 242-55 , 348-50. The
Code provisions dealing with "voidable title" and "entrustment" extended the exceptions
even further. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)-(3) (1987). See genera lly Gilmore, supra note 99, at 61619; supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
207. See 0 . HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAw 169-70 (1881) :
We find it laid down in the Year Books that, if I deliver goods to a bailee to keep for
me, and he sells or gives them to a stranger, the property is vested in the stranger by
the gift , and I cannot maintain trespas" against him; but that I have a good remedy
against the bailee . ... These cases have been understood , and it would seem on the
whole rightly, not merely to deny trespass to the bailor, but any action whatever ....
No lawyer needs to be told that ... this is no longer the law. The doctrine of the Year
Books must be regarded as a survival from the primitive times when we have seen the
same rule in force ....
Id . (footnote omitted).
208. Section 7-404 of the May 1949 Draft of the Code (the secured transactions article
was then denomiated Article 7) imposed a "sign posting" requirement on equ ipment lessors,
although it provided that only "buyers" who "bought the equipment for new value and
received delivery thereof without knowledge or reason to know of the owner 's interest"
would take free of a noncomplying lessor's interest. U.C.C. § 7-404 (May 1949 Draft). This
approach was ultimately rejected , in large part as a result of opposition by the leasing industry. See Leary, supra note 46, at 250 n.85.
209. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 178 (quoted supra note 14); Coogan &
Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[4)[1], at 4.3-45 (quoted supra note 61) .
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developed largely from unexamined notions. " 210 Gilmore sternly
warned us not to ignore "what the courts were trying to tell us. " 211
If expanding the filing requirements to encompass leases of goods
is sound policy, and it may well be, then it must be supported on
grounds other than some vague notion of historical and logical
inevitability.
2. Ostensible ownership: A closer look.-The argument in
favor of a filing requirement for leases of goods based on ostensible
ownership concerns 212 warrants close examination. The weakness
of claims that pre-Code and Article 9 filing requirements were
grounded on the ostensible ownership rationale 213 does not prove
that ostensible ownership problems are not real or that a filing requirement is unwise.
One flaw in the argument is immediately apparent. Because
filing generally is not required for leases under current law, 214 a
lessee's possession of equipment 2115 does not make ownership of the
equipment ostensible at all. Simply stated, possession of equipment by a user carries with it no suggestion whatsoever, based on
existing law, that the equipment is owned, rather than leased, by
the possessor. 216 Moreover, the prevalence of equipment leasing
210. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 178.
211. Gilmore , supra note 99, at 627 (criticizing the Code's extension of the good faith
purchase doctrine in the face of increased and persistent judicial hostility).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 159 passim.
213. See supra Part V.A.l.
214. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
215. This discussion assumes that a filing requirement for leases would affect essentially only leased equipment. See U. C.C. § 9-109(2) (1987) (defining "equipment" as "goods .
. . used or bought for use primarily in business"). It is reasonable to assume that leases will
virtually always involve a bailment for the purpose of use of the goods by the lessee (or,
perhaps, the lessee's sublessee). Although some leased goods are consumer goods, see id. § 9109(1), most proponents of a filing ruie for leases have recognized that consumer leases
probably would be excluded from the rule as with purchase money security interests in consumer goods. S ee id. § 9-302(1)(d). When a lessee of goods subleases the goods to a
sublessee, the goods would be characterized as the lessee's "inventory" for Article 9 purposes. !d. § 9-109(4). The relevant consideration is not the precise characterization under
Article 9, but the fact t hat the goods are being used by a possessor for business purposes.
Because the goods will be equipment in the hands of the user, it would rarely make sense
for a secured party (or lessor, if there were an applicable perfection requirement) to perfect
by taking possession under § 9-:305. Perfection in such goods is virtually always achieved by
filing. See id. §§ 9-302, 9-303.
216. Harris makes the point well in the context of the vendor-in-possession doctrine:
A straightfonvard premise underlies the common law notion that retention of possession is deceptive or fraudulent: possession of goods implies unencumbered ownership.
In a legal system in which a contrary premise prevails and in which no inferences
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during recent years 217 demonstrates, as a factual matter, that possession by a user indicates a reasonable possibility that equipment
is leased, not owned, by the user. A more refined conceptualization
of the ostensible ownership argument is required. The ostensible
ownership argument could be based on the assumption that if a
filing rule were adopted for leases, then ownership (or, at least,
freedom from claims of unperfected lessors) would be "ostensible"
from the fact of possession of the leased equipment. Enacting a
filing rule for leases, then, finally would provide a legal basis for
the myth that ownership of equipment is ostensible from the fact
of possession. 218
Because it is commonly known that business equipment often
is subject to security interests, one might argue that such common
knowledge justifies the abolition of a filing requirement for secured
transactions as well. Justifications for a filing requirement for secured transactions exist, however, which are unrelated to
ostensible ownership concerns. 219 Focusing on ostensible ownership
regarding the state of the title arise from possession of goods, retention of possession
would not be fraudulent.
Harris, supra note 124, at 191 n.49. The principal beneficiaries of a filing rule for leases
would be those who are sufficiently sophisticated to realize the need to search the files and
to know how and where to search. No doubt such parties realize that no inference of own er ship can be drawn from possession by a user of equipment.
Under current law the possession of equipment does rebut certain signals, which other wise would flow fr om the absence of possession, to a creditor or a prospective purchaser who
ascertains the fact of possession. For example, possession at least indicates that the goods
are not subj ect to a security interest perfected by possession. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1987).
Additionally, it can be argued that a lessee's possession of equipment places it in a position
to more easily deceive and defraud its creditors or purchasers. This raises an issue of ostensible ownership only to the extent that one not in possession might be less likely to affirm
its possession out of fear that its misbehavior would be discovered. Cf. Baird & .Jackson,
supra note 10, at 185 ("A debtor will be deterred from misbehaving, since a filing system
deprives him of the possibility of gaining from such misbehavior.").
217. See supra note 20.
218. More precisely, a filing rule would permit an interested person who ascertai ned
that a prospective debtor or seller is in possession of equipm ent and that the appropriate
records do not reflect a fil ing to assume that the equipment is not leased or that any lessor's
claim is unperfected. Even if the Article 9 perfection rules were applied to leases, however ,
some gaps would remain. For example, the four-month rule of§ 9- 103(1)(d) and the ten-day
grace period for purchase money security interests in § 9-301(2) each undercut the ostensible ownership rationale.
219. Consid er a "colorful" rh etorical question put to me by John Dolan: Would the
proponents of a filing rule for leases be satisfied, and would the ostensible ownership concerns be solved, by a rule requiring that all leased equipment be painted "school bus
yellow"? Aside from difficulties posed for sales and financings of school buses, not to men-
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problems created by nonpossessory interests offers an unduly narrow view of the various costs and benefits of imposing a filing rule
as a condition for protection of any property interest.
Another weakness of the ostensible ownership argument for a
lease filing requirement relates to the "ostensible" component,
rather than the "ownership" component just addressed. As an empirical matter, are the potential beneficiaries 220 of a filing
requirement-creditors of and purchasers from lessees-often
deceived or misled by the possession of equipment by lessees?
Stated otherwise, do the potential beneficiaries actually rely on the
possession of goods by a prospective debtor or seller? The proponents of a filing rule for leases have not presented an empirical
case that reliance, resulting in deception, is actually a problem.
Some critics of the role of the ostensible ownership doctrine in our
laws and jurisprudence have persuasively made the case for nonreliance, however. For example, John Dolan has observed that
"[m]odern credit practices ... have outgrown the ostensible-ownership doctrine. " 221 Although hard empirical data remains elusive,
a review of Code cases dealing with priority disputes between lessors and third parties supports the argument that mistaken and
detrimental reliance on lessees' possession of equipment is not
commonplace. 222 Perhaps there is no real "problem" at all.
tion tractors and t axicabs, surely the proponents of a fi ling rule would n ot be satisf. ed. A
public fi ling syste m may provide a cheaper, more relia ble, and more conveni ent means of
asce rtaining conflicting cla ims to property than a reg im e that would depend on phys ical
inspections. Yet, the ostensible ownership concerns per se result only from a supposedly
misleading appearan ce that can be ascert ained, and th erefore can be mislea din g, only by
such an inspection . Of course, many interes ted persons may be satisfi ed t o rely solely on the
word of a putative possessor as to the fact of possession.
Part V.B addresses the justifications for filing und er Article 9 and considers the ext ent
to which similar benefits might result fr om subjecting leases to t he Article 9 perfection and
priority regime.
220 . T he id entity of potential beneficiaries would depend on the nature of the priority
rules that would accompany the ad option of a filing requirement for leases. Se e ge n erally
sup ra P art IV.
221. Dolan , supra note 16, at 30. F or similar arguments, see, e.g., Burns, su pra note
26, at 429, 456-67; Helman , supra note 16, pass im ; Philli ps, supra note 16, at 35- 38. See also
Harris, supra note 124, at 191 n.49 ("That creditors rely on the debtor's possession of per sonal property in deciding whether t o extend credit long has been consid ered dubious,"
ci ti ng Davis v. Turner, 4.5 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 441 (1 848 ) (Baldwin , J.) ).
222. Cases reported in volumes 1 (fi rst se ries) through 2 (second seri es) of Callaghan's
Uni form Commercial Code R eport ing S ervice were reviewed in an attempt to estimate the
inciden ce of actual reliance on leased , or purportedly leased , equipment by creditors of and
purchasers from lessees. One hundred thirty cases (treating cases reported m ore t han once
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Arguments that actual reliance on a debtor's possession of
goods by extenders of credit is insignificant are persuasive, even
compelling. 223 But even the total absence or elimination of ostensias one case and excluding consumer cases) were identified in which the true lease-security
interest issue was involved and which involved a priority dispute between a putative lessor
and a third party. In 94 cases (7:2 .3% ) the priority dispute involved the failure to file a
financing statement and in 36 cases (27. 7%) a purportedly defective filing was involved. Of
these 130 cases, 92 (70.8 o/o) involved a priority dispute between a putative lessor and a lien
creditor (or a trustee in bankruptcy or d ebtor in possession), 31 (23.8%) involved a dispute
with a secured creditor, 6 (4.6 o/o) involved a dispute with a non-secured creditor purchaser,
and 1 (.8%) was impossible to characterize. No distinction was made between cases concluding that the transaction involved was a true lease and those concluding that it was a secured
transaction. It was assumed to be unlikely that any of the lien creditor (or trustee in bankruptcy or debtor in possession) cases involved actual creditor reliance on the leased
equipment. An attempt was made to glean from the remaining 37 decisions (competing secured creditor and other purchaser cases) some indica tion of whether the competing parties
relied on the debtor-lessee's possession. Seven cases (5.4 o/o) were class ified as probable or
possible reliance cases, and 5 (3 .9 %) were impossible to classify. The remaining 26 (20%)
cases were class ified as nonreliance cases. If the assumptions and cla ssifications were accurate, between 5.4% and 9.3% of the cases may have involved some reliance by a third party
creditor or purchaser.
The classifications were necessa rily imprecise. Because actual reliance was not material
to the decisions, as a legal matter, it generally was not mentioned. M oreover, certain conventions were adopted in the classification process. For example, if a competing secured
creditor claimed under an after ·acquired property clause, nonreliance was assumed. And, if
the equipment involved was specificaliy mentioned in a competing secured creditor's sec ur ity agreement reliance was assumed. Th e attem pt was made to id entify reliance on the
lessee's ownership of equipment rather than such reliance caused by the lessee's possession.
As a general matter, the facts disclosed in the reports did not permit identification of reli ance on possession. Further investigation of court records. busi ness records of the parties,
and interviews with the parties and counsel would, no doubt, shed additional insight. Even
allowing for a reasonable margin of error in the classi fications, however, it a ppears that the
inciden ce of third party reliance m ay be sl ight.
22 3. Reliance by buyers of goods, as opposed to creditors, may be a more frequent
phenomenon. See supra note 147.
The argument that the ostensible ownership doctrine has become obsolet e and is an
anachronism is less satisfying. Empirical studies of creditor and debtor behavior necessary
to demonstrate that less significan ce is attributed to possess ion of goods today than in ear lier tim es have not been developed. Moreover, the obsolescence argument assumes (i) the
existence of circumstances at earlier times which led to substa n tial reliance on possess ion
and (ii) that ostensible ownership concerns were and continue to b e at the root of public
notice requiremen ts . Each of those assump tion s is t roublesome . See ge n erally supra Part
V.A.l. If the demise of ostensible ownership justifies a rejection of a filing requirement for
leases today, then the argument also must ackn owledge that the law was inappropriat e during earlier times (i.e., prior to the demise) when ostensible ownership concerns were real,
but filing for leases was not requ ired . Have the tim es fin ally caught up with the law?
The perceived demise of os tensible ownership may provide more cogent support for
arguments in other contexts, such as the temporal issue of when one becomes a " buyer" for
purposes of § 1-201(9) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business"). David Frisch has
persuasively argued that neither the passi ng of title nor the delivery of possession of goods
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ble ownership concerns would not provide any clear signal as to
whether a filing requirement for leases should be adopted. Again,
the Article 9 filing regime provides benefits other than curing the
problem of ostensible ownership. 224
Baird and Jackson argue that the ostensible ownership concerns arising from a lessee's possession and the secret interest of a
lessor are the baseline theme upon which a filing requirement for
leases is justified. 225 They contend that this baseline makes more
sense than one which depends on locating the "ownership" or "title" inherent in the interest of a true lessor. 226 But, neither
theoretical model is necessarily useful in evaluating the merits of a
filing requirement for leases. A presumption favoring either approach, "possession" or "title," can create a doctrinal trap that
serves to cloud, rather than illuminate, the analysis. Rather, examining various types of property claims in particular contexts may
provide a more useful framework for identifying the relative merits
of requiring public notice as a condition for perfecting a property
interest as against claims of third parties. 227
to a prospective buyer should mark the creation of "buyer" status. Frisch, Buyer Status
Under the U.CC. A Suggested Temporal Definition, 72 IowA L. REv. 531, 556-67 (1987).
Baird and Jackson, relying on ostensible ownership consid erations, would opt for a rule that
would make a buyer's taking of possession the criterion for obtaining "buyer" status in this
context. Bai rd & Jackson , supra note 10, a t 209-12. Frisch contends that the time when a
prospective buyer becomes a "buyer" should turn on when it becomes entitled to "an award
of a possessory remedy" against the seller. Frisch, supra, at 570-72. The context of Frisch 's
argument is that of construing the Code, a "modern" statute, in light of contemporary practices and expectations. But the lease filing issue occurs in a different context because the
generally accepted norm for many, many years has been not to require public notice for
leases.
224. Se e supra note 219; se e also infra Part V.B.
225. See Baird & J ackson, supra note 10, at 186-90.
226. !d.
227. A decision to reject a filing requirement for leases does not necessarily mean that
filing should not be required for certain other bailments. When goods constitute inventory
in the hands of the bailee, such as in the case of "bailments for processing" or "tolling
contracts," the benefits of a fi ling rule might exceed t hose that would result from a similar
rule for leases if, for example, third parties rely more on possession of inventory than possession of equipment. See White, supra note 92, at 397 .
I am not suggesting that every owner of a good who puts it in the possession of a
third party runs the risk of losing it to a buyer or a trustee in bankruptcy unless he
files a financing statement. Courts should be concerned with the circumstances of
ostensible ownershi p . .. . I would argue ... for most industrial equipment in a society
where equipment leases are so commonplace that one should not put much store by
possession of equipment. T hat is not true, however, for cases involving inventory and
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Notwithstanding their emphasis on ostensible ownership, the
proposals of Baird and Jackson for exclusions from a generally applicable filing requirement for bailments do recognize that neither
a title approach nor a possession approach will in all cases indicate
the wisdom of a filing rule. The exceptions that they propose are
related to the relative costs and benefits of imposing a filing requirement in particular contexts. 228 Other proponents of a filing
requirement for leases would, on similar grounds, exempt certain
leases from the requirement. 229 It follows that my conceptual differences with proponents of a filing requirement for leases, whose
arguments are based largely on ostensible ownership concerns, may
be limited. My substantive quarrels and uncertainties arise from
two basic views. First, I take a different view of the approach to
various costs and benefits which might flow from imposing a filing
rule on leases. 230 Second, I remain unconvinced that either a baseline of ostensible ownership grounded on a lessee's possession and
a lessor's "secret" interest or a baseline grounded on the location
of title or ownership provides a helpful benchmark for exammmg
the policy in question.
things like inventory .... Here there is little to put [a secured creditor of the possessor] or other third parties on notice.
!d. ; see also U.C.C. § 2-326 (1987) (public notice requirements must be met for protection of
interest of consignor for "sale or return," but not in the case of consignor for "sale on approval"); infra note 308 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 17 and
accompanying text.

Although I argue more generally for consideration of the context of various separations
of possession and ownership as an important element of evaluating the need for a rule mandating public notice, White 's argument appears to be grounded solely on an ostensible
ownership rationale. Moreover, White's argument incorrectly assumes that ostensible ownership concerns arising out of such contexts can have a bearing, under current law, on whether
a transaction is covered by Article 9. See White, supra note 92, at 396-97. Since true bailments are not covered by Article 9, and the appearances created by possession of goods are
identical whether a bailment or a secured transaction is involved, ostensible ownership concerns offer no guidance as to the determination of whether a true bailment or a secured
transaction exists. White's argument may support a change in the law, but it does not support the conclusion that some true bailors are required to perfect their interests under
current law merely because some baiiments are perceived to create serious ostensible ownership problems.
228.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

229.

See generally sup ra Part III.

230.

See generally infra Part VI.
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Benefits of Article 9 Filing Rules for Secured Transactions
and Leases: A Comparison

This Subpart addresses various benefits, including reductions
in costs, provided by filing under the Article 9 perfection and priority scheme. 231 These benefits are compared to those which might
flow from subjecting leases of equipment to similar filing requirements. I argue that a filing requirement for leases probably would
produce smaller and fewer benefits than those provided for secured
transactions under existing law.
In an important conceptual sense, Article 9 does not legitimate
or provide the legal basis for secured credit. To the contrary, its
perfection and priority scheme establishes barriers to secured
credit. The rules comprising the scheme impede a debtor and a
secured party from dividing property rights so as to be effective
against third parties. 232 Property rights (i.e., security interests)
transferred to or retained by a secured party may be transferred
again by a debtor, and are vulnerable to claims by a debtor's creditors and purchasers, unless the Article 9 perfection and priority
scheme is observed. To this extent, Article 9 clearly overrides the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet-one cannot give what one
does not have. 233
Concepts aside, however, this characterization is distorted in
an historical sense. Article 9 and its statutory predecessors represented an accretion of legislative "reforms" which ultimately
displaced centuries of judicial and legislative rigidity and hostility
toward nonpossessory security interests. 2 3 4 Such a hostile environment did not and does not generally prevail in the case of leases
and other bailments. It is more appropriate, therefore, to ask why
231. The discuss ion continues to focus on equipm ent and pe rfection by filin g. See
su pra note 215. Except as otherwise noted, the disc uss ion also continues t o assume that
priority rules substantially the same as those provided by Article 9 wo uld apply t o a filing
requirement for leases.
As a ge neral matter, I do not h ere question th e need for filin g rules , su ch as those
included in Art icle 9, in a perfection a nd priority sc heme for secured t ransacti o ns. Although
ce rtain criti cisms of the fu nctional role of possession in t hat scheme have merit , see ge nerally Phillips, supra note 16, the thrust of this discuss ion assumes th e general sati sfaction
with and continued opera ti on of the exist ing Article 9 rules.
232. Se e, e.g., U.C. C. § 9-301(1) (1 987 ) (s ubordin ation of unperfec t ed security interests
to lien creditors and certa in purchasers) .
233. See su pra notes 20.'i -06 and accompanyin g t ext.
234. See ge nerally sup ra Part V.A.
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leases should be included in the Article 9 perfection and priority
scheme rather than why they should be excluded.
What are the benefits of a filing scheme for secured transactions? An essential characteristic of a security interest is the prior
right in the collateral which is conferred on the secured party. A
secured creditor will charge a lower interest rate on account of receiving collateral only if it can rely with relative safety on the
priority of its claim.235 A secured creditor requires a means to determine that it will receive such priority and can do so under the
Article 9 notice filing system. 236 A viable regime for secured credit
depends on the baseline, but not exclusive, rule of "first-in-time,
first-in-right." 237 A secured creditor, once it achieves priority, re235. Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Credi tors , 88
YALE L.J. 1143, 1153, 1163 -64 (1979); see also Baird, supra note 79, at 62 & n.27; Baird &
Jackson, supra note 10, at 183-86; Carlson, Rat ionality, Accident and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN L. REv. 207, 216-17 (1986). Jackson and
Kronman go on to consider how the lower interest rate charged by secured creditors may
not be fully offset by resultant higher interest rates charged by un secured creditors (to account for an increased risk) , thus demonstrating benefits offered by secured credit. They
rely primarily on the differences in "monitoring costs" incurred by differently situated creditors. Jackson & Kronman, supra, at 1149-61. Their exp lanation has been criticized. See ,
e.g., Schwartz, Security Int eres ts and Bankruptcy P1iorities: A Review of Cu rrent Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-14 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Current Theori es ]; Scott, supra
note 11, at 909-10. In recent years several commentators have engaged in highly theoretical
discussions of the policy rationale and conceptual basis for the Article 9 perfection and priority scheme. See, e.g ., Ayer, supra note 27; Baird, supra note 79; Buckley, The Bankruptcy
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393 (1986); Carlson, supra; Jackson & Kronman , supra;
Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 15; Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the E co nomic
Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U PA. L. REv. 929 (1985); Levmore,
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982);
Phillips, supra note 16; Schwartz, Th e Con tinu ing Puz zle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L REv
1051 (1984); Schwartz, Curr ent Theories, supra; Scott, supra note 11 ; White, Etficiency
Justifications for Personal Property Secu rity, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1984). This commentary either deals in depth with, or is premised upon, attempts to "explain" a "theory" of
secured credit and t he interplay be tween such explanati ons and the Article 9 perfection and
priority scheme. These recent expositions are strikingly explicit and elaborate in their treatment of the operation, effects, and rationale of the Article 9 rules as they affect the rights of
secured creditors, other purchasers, and unsecured creditors. The commentary relies upon
or deals with economic analyses of the "efficiency" or other justifications and explanations
for the existence of secured credit.
For purposes of this discussion, the author assumes that the law will continue to bless
(not prohibit) the creation of security interests which are generally enfor ceable "against the
world."
236. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 79, at 56-57, 60, 63-64; Baird & Jackson, supra note
10, at 183-84.
237 . See, e.g., Baird, supra note 79, at 64-65; Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 17980; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 235, at 1162. A perfected security interest in goods
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quires an assurance that, as a general matter, no subsequent
conflicting claim will become senior. 238 The Article 9 notice filing
scheme provides a mechanism for the operation of this first-intime principle for security interests.239
A prospective secured creditor may receive some assurance of
priority in goods upon discovering that the debtor is in possession
of the goods, thereby confirming that the goods have not been
pledged to a competing secured party 240 or delivered to a buyer,
and searching the proper filing office to ascertain the nonexistence
of prior filings against the debtor covering the same collateral. 241
generally is prior to the rights of later-arising lien creditors, U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987),
subsequent good faith purchasers, id. § 9-301(1)(c), and later-perfected or later-filed secured
creditors, id. § 9-:312(5)(a). There are, of course , exceptions. See, e.g., id. § 9-307(1) ("buyer
in ordinary course of business .. . takes free of a security interest created by his seller"); id.
§ 9-312(3) (purchase money security interest priority for inventory) ; id. § 9-312(4) (purchase
money security interest pri ority for collateral other than inventory). The exceptions create
more controversy than the general first-in-time rule. See, e.g. , Jackson & Kronman, supra
note 235, at 1167-75 (explaining justifications for purchase money priority rules); Scott,
supra note 11 , at 961-63 (criticizing Jackson and Kronman explanations and offering other
explanations).
Perceptions of the function and importance of the first-in-time principle may vary depending on whether a priority contest exists between a secured creditor and a lien creditor,
between a secured creditor and a purchaser other than a secured creditor, or between secured creditors inter se.
238. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 235, at 1161-64.
239. David Carlson has observed, accurately, that the Article 9 scheme does not
strictly embrace the principal of first-in-time, since that label is more properly descriptive of
the time of acquisition of rights in property. The Article 9 scheme is better described as a
first-to-perfect system. See Carlson, supra note 235, at 212 & nn.14 , 15. To be even more
precise, if perfection is achieved by filing, then the time of filing generally will be used for
priority purposes as between secured parties. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1987).
240. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1987) (security interest in goods may be perfected by possession); id. § 9-312(5)(a) (security interest perfected by possession is senior to security interest
subsequently perfected by filing). If the property is intangible, such as accounts, then the
debtor's possession is not material. See id . § 9-302(l)(a); id. § 9-305 (perfection of security
interest in accounts only by filing and not possession).
241. This process would involve determining the correct name of the debtor, the relevant state's law which governs perfection, and the proper filing office or offices in such state.
See U.C .C. § 9-103 (1987) (choice of law rules for perfection of security interests in multiple
state transactions); id. § 9-401 (place of filing) . Other issues may be subsumed in such determinations, depending on a determination of the type of goods involved, such as the period
of time during which the goods have been located in a particular jurisdiction or the location
of the debtor. See id. § 9-103(1)(d) (four-month grace period for reperfection when goods
already subject to security interest are brought into state); id. § 9-103(3)(a) & (b) (location
of debtor determines law applicable to perfect ion when collateral is mobile goods); id. § 9103(3)(e) (four-month grace period for repe rfection when debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction); see also Harris, supra note 124, at 212-13 & nn.l43-45.
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Similarly, other interested persons (prospective buyers and unsecured creditors, for example) may benefit from a filing system
which discloses the existence of potential prior claims to personal
property. 242 Thus, one benefit of the Article 9 filing regime is that
it provides information to interested third parties who desire to
uncover potential claims to the property of a debtor. 243 If requiring
filing for purposes of perfection and priority of security interests is
the least costly way to provide such information, then the costs of
discovering the information and the risks of nondiscovery imposed
on third parties who desire the information are reduced by the filing regime. 244
It follows that imposing a filing requirement for leases would
allow interested third parties to discover the interest of a lessor by
searching the files. A clean filing search coupled with verification
of the debtor's possession of goods, would provide a prospective
secured creditor, purchaser, or unsecured creditor with assurance
that either the goods were not leased or, if they were, that the lessor would be unperfected. 245 This benefit is qualitatively the same
as that provided by the perfection requirements for secured transactions under Article 9. 246 The proponents of a filing requirement
242. See infra text accompanying notes 289-91, 299-302.
243 . See Baird, supra note 79, at 57-59, 62-66.
244. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 183-84 .
245. This assurance of freedom from claims would extend only to security interests
created by the debtor and claims of lessors of goods to the debtor, not to claims of the
debtor's predecessors in interest or security interests created by them. For example, the
goods might be stolen or some other defect in the debtor's title might exist.
246. Baird and Jackson make a similar point: "The subsequent creditor's need for this
information is in no way diminished by the fact that the earlier interest was acquired
through a bilateral agreement that had the attributes of a lease. Therefore, these attributes
should not affect the filing requirement. " Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 188.
It has been argued that financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) should be sufficient to protect creditors and
purchasers from being misled by "secret" interests of secured parties of and lessors to a
debtor or lessee. E.g ., Helman, supra note 16, at 29-30. Others disagree. See, e.g., Phillips,
supra note 16, at 29-41. In the case of leases, the existence of material leases should be
disclosed in financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. See generally Dieter,
Stewart & Underwood, supra note 20, ch. 4. On the other hand, many lessees do not prepare
financial statements in accordance with GAAP . And transactions which occur in the gap
between the time of preparation and dissemination of financial stateme nts and the time of
preparation and dissemination of subsequent periodic statements would not be reflected. It
ce rtainly must be true tha t financial statem ents place many purchasers and creditors on
notice that some of a debtor -lessee's property is subject to security interests or leases. But,
as a general matter , reliance on finan cial statements would appear to be a poor substitute
for filing.
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for leases generally have recognized this benefit and have concluded that it sustains the argument in favor of a filing
requirement for leases.
Such a narrow approach, however, is flawed. In three respects
it fails to take into account, attempt to compute, and compare the
aggregate net benefits. 247 First, the informational benefits of a
lease filing requirement might be quantitatively less than the benefits resulting from the existing filing requirement for secured
transactions. For example, it may be easier and less costly for third
parties to discover that goods are leased than it would be for third
parties to discover the existence of a security interest in the absence of a filing requirement. 248 Second, there may be other
benefits provided by the filing requirement for secured transactions that are greater than those that would result from a filing
requirement for leases. 249 Third, the costs to lessors, lessees, and
third parties of imposing a filing requirement may exceed the costs
resulting from the existing perfection requirements for secured
transactions. ~ 0 The wisdom of mandating filing for leases is not
demonstrated merely by identifying one perceived benefit-information-which would be substantially identical to the
benefit resulting from the perfection and priority rules applicable
to secured transactions. Otherwise, the logical extension of the argument would be the imposition of a comprehensive title
registration scheme for all forms of personal property. 251 Most
would agree, however, that the cost of such a scheme could not be
justified by the benefits. 252
The remainder of this Subpart addresses the first and second
categories of possible differences in benefits-differences in reduc2

247. Baird and Jackson cons ider the net benefits of imposing a filing requirement on
non-secured transaction separations of possession and ownership in the context of exceptions to the general rule of filing. Baird & Jackson , supra note 10, at 190-94. But they
proclaim that the inherent bilateral differences between leases and secured transactions
have no impact on the benefits to be obtained and imply that the costs, similarly, would not
be affected by such bilateral distinctions. ! d. at 186, 188, 190.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 257-86.
249. See generally infra text accompanying notes 260-88.
250. Costs of a filing requirement for leases and the accompanying priority rul es are
discussed supra Part IV and infra Part VI.
251. With the exception of certain specialized types of property, such schemes are unknown for personal, as opposed to real, prop erty. S ee Baird & Jackson, supra note 79, at
306-07.
252. ld.
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tion of discovery costs and other, greater benefits-between a
proposed lease filing requirement and the filing requirement applicable to secured transactions.
1. Information: Reduction of discovery costs.-Under existing
law, an interested person who wants to discover conflicting claims
to a debtor's goods may search the public records for the existence
of financing statements covering the goods. Once the appropriate
records are identified and inspected, 263 the searcher will learn
whether a secured creditor of the debtor might claim an interest in
the goods. 264 But even if a debtor is in possession of goods and no
filings are found, an interested person nevertheless must conduct
further investigation to determine the nature and existence of conflicting claims to the goods. Such investigation is necessary even in
order to determine the appropriate filing office to be searched. 266
As a general matter, the Article 9 scheme extends only to whatever
rights in the goods which the debtor might have. The nature and
extent of the debtor's rights must be divined from the debtor or
other sources. 266
The investigation by an interested person might reveal that
the goods are leased. For example, a lessee, when asked by an interested person, may disclose the existence and particulars of the
lease. Of course, a debtor, when asked, also could reveal the existence of a security interest even in the absence of a filing system.
The interested person also might discover the existence of a lease
by searching the Article 9 files, if the lessor had filed a precaution253. See supra note 241.
254. A filed financing statement, however, will not confirm whether the secured party
in fact claims a security interest. "A financing statement may be filed before a security
agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches." U.C.C. § 9-402( 1) (1987) (second senctence). Except in the case of consumer goods, a secured party is not obligated to
terminate a filed financing statement after satisfaction of the secured obligations unless demanded by the debtor. ld. § 9-404(1) (second sentence). The information required to be
included in an effective financing statement is rather meager. See id. § 9-402(1) (first sentence); see also Baird & Jackson, supra note 79, at 308-09.
255. See supra note 241.
256. Prospective purchasers and secured creditors probably rely to a substantial extent on the debtor for such information. In some cases only naked representations by the
debtor may be requested and relied upon. In other cases, evidence of the source of the
debtor's title, such as invoices or bills of sale, may be examined and the authenticity of such
evidence may be verified with predecessors in the chain of title. This might req uire additional Article 9 searches against the names of such predecessors. Such relevant information
is not normally available either from searching against the debtor's correct name in the
correct filing offices or from verifying that a debtor is in possession of goods.

750

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

ary financing statement in the proper office pursuant to section 9408.257 Moreover, the interested person might request documentation to evidence the source of rights in goods held by a debtor or
lessee. Unless a lessee provides fraudulent documentation and the
interested person does not discover the fraud, such as by failing to
verify the authenticity of documentation, the documentation normally would inform the interested person of the existence of the
lease. Authentic documentation would show that the lessee is not
an owner of the goods, as well as the existence and nature of the
lessor's claim.
It is significant, however, that in most cases the receipt of authentic documentation as to a debtor's rights would not reveal the
interest of a conflicting secured claim. An interested person investigating the source of a debtor's title, no matter how diligent,
might not be satisfied regarding the nonexistence of a security interest granted by the debtor unless the interested person relied on
the debtor's assurances or could rely on the absence of any conflicting public filing. The debtor's title documentation would look
the same whether or not the debtor had granted a security interest.
But the existence of a lease as the source of a lessee's interest is a
positive, rather than a negative, fact which could be discovered by
an investigation of a debtor-lessee's source of title. 258 Therefore, in
many cases it is less costly for an interested person to discover the
existence of a lease than it would be for a person to discover a
security interest in the absence of filing. A filing requirement for
leases would not reduce the costs of discovery, including risks of
nondiscovery, to as great an extent as the existing filing system
reduces the costs of discovering security interests. Stated other257. The information function of the Article 9 perfection scheme is fully satisfied
when a filing is made rega rdl ess of whether any sanction is imposed for the failure to file.
258. Th e statement in the text should be qualified in two respects. First, where the
evidence of title cuns ists of documentation which itself revea ls the ex istence of a security
interest, such as in a conditional sa le or when t he equipment is covered by a certificate of
title di sclos ing a secu ri ty interest. then an investigation of the source of title s hou ld reveal
the claim of the secured party. Second, if a lessee were a previous owner of th e goods and
had sold them to a lessor and leased them back, the lessee's original evidence of t itle might
appear regular in all respects and would not reveal the existence of the leasing arran gement.
See infra P art V.D (discussi ng sale-leaseback transactions). Kripke acknow led ges tha t the
point made in th e text, which he attributes to Donald Rapson, has merit. Kripke, su pra
note 5, at 800-0 1. However, he a rgues that the same ci rcumstances may exist in the case of a
conditional sale and concludes that the argument "is insufficient to warrant a statutory interruption of the movement toward public notice of sp lit ownersh ip s ituations. " !d.
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wise, there is a greater need for a filing requirement for secured
transactions than for leases. 2159
The foregoing further illustrates that except in cases of debtor
misbehavior, such as a debtor's failure to reveal conflicting interests or provision of fraudulent documentation, the filing system
may provide little additional information to interested persons.
Many interested persons will, at a minimum, inquire as to conflicting interests. Perhaps the informational function of the Article 9
filing regime, at least in the context of prospective extensions of
credit and purchases, may not be significant in fact.
2. Other, greater benefits for secured transactions.
(a) Timing and veracity: Priority ordering; dis couraging
fraud and collusion.-Under Article 9, the exact time of perfection
or filing generally controls priority. 260 In the case of equipment,
perfection is virtually always accomplished by filing. 261 Filing provides definite, irrefutable evidence of t he baseline time on which
the first-in-time priority rule will be applied. This memorialization
of the relevant time, for priority purposes, serves as an "official
scoreboard" that is visible and, by definition , accurate. 262
Determining priorities based on the time of public filing
reduces evidentiary costs and disputes in connection with secured
transactions. It eliminates the need to ascertain and prove the time
at which a security agreement was signed, an advance was made, or
a debtor acquired rights in collateral in order to apply the first-intime principle. 263
259. Sear ching t he p u bli c fi les, however, migh t be less costly t han investigat in g t he
de btor's source of ti tl e.
260. See U.C.C . § 9-30 1(1) (1987) ; id. § 9- 312(.5)(a).
26 1. See su pra note 215.
262. See Baird , supra note 79 , at 55 (" A notice-fi li ng syst em .. . so rts out p rope rty
cla im s a mong those who have or see k property claims; its fu ncti on is not to give t he wo rld at
large notice of security interests." (emphasis add ed)); id . at 62 -63 (notice filin g u nde r Article 9 similar to staking claim s to min eral interests, cit ing Kitch, The Nature and Func t io n.
of the Pa t ent System , 20 ,J. L Aw & E coN. 265 (197 7) ).
26;3. See id. at 64 (other poss ible benchmarks fo r a gene ral p riority rule unsatis factory
because they wo uld req ui re reli ance on debtor 's reco rds); see also Jackso n & K ronma n,
supra note 235, a t 1162. Pe rfect ion by possession d oes involve a d et erminatio n of issues
such as t hose mention ed in t he text an d has bee n criticized on this bas is . Ba ird , supra note
79, at 64 & n.3 1; Ph illips, supra note 16, at 20 -34. But a ny perce ived d eficie ncies in the rul es
fo r pe r fect ion by pussess ion does not redu ce th e im po rta nce of t hi s m em or ia li za ti on func t ion of fi ling. Many organ izatio ns, la rge and small , may lack systems of recordkeep ing whi ch
would fac ilita te determin atio n of t he exact timing of acq ui sit ion of rights in co ll a teral, espe -
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Another, perhaps more significant, benefit results from a system which encourages memorializing the timing of transactions by
public filing: the reduction of opportunities for fraud and collusion.
The filing made in a public office ensures the veracity of the timing
and the existence of a security interest by eliminating the possibility, which might exist under a "first-to-attach" rule, that a debtor
and a secured party could conspire to claim that a security interest
was created earlier than it actually was. 264 The relationship of public filing to the veracity of claims to security also may explain the
rule that provides priority to lien creditors over unperfected security interests. 2611
A filing requirement for leases generally would not produce
timing and veracity benefits as great as those provided for secured
transactions. 266 The timing and veracity of a lease normally would
cially if the acquisition were not being contemporaneously financed on a secured basis, the
making of advances, and, in particular, the execution of documents.
264. Notice filing does not actually evidence the creation of a security interest. See
supra note 254. However, because the time of filing generally controls priorities, there is
little risk that collusion concerning the time of creation will affect priorities. Concerns about
potential fraud and collusion associated with nonpossessory security interests also influenced the development of pre-Code filing systems. See generally supra Part V.A. Burns
agrees that "collusion" is a "type of fraud which public filing may be especially useful in
defeating." Burns, supra note 26, at 465.
The timing and veracity effects of filing discussed here are inherently related to the
informational functions of filing discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 23559. The earlier discussion focused on the ex ante discovery of information about claims to
property by a prospective extender of credit or purchaser. This discussion focuses on other
benefits: reducing evidentiary costs and discouraging fraud and collusion.
265. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987). The point is most vividly illustrated by imagining a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding in a world where unperfected security interests prevail
over lien creditors and, pursuant to § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's trustee in
bankruptcy. The absence of a filing requirement might be viewed as creating the potential
for debtor and creditor misbehavior , perhaps in order to escape the avoidance of a preference under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code or otherwise. The existence of a public record
verifiable as to time of filing discourages false, perjured claims of secured status as an afterthought. See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also Baird & Jackson, supra note
10, at 184 & n.34 (" [T]he absence of a record of a superior interest is unambiguous, because
unless the interest is recorded, it cannot be superior. It therefore provides a reliable check
on the veracity of the information provided by the debtor.") .
266. Burns argues that a filing requirement for leases is not the best choice for reducing collusion, although she acknowledges that it would have that effect. Burns, supra note
26, at 466-67. Although her conclusion may be correct, her argument is not persuasive. First,
she claims that a filing requirement would result in "a public file chock full of entries" and
would not solve the true lease-security interest definitional problems. ld. at 466. I fail to see
how her point bears on the issue. Second, she argues that "certified financial statements and
credit reports .. . offer public confirmation of leases" and that investigation of the source of
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be easier to determine and prove than would be the timing and
veracity of many secured transactions were it not for the existing
Article 9 filing requirements. Unless a lessor is a manufacturer,
there often will be a third party vendor involved in a leasing transaction and, consequently, some independent, verifiable paper trail
will reflect the time of the lessor's acquisition of its interest in the
equipment. And the lessee will have no genuine evidence of any
interest other than its interest as lessee under the lease. 267 It is also
likely that documentary evidence, perhaps involving third party
carriers or the like, may exist to demonstrate the time of lessee's
receipt of possession of the equipment under the lease. 268 But
when a debtor grants a security interest in previously acquired
equipment, there often may be no evidence of the timing of the
transaction other than the agreements between the debtor and the
secured party.
Under existing law, there is no timing issue for leases at all. If
a transaction is a true lease, the lessor's interest generally prevails
over prior and subsequent creditors of and purchasers from the
lessee. 269 Adopting a filing rule for leases at once would create a
timing issue and require that the timing to be memorialized by a
public filing. Moreover, it is probable that leases would not be subjected strictly to the first-to-file rule in any event, assuming a filing
were made substantially contemporaneously with the leasing transaction. A purchase money-type priority rule would be appropriate
for leases if a filing requirement were imposed. 270 The lessor's inacqu isition of goods provides adequate means to discover leases. Jd. She is closer to the
mark here, because she appears to recognize that discovery of leases may be easier than
discovery of secured transactions. Yet, she fail s to explain explicitly why this is so.
267. Sale-leaseback transactions, however, represent an exception to this point. See
infra Part V.D.
268. It is customary practice for professional equipment lessors to obtain an "acceptance and delivery certificate" or the lik e in order to memorialize the delivery of equipment
to lessees. See Bayer, supra note 122, at 166-68.
269. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
270. Most commentators have acknowledged that a "purchase money" type priority
rule, similar to§ 9-312(3) or (4), would be appropriate for leases if a filing requirement were
imposed. Filing within 10 days after the lessee's receipt of possession of the equipment
would be necessary for lessor priority if§ 9-312(4) were to be used as a model. Application
of a rule based on § 9-312(3) , which covers purchase money security interests in inventory,
would requi re the lessor to file and to give notice to prior-filed secured parties prior to the
lessee's receipt of possession. See also U.C.C. § 9-301(2 ) (1987) (purchase money security
interest perfected by filing within ten days after debtor receives possession has priority over
intervening lien cred itor). How would these purchase money priority rules work in the case

r
1

l
754

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

terest, then, would be superior to previously or subsequently filed
or perfected security interests.
(b) Purchase money security interests.-The argument that
the information, timing, and veracity characteristics of public filing
provide greater benefits for secured transactions than would result
from a filing requirement for leases can be criticized on the basis
that it fails to take account of the treatment of purchase money
security interests under Article 9. Certainly, purchase money security interests have more in common with leases than do other
security interests. Purchase money security interests in equipment,
however, are not excused from the Article 9 filing requirements 271
and also are not strictly subjected to the first-to-file priority
rule. 272 And, like most leases, purchase money security interests
necessarily involve the acquisition of a new asset. 273
This criticism is well taken. Filing does provide smaller benefits for purchase money security interests than for transfers of
security interests in earlier-acquired collateral. Nevertheless, some
features of purchase money security interests and leases suggest
of a lessee which never received possession of the goods (such as when a lessor or vendor
delivers goods directly to a sublessee without the lessee ever obtaining possession)? Would
proponents of a filing rule based on curing ostensible ownership problems be satisfied if
such a lessor were not required to file? A literal application of rules such as those in §§ 9301(2), 9-312(3), and 9-312(4) could mean that the filing necessary for purchase money priority could be delayed indefinitely, since the ten-day grace periods provided in those
sections do not begin to run until the debtor receives possession of the collateral. Cf. In re
Automated Bookbinding Servs., Inc., 471 F .2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972) ("receives possession" as used in § 9-312(4) means the demonstration of ostensible ownership through
exercise of "simple physical control," citing 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 29.3, at 787).
The same issue can arise und er current law for a purchase money lender (the secured party)
to an equipment lessor (the debtor) when the equipment is delivered by the vendor directly
to the lessee. A purchase money security interest even might be perfected after the commencement of a bankruptcy case and nevertheless prevail over a § 544(a) avoidance claim.
See Bankruptcy Code §§ 544(a), 546(b). But see Bankruptcy Code § 547(e)(2)(C) (transfer
not perfected within ten days after it is effective between the parties deemed to be made
"immedi ately before the date of the filing of the petition"). That it may seem bizzare for the
late-filing purchase money secured party to be prior to competing secured parties and lien
creditors, so long as it files prior to a final determination of priority, serves to undercut
arguments that the Article 9 perfection and priority scheme is grounded essentially on an
ostensible ownership rationale. I would argue t hat when purchased goods reach a state of
repose in connection with a fully consummated sale transaction, the ten-day grace period
should begin to run notwithstanding that the debtor-buyer may not have received actual
physical possession of the goods.
271. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9- 303 (1987).
272. See id. §§ 9-301(2), 9-312(3), 9-312(4).
273. See id. § 9-107.
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that a filing regime produces greater benefits in the case of
purchase money security interests than would result from a filing
requirement for leases. For example, in many purchase money
financings the debtor receives documentation evidencing title
which does not reflect the existence of the purchase money secured
party. 274 Additionally, there may or may not exist a prior-filed secured party claiming an interest in the new equipment, and even if
such a prior-secured party does exist, its security interest may be
extinguished subsequently by satisfaction of the secured obligation. As to all subsequent claimants, then, the purchase money
secured party is like any other secured creditor, and the first-to-file
rule will ensure priority. 27 r; Moreover, a debtor's "equity" in equipment subject to a purchase money security interest, even if the
security interest is perfected by filing, may be put in play in the
marketplace by the creation of a subordinate security interest, attachment, execution by a creditor, or other transfer of the
equipment. 276 As to subsequent claimants and transferees, filing
for purchase money security interests provides benefits (information, timing, and veracity for ordering priorites) similar to those
274 . This situation exists when a debtor borrows money and uses it to purchase the
collateral. If the only documentary evidence of the debtor's acquisition of the collateral is a
conditional sale or similar agreement, then the debtor's title documentation itself would be
likely to reflect the secured party's interest. But excluding conditional sales from a filing
requirement would encourage parties to structure financings as conditional sales so as to
avoid filing.
275. It can also be argued that Article 9 need not be taken as it is found in order to
compare the relative benefits of a filing requirement for leases. Perhaps Article 9 ought not
to require filing for purchase money priority as against prior-filed secured parties. That was
the law prior to the Code. See Carlson & Shupack, Judi cial Lien Pri orit ies Under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (pt. 1) , 5 CARDOZO L REv. 287, 326 & n.169 (1984); see
also infra note 296. I do not attempt to sustain that argument here. Note, however , that
such an approach would be inconsistent with one of the basic conceptual underpinnings of
Article 9: the unification of treatment of all secured transactions that have the same economic effect without making unnecessary distinctions based on the form of the transaction
or the location of "title." See U.C.C. § 9-101 comment ("The aim of this Article is to provide
a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty. "). See ge nerally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 9.1, at 288-94 . Yet, Article 9 does contain exceptions
from filing as a condition to perfection. See U .C. C. § 9-302(1)(a) ( 1987) .
276. The equity may result from a downpayment, reduction in the secured debt, or
appreciation of the equipment. A transfer of an interest in the equipment might or might
not violate the debtor's agreement with the purchase money secured party. See U.C.C. § 9311 (1987) ("de btor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred ...
notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making
the transfer constitute a default") .
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provided for other secured transactions. A filing requirement for
leases might provide fewer benefits. If a lease were perfected by a
proper filing, then, as under current law, the lessee would have no
interest to transfer or to be subjected to creditors ' claims except a
leasehold interest. Leasehold interests are inherently less marketable interests than ownership interests and consequently may be
less fre quently put in play, especially by honest lessees, than ownership interests in equipment subject to security interests,
purchase money or otherwise. 277 Some will be unconvinced by arguments that appear to split hairs so as to distinguish between
benefits provided by filing for purchase money security interests
and leases. Others may argue that filing should not be required for
purchase money security interests. 278 The issue is where to draw
the line. 279
(c) Contextual differences between secured transactions and
leases .-The previous discussion in this Part illustrates some ways
in which the benefits that would be achieved by a filing requirement for leases might be less significant than those which result
from the existing filing requirement for secured transactions. But
that discussion is incomplete. It fails to acknowledge explicitly that
Article 9's shape largely reflects patterns of credit markets rather
than property markets. The discussion implicitly proceeded on the
premise that the principal, if not the sole, function of the Article 9
scheme is to provide a means of ensuring a secured creditor's prior
claim to specific assets of a debtor.
Article 9 does not limit either the types of "obligations" which
may be secured by a security interest in personal property or who
27 7. As an empirica l matter, a leasehold interest in eq uipment probably is far less
useful t o a lessee's cred itors and t ransferrees tha n an ownership interest in equipment subject to a prior security interest. See id . § 2A-303 (1) (lease contract may prohibit voluntary
t ransfers; effectiveness of transfers t hat materially increase bu rden or risk to a party de p ends on p rov iding specifie d pr otections t o such party); id . § 2A-307( 1) (credi t or of lessee
gen era lly t ak es subj ect t o lease contract) . S ee generally H arris, The Rights of Creditors
Und er Article 2A , 39 ALA. L. R Ev. 803 (1988) (this Sym pos ium ).
278. Pu bli c fi ling r ules were slow to be adop ted for co nd itional sales. S ee ge nerally
su pra notes 182- 88 and accompanying text. Although the ost ensible ownership concerns after the delivery of goods under a condit ional sale and in t he case of a chattel mortgage are
the same, generally the courts responded with less concern about the fraud p otential of
condi ti onal sa les t ha n with the ''secret " nonpossessory mortgage of goods alread y on hand .
279. Even if t he benefits provided by fil ing for p urch ase money security interests and
leases were t h e same, t h e costs of imposing a fi ling req uiremen t for leases could b e greater.
See supra notes 124 -26 and accom panying t ext.
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may be a secured party. 280 But it cannot be seriously questioned
that security interests usually are taken by professional lenders or
sellers engaged in the business of extending credit. Viewing se cured transactions in the context of a credit market may provide
insight into the function of the perfection and priority rules that is
not provided by considering those rules either in the context of a
system of ordering claims to specific property or in the context of
curing ostensible ownership concerns arising from nonpossessory
interests in personal property. As discussed in Part IV, secured
creditors may be expected to rely less on collateral than lessors
rely on the residual interest in leased goods. 281 A filing requirement
for secured transactions may provide benefits relating to credit extension and related conveyancing aspects of t he Article 9
perfection and priority rules which might not be provided by a filing requirement for leases.
Operating in conjunction with the concept of notice filing and
the broad sweep of after-acquired property and future advance
clauses, Article 9's first-to-file rule 282 may create a "situational monopoly' ' for a secured creditor. 283 Aided by the first-to-file rule, an
abbreviated notice filing and a security agreement entitles a secured party to obtain priority in after-acquired personal property,
as well as existing personal property, to secure existing de bt and
future advances. 284 T he dominant, exclusive position which a secured creditor may achieve under Article 9 may be usefully
characterized as the "relational" aspect of secured transactions. 285
280. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987) ("'Secu rity interest' means a n interest in personal
property or fixtures which sec ures an obligation."). The term "obligati on" is not defined in
the Code.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 11 8-25.
282 . See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1 987); see also id. § 9-30l(l)(b).
283. See, e.g. , Jackson & Kronman, supra note 235, at 1167 ("A lthough the after-acqu ired property clause saves costs, it also creat es what econom ists call a 'situational
monopoly,' in that a cre ditor with a security interest in after -acquired property enjoys a
special competitive advantage over other lend ers in all his subsequent dea li ngs with the
debtor. " (footnote omitted)).
284. See U.C.C . § 9-204( 1) (1987) (security agreement may cover after-acquired colla t eral ); id . § 9-204(3) (secured obligations may include future advances); id. § 9-205 &
commen t 1 (debtor's lib erty to "use, commingle or dispose .. _of collateral" does not render
secur ity interest " in valid or fraudulent against cred itors"; repealing rule of Benedict v.
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (192.5)); id. § 9-312(5)(a) (general first-to -file-or-perfect priority rule as
a mon g secured cred itors) ; id. § 9-402 (formal req uisites of financing sta tements).
285. See Scott, supra note 11. Scott reviews and critiques various current theories
seek in g to exp lain why secured credit exists and the benefits, if any, that it provides. A
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The related, but in some respects discrete, functions of information, ordering of priorities, timing, and veracity embraced by
the Article 9 filing scheme serve not only to identify and evidence
claims to collateral, but also to identify the existence and extent of
the dominant position of secured creditors. 286 Secured creditors,
then, may stake claims on relationships as well as collateral. 287 The
user-friendly structure of Article 9 many not be so friendly to general creditors who do not hold a dominant position by virtue of
secured status. But the informational attributes of the filing system may protect such creditors from such security interests just as
it provides protection for secured creditors. 288
principal criticism is the emphasis that such theories place upon the collateral itself is the
"focal point for the creditor's efforts to discourage asset substitutions or conversion ." !d. at
911. He also criticizes such theories for assuming that the myriad types and contexts of
secured financing are subject to explanation by a single theory.
While the drafters of the Code sought to achieve some transactional efficiency by
bringing these diverse patterns under a single regulatory scheme, they may have unwittingly contributed to the current uncertainty. It is unlikely that a single
explanation can rationalize all of these various forms of security. Because th ey are
attempts at comrehensiveness [sic], current analyses are vulnerable to criticism from
competing visions. As a consequence, the existing literature fails to assemble and
evaluate even the most rudimentary data on patterns of secured and un secured
lending.
!d. at 912. Scott examines prevailing patterns of secured credit and finds them largely consistent with a "relational theory" of secured financing . !d. at 918-19, 925-33, 958-59.
Here, Scott's article is useful on ly as an example of the identification and description of
the dominant relationship that a secured creditor may achieve as a result of the Article 9
priority scheme. I do not address or express any view here on whether Scott's more refined
descripti ons of and hypotheses concerning creditor and debtor behavior are accurate or
demonstrate economic benefits of secured credit, as he claims.
The "relational" aspect of secured credit, as I have qualified the use of that term, is not
unlike the "enterprise theory," which Leary described more than twenty years ago. See
Leary, Secured Transactions, Revolution or Evolution, 22 MIAMI L. REv. 54, 62-65 (1967)
("Let others talk of the floating lien, the author prefers the 'enterprise concept'; the idea of
a going concern or a flow of goods, or a balance-sheet asset, even if fluctuating, as security
for a debt.").
286. The meager requirements for financing statements under § 9-402 may require a
searcher of the files to undertake further investigation to uncover the facts. See supra note
254.
287. This may explain some of the interest in Article 9 filings by some unsecured creditors and, thereby, the rule providing lien creditors with priority over unperfected security
interests. See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
288. The exceptions to the first-to-file rule, principally the purchase money priority
rules of§ 9-312(3) and (4), underscore the obvious point that noti ce of the potentially dominant posiiion of a secured creditor is not the only function of the Article 9 filing scheme.
Just as no single explanation may account for the occurrence of or the benefits provided by
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It would be anomalous for features such as after-acquired
property clauses and future advance clauses to be included in an
lease agreement. A lessor's interest in discrete leased equipment,
therefore, would not represent the same type of "threat" to a
lessee's creditors that is represented by many secured financing arrangements. Lessors would not be expected to occupy the role of a
dominant, relational secured creditor. Consequently, a filing requirement for leases would not provide information about a
dominant relationship or a transaction possessing significant conveyancing attributes, such as after-acquired property and future
advance clauses.
(d) Different effects on beneficiaries.-How would a filing requirement for leases of equipment affect the potential beneficiaries
of such a requirement, assuming the general applicability of the
Article 9 priority rules? A response to this question will illustrate
some of the points previously made in this Part, as well as some
additional points.
(i) Buyers: Non-secured creditor purchasers.-Buyers of
goods in ordinary course of business would be affected very little
by a filing requirement for leases. Even in the unusual situation
where goods are leased to a merchant dealer in goods of that kind,
such buyers would take free of the interest of a lessor to their
seller. 289 Buyers of used equipment not in ordinary course would
benefit to the the extent that they would take free of an unperfected lessor's interest, assuming a priority rule similar to
section 9-301(1)(c) were adopted for unperfected leases. Under existing law such buyers would not take free of a lessor's interest. 290
It is doubtful, however, that a filing rule would be worth the candle
solely on the basis of protection of such buyers. Unless such a
buyer were completely happy to accept the seller-lessee's
creditworthiness to stand behind title warranties, buyers in such
non-ordinary course transactions ought to, and probably do in
secured credit, no single explanation may account for the existence and function of the filing
scheme for secured transactions.
289. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) & (3) (1987). Application of the priority rule of§ 9-307(1) to
leases would have the same effect. See id. § 2A-305(2).
290. The rule of nemo dat holds here. See id. § 2-403(1) (first sentence). Not only
would a buyer who is not a buyer in ordinary course of business fail to take free of a lessor's
interest, but a lessee may be restricted from voluntarily transferring its leasehold interest.
See id. § 2A-303(l)(a) & (7). This is a different rule than would apply to a debtor's transfer
of an interest in collateral. Id. § 9-311.
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most cases, investigate the source of the seller's title. 291 Such an
investigation likely would reveal the existence of the lessor's
interest. 292
(ii) Secured creditors.-Baird has argued forcefully that
the principal beneficiaries of Article 9 filing are secured creditors
and potential secured creditors who require information in order to
be assured of priority. 293 A creditor who obtains a security interest
in a debtor's existing equipment would benefit from a filing rule
for leases if the secured creditor failed to investigate the source of
the debtor's title and if the debtor's misbehavior deceived the secured party as to the existence of the debtor's lessor. 294 Secured
purchase money financers of used equipment can make the same
investigation of title as that made by non-ordinary course
buyers. 295
As for lenders who claim an interest in after-acquired property, the value of after-acquired property clauses is most
pronounced in the context of financing continually shifting masses
of property, such as inventory and receivables, rather than in the
context of financing used equipment. 296 A principal value of after291. The statement in the text is based on personal experiences and observations of
documentation and procedures employed in sales transactions and commonly rendered advice of counsel to buyers. See also Burns, supra note 26, at 459 (arguing that because of the
''unusual nature of such transactions" such buyers should rely on their own vigilance, including "external evidence of title").
292. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
293. Baird, supra note 79, at 60-62.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59.
295. See supra text accompanying note 291. If the debtor were a buyer in ordinary
course of business, the purchase money financer would be sheltered from claims of the
seller's secured creditors or a lessor to the seller to the same extent as the debtor. See supra
note 289 and accompanying text.
296. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) comment 2 (1987); see also Hawkland, Consignments
Under the U.C C.. Sales or Security?, UC C CooRDINATOR ;:S95, 412-13 (1963); Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 235, at 1166-67. Some commentators have argued that this phenomenon suggests the propriety of applying a "transactional" filing rule, rather than the Article 9
presumption favoring notice filing, for collateral other than inventory, receivables, and the
like. See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV L. REv. 8:38, 879-80 (1959); Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 235, at 1180-82.
Baird and .Jackson argue that the law s hould condition purchase money priority in
equipment on the giving of notice to a prior-filed secured party, as is now required for
purchase money priority in inventory. Compare U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987) with id. § 9-312(4).
See Baird & .Jackson, supra note 10, at 194-96. Apparently they perceive that secured creditors claiming after-acquired equipment place such reliance on equipment that negative
covenants of debtors do not provide sutficient protection. Remarkably, they base their argu-
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acquired property clauses covering equipment may lie in the relational function of security rather than secured creditor reliance on
collateral value of equipment that a debtor may acquire from time
to time. 297 Empirical investigation might demonstrate that the
chief benefit of a filing rule for leases, insofar as secured creditors
of lessees claiming under after-acquired property clauses are concerned, would be only the prospect for an unexpected "windfall"
when a lessor fails to file or makes a defective filing. 298
In sum, it is plausible that the principal effects of a filing requirement for leases would be to protect certain creditors who
claim security interests in equipment, but fail to investigate their
debtor's source of title and are deceived by their debtor's misbe havior, and to provide a windfall potential to secured creditors who
claim under after-acquired property clauses.
(iii) Unsecured creditors.-It is likely that the chief impact on unsecured creditors of a filing requirement for leases would
be a windfall benefit resulting from a lessor's noncompliance with a
filing requirement. 299 Although Baird acknowledges that some benment on ostensible ownership grounds, but they fail to address the empirical question of
creditor awareness and reliance on debtors ' possession of after-acq uired equipment. See
supra text accompanying notes 220-23.
297. I do not suggest that an after-acquired property clause covering accounts and
inventory, for example, may not similarly place secured creditors in a dominant position.
Rather , the point is that because equipment acquisitions generally are more infrequent,
sproadic, and fortuitous than accounts and inventory acquisitions, from a lender's perspective creditor reliance on the collateral value of such equipment is likely to be less
pronounced. See Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg 's Bankruptcy in Perspective, 30
UCLA L. REv. 327, 338 n.66 (explaining that the two-point test of Bankruptcy Code §
547(c)(5) voidable preference exception properly applies only to accounts and receivab les,
not equipment):
[T]hose who take equipment as collateral typically expect the original collateral to
remain in the debtor's possession so that he can use it to generate incom e that will
enable him to repay the loan. Although they may easi ly take a security interest in
after-acquired equipment, ordinarily these lenders do not expect to rely upon it and
would be protected without it.
298. The NCF A proposal appears to limit the effect of a lessor's failure to file to circumstances more likely to involve reliance-i.e., the priority would work only in favor of
secured parties and only to the extent of advances made after the lessee came into possession. S ee supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. In the absence of evidence that secured
financers generally become aware that after-acquired equipment has been acquired by their
debtors, however, the possibility remains t hat the reliance nexus is indirect and tenuous.
299. The reference to unsecured creditors is intended to include lien creditors because
pri ority over an unperfected lessor under § 9-30l(l)(b) would depend on achieving that status . The "windfall" refers to the se nior claim to equipment that was not relied upon by an
unsecured creditor at th e time credit was extended. Obviously, there is some actual reliance
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efits of filing information inure to unsecured creditors, he
questions whether such benefits alone would justify the costs of the
filing system. 300 But, even if unsecured creditors typically do not
conduct record searches they may receive relevant information on
filings indirectly, such as through credit reporting services. 301 Empirical data relating to the impact of filings on unsecured creditor
behavior and credit decisions would be useful. However, Baird
probably is correct that the benefits that unsecured creditors receive from information contained in Article 9 filings are even less
significant, and less direct than those afforded secured creditors. 302
And, to the extent that unsecured creditors do rely on filings, it
may suggest that the identification of dominant relational secured
creditors, rather than claims to discrete goods, is paramount.
3. Conclusions.-Filing under Article 9 provides various benefits, but the nature and magnitude of the benefits differ according
to the context. It is difficult to identify and isolate any overriding
theme or theoretical basis for Article 9's filing rules that applies
uniformly in all contexts. Although a filing requirement for leases
would seem to provide fewer and smaller benefits than filing provides for many secured transactions under existing law, the
disparity is the least when leases are compared with purchase
money security interests held by sellers of goods. The question is
on any prope rty levied upon once a creditor goes to the time, trouble, and expense to levy
executi on. See Burns, supra note 26, at 459-61.
300. Baird, supra note 79, at 60-62; see also Burns, supra note 26, at 456-57.
30 1. For example, standard Business Information Reports issued by Dun & Bradstreet
Inc. always include information on public filings , including Art icle 9 filings, against the
debtor covered by the report. This information provides important signals to existing and
prospective unsecured trade creditors and sometimes may affect the type of credit terms
extended to the debtor or even may be the basis for denying credit extensions. Telephone
interview with Delaine Donohue , Senior Vice-President, Dun & Bradstreet Information Re sources (July 10, 1987).
302. Baird, supra note 79, at 60-62. T o the extent that benefits of the fi ling system for
unsecured cretlitors are questionable, what justification exists fo r the § 9-301(l)(b) rule that
provides priority to lien creditors, irrespective of knowledge , over unperfected security interests ? Concerns about ostensible ownership do not appear t o offer an explanation; it is
diffi cult to im agine that existing or potential unsecured creditors would investigate and rely
on a debtor's physical possession of assets, especially equipment, wh il e fa ilin g to investigate
and rely , directly or indirectly, on public records. Carlson has persuasively argued that the
priority rule of § 9-301(1)(b) is not justifiable on efficiency grou nds alone. See Carlson,
supra note 235, at 218-23. The antifraud and anticollusion functi on of filing may offer justi fi cations for the rule. See supra note 265, text accompanying notes 260 -70. The rule also
serves to provide a definite framework for the ordering of priorities. S ee supra note 263 and
accompanying text.
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where, short of a title registration system for all interests m personal property, the line ought to be drawn.
C. Code Treatment of Consignments and Sales of Accounts
and Chattel Paper: Analogues, Exceptions, or Red Herrings?
Several commentators have relied on the Code's treatment of
consignments of goods and sales of certain receivables as support
for their arguments that leases should be subjected to a filing requirement. 303 In both consignments and sales of receivables, the
Code places the burden of giving public notice on a "real" owner of
personal property at the risk of subordinating the owner's interest
to creditors. Those who question the wisdom of adopting a filing
requirement for leases ought to distinguish the treatment of consignments and sales of receivables from that which would apply to
leases under a filing rule or, alternatively, explain why the treatment of consignments and sales of receivables is not appropriate.
This Subpart addresses the Code's treatment and concludes that
the imposition of a filing requirement for leases might produce
fewer net benefits and impose greater costs than result from the
public notice requirements applicable to consignments and sales of
certain receivables.
1. Consignments.-The Code perpetuated the pre-Code distinction between "true" consignments and consignments which are
disguised secured transactions. 304 True consignments are dealt with
303. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46; Coogan & Boss, supra note
53,§ 4.3.04[4][a], at 4.3-45 to -46; Hawkland, supra note 46, at 114; Leary, supra note 25, at
1088.
304. Section 1-201(37) provides, in pertinent part: " Unless a [lease or] consignment is
intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a 'security interest,' but a consignment in any event is subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Section 2-326)."
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987) (emphasis added). The bracketed language in the quotation was
deleted and the italicized language was added by the 1987 Official Text. The effect of these
changes was to remove leases from the operation of the sentence and to change the sentence
structure slightly. No substantive change affecting consignments was made or intended.
Consignments had a checkered past under pre-Cod e law. The use of consignments was employed both as a device to enhance marketing (i.e., the consignee was not obligated to
purchase the consigned goods, at least until they are sold to a third party) and as a price
fixing scheme. The demise of the latter purpose was occas ioned by developments in antitrust law. Judicial treatment, even when consignments were respected in theory, tended to
be unfriendly based on ostensible ownership, as weii as fraud, concerns spawned by the
consignor's "secret" interest. See ge nerally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.5, at 73-75;
Dolan, supra note 16, at 22-24; Duesenberg, Consignment Dist ribution Under the Uniform
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in section 2-326, which provides that when goods are delivered for
"sale or return" (i.e., "primarily for resale"), they are "subject to ..
. claims [of the buyer's creditors] while in the buyer's possession."305 But an exception to this rule is made when public notice
of the consignor's interest is given. 306 The public notice required
normally is satisfied by the filing of a financing statement as if the
transaction were subject to Article 9. 307 Thus, the treatment of
consignments under section 2-326 imposes a filing requirement on
bailments of goods and the sanction for noncompliance is subordination to the bailee's creditors-essentially the same result urged
by proponents of a filing requirement for leases, which are another
form of bailment.
The Code's present treatment of consignments does not support an argument that a filing requirement should be imposed on
leases as a logical extension based on similar policy concerns. If
anything, the Code treatment suggests the opposite. Section 2326(2) expressly provides that goods delivered for "sale on approval" (i.e., "when goods are delivered primarily for use") "are
not subject to claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance." 308
On the merits, the existing provisions of section 2-326 dealing with
"sale or return" and "sale on approval" do not tend to advance the
argument either for or against a filing rule for leases.
Commercial Code: Code, Bankruptcy, and Antitrust Considerations, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 227,
228-41, 243-46 (1968); Hawkland, supra note 46, at 108-12.
As with leases for security, consignments for security create full-fledged security interests subject to the Article 9 rules, but true consignments are generally excluded from the
scope of Article 9. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(2) (1987). Although true consignments are not
security interests, § 9-114 does deal with the priority between a true consignor and secured
creditors of the consignee. See infra text accompanying notes 318-22.
305. U.C.C. § 2-326(1) & (2) (1987). When goods are delivered for sale to a dealer in
such goods the delivery is "deemed to be on sale or return." I d. § 2-326(3) (first sentence).
306. !d. § 2-326(3) (third sentence).
307. See id. § 2-326(3)(c). The public notice requirement also may be satisfied if the
consignor "complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the like to
be evidenced by a sign" or "establishes that the person conducting the business is generally
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others." Id. § 2326(3)(a) & (b) . The dearth of sign posting laws and the uncertainty inherent in the "generally known" standard make Article 9 filing the only practical alternative for the true
consignor. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE
883-85 (2d ed. 1980); Hawkland, supra note 46, at 109.
308. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1987) (emphasis added). However, the rule in subsection (2) of
§ 2-326 is made subject to the provisions of subsection (3), with the result that even a consignment for use, pending acceptance, will be subject to the public notice requirements if
the the consignee maintains a place of business and deals with goods of the same kind.
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What policies are promoted and what benefits are provided by
the public notice requirements of section 2-326? The Official Comment indicates that protection is afforded in circumstances where
"creditors of the buyer may reasonably be deemed to have been
misled by the secret reservation" of title by the consignor. 309 The
rationale of the Comment is the ostensible ownership concern created by the consignee's possession of the goods. 310 Dolan has
questioned the assumption that creditors rely on the consignee's
possession and has argued persuasively that the current policy rationale of section 2-326 is the protection of creditors from
fraudulent practices. 311 Whatever label or rationale is asserted as
the policy justification for the filing requirement resulting from
section 2-326, there are fundamental differences between true consignments and leases. These differences relate to the nature and
309. !d. § 2-326 comment 2.
310. See Dolan , supra note 16, at 29.
311. Dolan has stated:
The only advantage of the pro-creditor rule [of § 2-326(2) & (3)] today is its inhibition of fraudul ent practices at little cost ... ..
At one time creditors may have relied on their debtor 's stock in trade , but modern commercial lenders, beginning with the advent of open-account selling and
inventory finan cing, stopped extending credit based on a debtor's ostensible ownership of merchandise. Today creditors either investigate that appearance or do not
rely on it at all.
Modern credit practices thus have outgrown the ostensible-ownership doctrine.
Creditors actually do not rel y on their debtors' ostensible ownership of inventory;
in stead they verify that ownership with m ore than filing searches, rely on other collateral, or depend on the general creditworthiness of the borrower or a guarantor.
!d. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted). Interestingly, Dolan ultimately concludes that antifraud
considerations alone do not justify denial of protection to the true consignor, such as by
imposing a public notice requirement, but he justifies the public notice rules of § 2-326 on
the grounds that "the cost of distinguishing" th e true consignment from the security consignment " is great." !d. at 35. But see Coogan, supra note 24, at 958 n.126 ("The test as to
whether a consignment is a true consignment or a disguised security agreement should provide no difficulty except in establishing the bargain of the parties."). Note also that the
failure to tile will subordinate the true consignor's interest to all creditors of the consignee
while the security consignor would be subordinated only to such creditors who have become
lien creditors . Compare U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1987) with id. § 9-30 l (l)(b). See Hawkla nd ,
supra note 46, at 110. Yet, this difference is of little practical significance in most circum stan ces because the principal means for a creditor to acquire an interest in the goods is for
such creditor to become a lien creditor. See U.C.C . § 9-301(3) (1987) (defining "lien creditor "). Moreover , the consignee's trustee in bankruptcy could avoid the unfiled true
consignor's interest as well as the unfiled security consignor's interest. See Bankruptcy Code
§ 544( a) & (b).

766

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

extent of the benefits to be derived from and the costs imposed by
a filing requirement.
The consignor desires and probably expects that the goods will
be sold by the consignee to a third party buyer. If and when the
goods are sold, the consignor expects to receive only a payment
from the consignee equal to the purchase price of the goods. The
consignor's role is similar to that of a credit seller to the consignee;
after a sale to a third party, the consignor is a creditor of the consignee with respect to payment of the price of the goods. 312 The
effect of a consignor's noncompliance with a filing requirement
does not result in any increase in the amount of the consignor's
claim over the amount expected to be claimed upon the sale of the
goods to a third party-the purchase price. In contrast, a lessor
does not expect to have a claim against the lessee for the entire
value of the leased goods except upon the occurrence of uncontemplated events, such as destruction or loss of the goods. 313 The
lessor expects to claim only the rentals and redelivery of the goods
at the end of the lease term. 314 In the event of either nonfiling or a
sale of the goods to a third party, the consignor expects to lose its
rights in the goods. 315 Nonfiling by a lessor (assuming a filing rule
were to apply), however, would have the effect of cutting off the
lessor's expected residual interest in the goods. 316 The risks and
costs of noncompliance are greater for the lessor than for the
consignor. 317
Other distinguishing contextual features arise from the nature
of goods consigned for "sale or return" as "inventory." 318 Section
9-114 provides a priority rule as between the interest of the true
312. See U.C.C. § 9-114 comment 1 (1987) ("It is believed that under many true consignments the consignor acquires a claim for an agreed amount against the consignee at the
moment of sale, and does not look to the proceeds of such sale." (emphasis added)).
313. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
314 . See supra text accompanying notes 112-31.
:n5. The typical context of consignments suggests that most buyers would be "buyers
in ordinary course of business" and would take free of the consignor's interest under § 240:3(2), just as such buyers would take free of the security consignor's security interest under
§ 9-307(1).
:316. See supra text accompanying notes 112-31.
317. Essentially the same arguments and reasoning set forth in Part IV apply here.
See supra text accompanying notes 112-31.
:118. The characterization of the goods as inventory, as defined in § 9-109(4), would
not be affected by the fact that the goods owned by the consignor are in the possession of
the consignee.
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consignor and secured creditors of the consignee. That rule is substantially the same as the inventory purchase money priority rule
of section 9-312(3). 319 Hawkland has explained the need for filing
as well as notice to prior-filed creditors in the case of purchase
money financing of inventory and consignments. 320 Because inventory, by its nature, is expected to be sold and replaced continually,
secured creditors rely substantially on after-acquired property
clauses to assure them of a continuously prior perfected security
interest in the shifting mass of inventory. 321 Secured party reliance
on after-acquired property clauses covering more stable goods,
such as equipment, is less significant. 322 Indeed, some inventory financing may represent an example of frequent, actual reliance by
secured creditors on debtors' possession of after-acquired property.323 Whether or not reliance typically is placed on possession,
the point remains that inventory financers have high expectations
that there will be no unknown interference with their claims to
shifting masses of inventory.
Finally, the shifting nature of inventory makes it difficult for
existing or potential secured creditors to rely on evidence of a
debtor's source of title to inventory. Continual shipments of consigned goods might create much greater impediments to discovery
of conflicting claims than normally would be expected in the case
of equipment covered by leases. 324 For this reason the filing re319. If the consignor files a financing statement prior to the consignee's receipt of possession of the goods and gives notification in writing to prior-filed secured parties claiming
interests in that type of goods less than 5 years prior to t he consignee's receipt of possession ,
the consignor will obtain priority over such prior-filed secured creditors of the consignee and
"identifiable cash proceeds" from the goods. U.C .C . § 9-114(1) (1987).
320. See Hawkland, su pra note 46, at 111.
321. ld.
322. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text. Baird and Jackson, however,
favor imposing on purchase money finance rs of equipment a § 9-:312(3) -type obligatio n to
notify prior -tiled secured parties as a con dition to purchase money priority. Baird & Jack son, supra note 10, at 194-96; see supra note 296.
323. See White , su pra note 92, at 397 (quoted su pra note 227). The statement in the
text is supported by somewhat ci rcular reasoning since existing law induces reliance by in structing secu red parties that such reliance is app rop riate for inventory until such time as a
notification is received from a consignor or a purchase money inventory finan cer. See U.C.C.
§§ 9-114(1), 9-312(3) (1987).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 253 -59 (discussing the effect of tiling on di scovery of conflicting claims and lower costs of discove ring leases t ha n discovering secured
transactions in the absence of a filing requirement).
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quirement for consignments provides more benefits than such a
requirement for leases would provide.
2. Sales of receivables.-The Code mandates filing for certain
sales of accounts 325 and chattel paper 326 by using a technique different than that employed for encouraging public notice of
consignments. Sales of accounts and chattel paper actually create
security interests that are subject to Article 9. 327 The principal effect of subjecting sales of such receivables to the Article 9 scheme
is the impact of the Article 9 filing and priority rules. 328 In several
respects the Article 9 treatment of sales of accounts and chattel
paper seems to be an apt analogue for adopting a filing requirement for leases. The buyer of accounts or chattel paper is the
"real" owner, and the Article 9 default and remedies provisions are
inappropriate, just as with leases. Nevertheless, such sales are subject to the Article 9 perfection and priority rules.
Including outright sales of accounts within the scope of Article
9 was not a new idea. 329 However, the exclusion from the scope of
Article 9 of the outright sales of certain receivables and other intangibles is enlightening as to the Article 9 drafters' rationale for
those that are included. Article 9 was intended to cover only sales
325. "'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has
been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1987).
326. " 'Chattel paper' means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods ... ."!d. § 9-105(1)(b).
327. !d.§ 1-201(37) ("The term [security interest] also includes any interest of a buyer
of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9."); see also id. § 9-102(1). Certain
security interests in and sales of accounts and chattel paper, however, are excluded from the
scope of Article 9. See id. § 9-104(f). Additionally, certain assignments of accounts are excluded from the Article 9 filing requirement. See id. § 9-302(1)(e).
328. Security interests in accounts may be perfected only by filing, but security interests in chattel paper may be perfected either by filing or possession. !d. §§ 9-302(1), 9-305.
Sales of receivables are largely excepted from the impact of the Article 9 default and remedy provisions. Unlike security interests that secure an indebtedness, if accounts or chattel
paper, which have been sold, are collected upon or disposed of after default, the secured
party (i.e., buyer) is not entitled to a deficiency claim and the debtor (i.e., seller) is not
entitled to any surplus, unless otherwise agreed. !d. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2).
329. The same approach was employed in the pre-Code accounts receivable statutes,
which generally encompassed security assignments as well as factoring transactions involving nonrecourse purchases of accounts. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 275-76, §
10.5, at 308-09; see also supra note 196 and accompanying text. Gilmore explained that
omitting such sales (i.e., factoring) transactions from the accounts receivable statutes would
have exposed "non-notification" assignments to attack in bankruptcy under the rule of Corn
Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943). Chattel paper, per se, was
not included within the scope of such statutes, however.
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of intangibles within the context of typical business financing
transactions; the sales of intangibles excluded from its scope were
considered not to fit that mold. 330
The functions and benefits of a filing requirement for sales of
receivables reveal a pattern which is similar to that considered for
consignments and conventional secured transactions securing obligations. Sales of receivables subject to Article 9 are essentially
financing transactions. Money passes from the buyer-secured party
to the seller-debtor, and an interest in receivables of (presumably)
equal value passes from the seller-debtor to the buyer-secured
party. But, rather than relying on a contractual obligation of the
seller-debtor to repay the funds advanced, the buyer-secured
party's "way out" is the collection of the receivables from the account debtor obligors. 331 Such transactions, indeed, are extensions
of credit to the seller-debtor, but the buyer-secured party relies
primarily on the creditworthiness of the account debtors rather
than on that of the seller-debtor. 332 Thus, loans secured by such
receivables vary from sales of receivables in the degree of reliance
on the debtor's creditworthiness.
330. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 10.5, at 309 ("Article [9] was meant to apply
to sales of intangibles in institutionalized financing transactions (such as factoring) ; the
three types of transfers which are specifically excluded [by § 9-104(f)] are merely examples
of 'non-financing' sales.") Section 9-104(f) excludes from the scope of Article 9:
a sale of accounts or chattel paper as part of a sale of the business out of which they
arose, or an assignment of accounts or chattel paper which is for the purpose of collection only, or a transfer of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee who is
also to do the performance under the contract or a transfer of a single account to an
assignee in whole or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness.
U.C.C. § 9-104([) (1987) . Gilmore does not otherwise dwell on the policy rationale for such
exclusions except to note that "[o]ne defect of the accounts receivable statutes was that on a
literal reading many transfers would be included (and thus subjected to filing requirements)
which were not financing operations, which it made no sense to file, and which no one would
ever think of filing." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 10.5, at 309.
331. Such transactions may be denominated "sales," "assignments," or "nonrecourse"
or "limited-recourse" loans which limit the source of repayment to the collateral. The economic effect is the same.
332. Receivables financings are found in all shades of gray in a spectrum between
clearly recourse loans secured by receivables and clearly nonrecourse sales. Coogan argued
that the exceedingly difficult task of distinguishing the rece ivable sale from the secured loan
is even more difficult than the parallel distinction between leases and secured transactions.
Coogan, supra note 24, at 957-58. He concluded that this difficulty was an important justification for subjecting receivables sales to the Article 9 filing regime since the filing rule
would largely reduce the need to decide the issue at the outset of a transaction. I d. at 94247, 957-58.
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Sales of receivables are both similar and dissimilar to equipment leasing transactions in ways that influence an evaluation of
relative benefits of a filing requirement. The nonrecourse feature of
a receivables sale means that the buyer-secured party relies less on
the debtor and more on the collateral (i.e., the account debtors'
creditworthiness and any collateral for their obligations) than may
occur with more conventional secured loans. As earlier discussed,
equipment lessors similarly, and necessarily, rely more on the
equipment involved than do lenders whose interests are secured by
equipment. 3 3 3 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that a
receivables buyer-secured party does not rely substantially on the
creditworthiness and integrity of the seller-debtor. Unlike the typical equipment leasing scenario, the seller-debtor in a receivables
sale typically generates the property (i.e., receivables) which is the
subject of the transaction. Consequently, the buyer-secured party
must rely on the business practices and integrity of the sellerdebtor as to the quality of the receivables (such as their validity
and freedom fr om defenses of account debtors), the warranties of
the seller-debtor with respect thereto, and the creditworthiness of
the seller-debtor to back up such warranties. 334
Assuming those warranties are complied with, the receivables
buyer-secured party relies on the property involved in order to recover its investment, as does an equipment lessor. Moreover,
nonfiling jeopardizes that recovery, as would be the case for nonfiling if filing were to be required for leases, assuming Article 9
priority rules were applied. But the unperfected receivables buyersecured party is left with an unsecured damage claim against the
seller-debtor in an amount which is essentially equal (ignoring discount and profit factors) to the value given to the seller-debtor. 335
333. See sup ra text accompanying notes 111-31.
334. Alt hough t his fe ature serves to distinguish receivables sales from equipment
leases, equ ipment lessors also may rely on the lessee for some analogous purposes such as
the ma intenance and repai r of the equipment. When a small number of large receivables are
involved, rece ivables fina ncers may seek verification from account de btors as t o the existence of the rece ivab les and the absen ce of claims and defenses. See U. C.C. § 9- 318(1)
(1987). Rece ivables fina ncers also may require waivers of such defenses from account debtors. S ee id . § 9-206(1) .
33.5. The statement in the tex t assumes that the receivables sold are fully collectible
or, at least, of the barga ined -fo r valu e. Agreements fo r the sale of rece ivables in variably
contai n sell er-d ebtor warranti es of t itle and freed om from con flicting claims as well as warranties coverin g valid ity, enforce ability, and the li ke . If an unperfected buyer-secured party
is deprived of its inte rest in th e rece ivables by a trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor of or
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The equipment lessor's claim, however, might be substantially in
excess of the value transferred to the lessee-the right to use the
equipment during the lease term.336 Also, if the receivables sale
transaction works out as expected, the receivables will be gone
(i.e. , collected) at the end of the day. The essence of leasing transactions, however, is the existence of the equipment's residual value
for the lessor at the end of the term. Again, a lessor's investment in
equipment may be subjected to a greater degree of risk, and cost,
in the event of nonfiling or defective filing than presently exists for
a re ceivables buyer-secured party. 337
There are other differences between receivables sales and
leases which bear on the relative costs and benefits of a filing rule.
First, as with most secured transactions, a receivables transaction
begins with property owned by the debtor and, indeed, normally
generated, through sales or services or extensions of credit, by the
debtor. An investigation by a prospective lender or purchaser as to
conflicting claims to the receivables, such as accounting records,
invoices, or the like, would not be likely to uncover the nonexistence of a prior transfer of the receivables by a less than honest
debtor, especially if the account debtors had not been notified by a
prior transferee. 338 The costs of discovery of competing claims,
then , is greater for receivables than for equipment, in the absence
of a filing rule. 339 Second, because assignments of receivables that
are subject to the Article 9 filing rules take place exclusively in the
finan cing credit context, the risk that such rules would affect nonprofessionals adversely may be slight when compared to such risks
in the context of leases of equipment. 340 Third, receivables often
purchaser from t he debtor -seller, the buyer-secured party would have a damage cla im fo r
breach of warranty.
336. S ee su p ra note 131 and accompanying text.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 11 2-31.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. H owever, sometimes an ass ignee of
receivab les will mark the accounting records of the assignor so as to indicate the existence of
t he assignment.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. F iling also provid es other, related
be nefits for receivables sales, such as priority ordering and discouragement of fraud and
collusion, to a greater extent than would be the case if filing were required for leases. Se e
supra text accom panying notes 260-79; see also Coogan , supra note 24, at 944 (" [T ]he priority rules of article 9, including the fi rst-to-file rule of § 9- 312(5)(a) , m ight work poorly if
sales of accounts we re outside the scope of the article. ") .
340. See supra text accompanying note 141. The statement in t he t ext ass umes that a
fi ling ru le would be applicable to some nonprofessional lessors.
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represent a debtor's most liquid collateral and its principal means
of financing its operations. The importance of receivables as a
source of financing, and the consequent importance of satisfying
lenders' and purchasers' priority concerns, may justify the expanded reach of the Article 9 filing rules for receivables. 341 Finally,
the operation of the first-to-file rule, especially in the absence of
influence from an overriding purchase money priority rule, when
considered with the importance of receivables financing, suggests
that receivables financings, including sales, frequently may involve
dominant, exclusive, relational secured creditors. Notice of such relationships provided by a filing rule may provide more significant
benefits than would result from a filing requirement for leases. 342
A comparison of costs and benefits of filing for receivables
sales and equipment leases is especially problematic. There are no
smoking guns. The principal reason given by the drafters for subjecting receivables sales to Article 9 was the difficulty of
distinguishing true sales from secured sales. 343 The similar difficulty inherent in the true lease-security interest distinction would
seem to cut in favor of a filing requirement for leases. 3 44 But that
argument is incomplete. The principal benefits of filing for receivables sales also result from the commercial importance of
receivables financing , the need for information about conflicting
claims and assurance of priority for lenders and buyers alike, and
the difficulty of discovering such claims and verifying such priority
in the absence of a filing requirement. In each case, filing for receivables sales provides more benefits than filing for leases.
341. See Coogan, supra note 24, at 944. The importance of accounts financing was
recognized by the drafters of the 1972 amendm ents to Article 9, which amended § 9-312 so
as to make it clear that the priority of a purchase money securi ty interest in inventory
extends only to cash proceeds and not to other proceeds such as accounts. See U.C.C. § 9312(3) & (6) (1987). "Accounts financing is more important in the economy t han financing
the kinds of inventory that produce accounts, and the desirable rule is one which makes
accounts finan cing certain as to its legal position." !d. § 9-312, Reasons for 1972 Change.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 282-88.
343. See U.C .C . § 9-102 comment para. 1 (1987) (" [C]ertain sales of accounts and
chattel paper are brought within this Article to avoid di fficult problems of distinguishing
between transactions intended for security and those not so intended.'').
344. Coogan, however, argued that the Article 9 approach to sales of receivables
should not be appli ed to leases, in part because t he distinction between a true sale of receivables and a loan secured by receivables is more difficult to make than the true lease -security
interest distinction. Coogan, supra note 24, at 957-58.
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3. Summary.-The foregoing discussion identified various
characteristics of both consignments and sales of receivables that
indicate greater benefits and fewer risks and costs may be achieved
by the existing filing requirements for such transactions than
would result from mandating filing for leases of equipment. Consignments and receivables sales, when viewed in the context in
which they typically occur, demonstrate characteristics that support the wisdom of a filing requirement and that are not unlike
those of more conventional secured transactions.
D. Sale- Leaseback Transactions

For a variety of reasons, an owner of equipment may desire to
sell the equipment and lease it back, all the while maintaining possession and use. If the leaseback is a security lease, rather than a
true lease, the transaction as a whole amounts to nothing more
than a loan secured by a "chattel mortgage" security interest. 345 A
consummated sale-leaseback transaction is, with one principal exception, like any other equipment lease, and what already has been
stated concerning the relative costs and benefits of a filing requirement remains applicable to the sale-leaseback. T he exception is
that prior to the sale-leaseback transaction, unlike most equipment leases, the lessee was the owner and in possession of the
equipment. Two issues are raised by this circumstance.
First, as with most secured transactions, other than certain
purchase money financings, 346 an attempt to investigate the source
of the seller-lessee's title likely would fail to uncover the sale-leaseback if the seller-lessee were less t han forthcoming. The sellerlessee might well retain evidence of its original acquisition of title.347 Thus, a stronger case is presented for a filing requirement
for leases resulting from sale-leaseback transactions than for leases
345. Cf. In re Berez, 646 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1981 ). My experience an d observations
indicate t hat a very high p erce ntage of such leasebacks a re secured t ra nsact ions. The buyer lessors are, almost in vari ably, fin ancial instituti ons that a re less lik ely t o rely substa ntially
on the res idual value of used equipm ent than the residu al value of new equ ipment.
:346. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59.
347. In vestigati on of accounting record s might un cove r t he tra nsaction, but such audits would be cos tly a nd un usual in credit tra nsactions secured by equi pme nt. M oreover,
unless a transacti on was material and sufficient time had passed fo r it t o find its way into
the sell er-l essee's fin ancial statem ents, no rmal credit in vestigati ons often wo uld not reveal
tha t the t ra nsaction had occurred . See supra not e 246.
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generally. The antifraud and anticollusion functions of filing also
might be more useful in the case of sale-leasebacks than for leases
generally.348
The second issue is not directly related to the Article 9 filing
requirements. The remnants of Twyne's Case 349 manifested in the
"vendor in possession" doctrine continue to cast a shadow over the
retention of possession by sellers in many jurisdictions. 3150 Although
few states make such retention of possession a per se avoidable
fraudulent conveyance, it does create a presumption, or at least
evidence, of a fraudulent conveyance in most states. 351 A few states
have addressed the problem by allowing some form of public notice
to provide a definitive cure. 352
Hawkland has argued that eliminating the spectre of the vendor-in-possession doctrine and providing certainty for buyerlessors in sale-leaseback transactions would be significant virtues
of a filing requirement for leases. 353 Hawkland's argument misses
the point. It is true that if the law were changed so that leases were
subject to Article 9 perfection and priority rules and if the law also
were changed so that an Article 9 filing would cure the vendor-inpossession fraud risk, then the vulnerability of the lessor in a saleleaseback transaction would be reduced and some useful information might be provided to the marketplace. But the second change
in the law does not follow from or depend upon the first. The California approach, 354 which provides that public notice will cure the
fraud risk in sale-leaseback transactions, exists in the absence of a
general filing requirement for leases. Perhaps the law ought to be
that a permissive filing for leases under section 9-408 would provide conclusive protection from the vendor-in-possession fraud
348. See supra text accompanying notes 260-74.
349. 3 Coke SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601).
350. See ge nerally supra text accompanying notes 162-7 4.
351. See supra note 172. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfe r Act, promulgated in 1984,
provid es that "[i]n determining actual intent under subsection (a)(l), cons ideration may be
given, among other factors, to whether ... the debtor retained posssession or control of the
prope rly t.ransferred after the transfer. " UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT§ 4(b) , 7A U.L .A.
653 (1984). Articl e 2A overrides t he vendor-in -possession doctrine for sale- leasebacks when
the buyer-lessor buys for value and in good faith. See U.C.C. § 2A-308(3) (1987).
352. See, e.g ., CAL CIV. CoDE §§ 3440. 1-.9 (West Supp. 1987) .
35:3. See Hawkland, supra note 46, at 114-15.
354. See sup ra note 352.
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risk. 355 But the wisdom of permitting a filing to cure the risk of
fraudulent conveyance avoidance in a sale-leaseback transaction
does not provide support for the wisdom of a filing requirement for
leases generally in other contexts.
Such a means of curing the fraud risk might have other benefits as well. An opportunity to cure the fraud risk as well as the
risk of a subsequent determination that a lease is one for security
would provide an increased incentive for all lessors in sale-leaseback transactions to file, although most probably file anyway.
Although more filing by lessors might occur (thus providing more
beneficial information), it would not be accompanied by the problematic results of coercing filing by imposing the Article 9 priority
rules on all leases. 356

VI.

CoNCLUSION: CosTs AND BENEFITS CoMPARED

A.

The Approach

Any attempt to identify and quantify costs and benefits to society that might flow from a change in the law is an enormously
difficult task. 357 Indeed, my principal criticism of much prior commentary is not directed so much toward the conclusions reached
(i.e., that a filing requirement should be imposed), but toward the
surprising ease with which those conclusions were reached. Proposals to expand the Article 9 filing scheme to cover leases have not
adequately identified and explored, much less balanced, the various costs and benefits of such a change in the law. Previous
commentary appears to have overstated the benefits and underestimated the costs of imposing such a filing requirement.
Nevertheless, I reach no firm conclusions based on consistent theoretical and empirical grounds as to whether the law should impose
a filing requirement for leases.
355. Such a rule, however, would be largely superfluous in a state which had enacted
Article 2A. See U.C.C. § 2A-308(3) (1987); supra notes 172, 351.
356.

See generally supra Part IV.

357. Apparently, it is difficult to explain or describe what happens under Article 9. See
supra note 235. It is even more daunting to contemplate and explain what the effects would
be if the filing requirements were expanded.
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This article does not rely on a paradigmatic model or hypothesis designed to reveal the "correct" analysis or conclusion. ~
Because too little information is available and too many questions
remain to be asked and answered, any such model or hypothesis is
likely to provide inconclusive results. 359 An information base of a
3

8

358. Baird and Jackson have proposed a microeconomic pricing model, of sorts, on a
very general level : Secured creditors charge lower interest rates because they rely on specific
assets and, therefore, require reliable information about competing cla ims t o the collateral.
See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 183-90. See gen erally supra text at notes 71-81. A
filing requireme nt for leases would enhance the reliability of such information and thereby
reduce costs fo r secured parties and, therefore, the price of secured credit. I d. The analysis
in Baird and Jackson's mod el suggests, therefore, that the widespread enactment of a filing
requirement for leases would result in a measurable reduction in the average interest rate
charged for secured credit. Has the impact of public notice requirements as a positive instrument of anti-inflat ionary mon etary policy been overlooked? The costs of such a filing
requirement which Baird and Jackso n identify are limited to those involved with a lessor's
cost of filing and otherwise dealing with the filin g process. Se e Baird & Jackson, supra note
10, at 185-86. They acknowledge that their argument depends on empirical assumptions. !d.
at 183 (quoted supra note 79) . Other commentary proposing a filing requirement was even
less refined and also relied essenti ally on th e untested assumption that leases create a problem of ostensible ownership.
359. For this reason, I have sought to walk a tightrope strung above the fray of legal
analysis based on economic theory and empirically based analytical techniques developed by
social scientists and historians, not to mention critical legal scholarship. Yet, these and
other analytical tools may be useful to any effort to reach a t houghtful policy decision.
Some take the position t hat economic analysis of law based on an efficiency model is
invariably destined to provide inconclusive results.
In the end , we can on ly say what every law-and-econom ics article ends up saying: In a
world with no transaction costs, no one gives a hoot what the law is. But in a world
wit h transaction costs, who the hell knows what is going on!
Carlson, Is Fraudul en t Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643, 682 (1987) (arguing that fraudulent conveyance law is not efficient, but is justifiable on ethical grounds). My
point is more modest. The less that is known about behavior of the players, and the less
deep t he inquiries about diffe rences between the existing operation of the Article 9 perfection an d priority rules and the existing and potential results of leasing with and without a
filing requirement, the more likely it is that any conclusions will be inconclusive or, perhaps,
wrong. See Schwartz, Curren t Theories, supra note 235, at 37 (concluding that efficiency
justifications for existing security law are "problematic" and that "current knowledge" is
insuffic ient to esta blish a normative basis to change bankruptcy priorities and calling for
further research); Scott. supra note 11, at 970 (explaining that the development of a "theoretical framewo rk " to understand secured credit requires "accumulated evidence of the
actual operati on of credit markets"); see also Weinberg, supra note 206. Weinberg concludes
that the "efficiency criterion has proved useful in explai ning the pattern of protection for
legally innocent purchasers of goods that exists under American law. " !d . at 592. However,
he recognizes that other issues, such as "costs of a rule change" and "public and private
costs of alternative regimes,'' should be consi dered before a conclusion is reached as to the
desirab ility of changing the ru les. ld . Of co urse , the likeli hood that an approach to a policy
quest ion will produce inconclusive results does not mean t hat the an alysis will not surrender
valuable insights or indicate areas which might warrant further investigation.
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sufficient critical mass is necessary to devise an appropriate model
or hypothesis to be tested. 360 One goal of t his article is to provide
an agenda relating to existing filing requirements for secured
transactions, as well as for leases and other bailments, which may
facilitate more rigorous exploration than has been achieved to
date.
My methodology, if it can be given that label, is to identify the
various likely, or reasonably possible, costs and benefits of imposing a filing requirement on leases and to compare the costs and
benefits of a filing requirement for leases with those presumed to
flow from the existing Article 9 rules. 361 "Costs" and "benefits"
360. Economic analysis of law or anything else relies on assumptions which often do
not exactly or even roughly replicate the real world. But economists also relax their assumptions in various contexts in order to more closely reflect the real world. See generally M.
PoLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION OF LAw AND EcoNOMICS 2-4 (1983); R. PosNER, supra note 125,
at 15-17. Even though the complexities of the world are such that the assumptions will
never be accurate or complete, the creation of any economic mod el for the purpose of analysis of an existing or proposed legal rule, including the art of simplifying and relaxing
assumptions, requires an understanding of its operation, the players which are likely to be
affected by any change, and the nature of the effects. Similarly, social scientists who investigate empirical eviden ce in society must develop hypotheses to be tested based on
perceptions, imperfect as they may be. See, e.g. , Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, The Use
of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 200
(1987) ("It is not merely important that the researcher identify the normative and empirical
issues clearly. It is necessary to identify the right questions- or at least the most useful
ones-in advance, so that scarce resources will not be squandered."). It is likely that neither
the other commentators nor I have a sufficient grasp of the behavioral patterns or value
judgments of the players who would be affected by a filing requirement. Anecdotal observations such as mine, while useful, do not provide a substitute for employing various, more
rigorous analytical tools of scholarship. See Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 15, passim . But
theoretical analysis in the absence of an adequate information base is equally problematic.
361. Douglas Baird has criticized this approach because it compares the likely effects
of a filing requirement for leases with those of filing requirements for all secured transactions rather than only the closest analogue of a lease, a purchase money security interest
held by a seller of equipment. Letter from Douglas Baird to Charles W. Moon ey, Jr., supra
note 126. Baird's criticism is fair and astute and the comparison he favors must be made.
See supra text accompanying notes 271-79. But the analysis also may benefit from an appreciation that filing under Article 9 serves a variety of purposes which vary in qua lity and
quantity depending on the context. The lease- purchase money security interest comparison
Baird proposes might indicate that such security interests should not be subjected to a filing
requirement under Article 9. Indeed, it would be appropriate also to explore more generally
the wisdom of the existing Article 9 filing rules. If the filing rules under Article 9 are not
warranted, then the argument that they should be extended to leases would be crippled.
This article does not undertake t hat task, except to the extent that it identi fies the costs
and benefits of the existing rules .
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mean different things to different people. 362 For present purposes
the terms "costs" and "benefits" continue to be used in a broad
sense. And the assumptions are maintained that the Article 9
perfection and priority rules are generally satisfactory and likely to
remain in place and that the priority rules which would accompany
a filing requirement for leases would be similar to the existing Article 9 rules.
B.

The Benefits

What are the benefits which might be expected to flow from a
filing requirement for leases? 363
(i) Information: Reduction of discovery costs.
A principal benefit would be the provision of information, as is
contemplated by the Baird and Jackson model. The costs to interested persons of discovering, and risks of not discovering, leases
might be reduced. Since leases are easier to discover than most secured transactions, a filing requirement for leases would provide
fewer benefits than filing for secured transactions. 364 And the proponents of a filing rule for leases have not demonstrated that the
costs of existing law are sufficiently significant to warrant a change.
For example, a very small percentage of reported decisions appears
to involve reliance creditors or purchasers who have been misled. 365
Even if filing were required, many reliance creditors and purchas362. "Cost-benefit analysis" has reached an enormously refined state in the economic
literature generally. See, e.g., A. RAY, CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, IssuEs AND METHODOLOGIES
146-50 (1984); BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS OF SociAL REGULATION: CASE STUDIES FROM THE
CouNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (J. Miller III & B. Yandle eds. 1979). For an earlier
example of an effort to weigh and balance the costs and benefits of imposing a filing or
recording requirement on assignments of accounts receivable and trust receipt financing, see
Hanna, supra note 197.
363. It is difficult to separate the discussion of benefits and costs. The benefits of enacting a filing rule for leases would serve primarily to reduce costs resulting from the
absence of a filing rule under existing law.
One benefit claimed by other commentators-curing the problems of ostensible ownership-is unproven and probably spurious. See supra Part V.A.2. Moreover, the
identification of dominant, relational creditors, a benefit of filing under Article 9, would not
be served by filing for leases. See supra text accompanying 280-88.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 253-59.
365. See supra note 222.
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ers might continue to investigate the source of a lessee's interest in
any event. 366
(ii) Timing and veracity: Priority ordering and dis couraging
fraud and collusion.
Although a filing requirement for leases also might discourage
fraud and collusion, such benefits probably would be smaller than
those provided by filing for secured transactions. 367 Sale-leasebacks
are an exception. 368 Moreover, it is doubtful that a filing rule would
provide material benefits in connection with the evidentiary aspects of determining priorities. 369
(iii) Reduction of true lease-security interest controversy.
A filing requirement for leases might reduce true lease-security
interest characterization disputes. 370 Uncertain and vague legal
rules may impose costs by making the outcome of an existing or
potential dispute more difficult to predict and by encouraging
costly litigation. 371 But an argument that the law should eliminate
the true lease-security interest distinction for purposes of priority
in order to save costs, standing alone , is absurd. 372 The argument
must be that if there is some other rational basis for imposing a
filing requirement, such as providing useful information to the
marketplace, or if there is no rational basis for the true lease-security interest distinction in this context, then a collateral benefit
would be the reduction of costs associated with determining the
issue. In any event, to the extent that lessors file voluntarily under
section 9-408 and to the extent that the true lease-security interest
366. Interested persons might be no less inclined to pursue such investigation, even in
the face of a filing search showing no leases, so as to uncover prior owners and to search for
filings against such prior owners. In those circumstances, a filing requirement would provide
little additional information , except when the prospective debtor or seller provided fraudu·
lent documentation of its source of title.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 262 · 70.
368.

See supra note 258; supra Part V.D.

369.

See supra text accompanying notes 266-68.

370. See supra note 130.
37 1. See, e.g., R. PosNER, supra note 125, at 512-1 4. On the other hand, it is the very
vagueness of the frontier between tru e leases and secured transactions that appears to encourage precautionary filing by lessors.
372. The la w also might be changed to abolish the crime of murder or even to create a
comprehensive title registration system for all interests in personal property. Predictability
would then be enhanced and costly litigation would be reduced.
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determination would be necessary for other purposes, there would
be little or no reduction in costs. 373
C.

The Costs

It seems clear enough that some benefits would result from
subjecting leases to a filing requirement, even though estimating
the materiality of such benefits is problematic. But the various
costs which might arise as a result of a filing requirement also must
be considered.
(i) Costs of compliance.
The most obvious costs, and the principal costs addressed by
prior commentators, are costs of compliance with a filing requirement. 374 These costs include filing fees, search fees (depending on
the applicable priority rule 37 ~) and, in particular, the cost of deal373. The true lease -security interest determination would be necessary anyway in
many situations where the nature of appropriate remedi es and damages on default (most
priority disputes occur in the context of a default) and bankruptcy issues are in volved as
well as in various other contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 32 -36. Determination
of the amount of a lessor's claim, and consequently determination of the true lease-security
interest issue, would be necessary in the case of avoidance or priority occas ioned by a lesso r's failure to file. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
Kripke argues that the revised § 1-201(37) will res ult in more predictability and , consequently, fewer instances of voluntary filin g by lessors. Kripke, supra note 5, at 798; see also
Cuming, supra note 40, at 258. Although the new definiti on is an improveme nt, it probably
is not that good. See supra note 24 and accom panying text. Additiona lly, aggregate costs
associated with fewer voluntary filings would be offset, at least partially, by the more clear
and predictable definition . It remains anyone's guess as to the mate riality of any cost savings based on reducing the circumstances where t he t ru e lease-security interest di stinctio n
need be made for perfection and priority purposes.
374. These costs sometimes have been addressed by arguing that, as among a lesso r, a
lessee, and third parties, the lessor can most cheaply bear the cost of so lving probl ems (i.e.,
creating benefits) by filing. See , e.g. , Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 188-89; see also R.
PosNER, supra note 125, § 3. 10, at 71. If the filing related costs were the only costs involved,
this argument would be more persuasive. But there are othe r costs to cons ider. Posner acknowledges that the "lower-cost avoider" should not always bear the risk. In discussing the
thief rule, he states:
Although [the owne r] could prevent the erroneou s trans fer to [th e good faith pur chaser] at lower cost than the [the good faith purchaser] by taking greater
precautions against theft, allowing [the good faith purchaser] to obtain a good titie
would encourage theft .... We do not want an efficient market in stolen good s.
375. For example, Baird and .Jackson wou ld require a lessor to notify secured parties,
who previously fi led on equipment, in order to acquire the equ iva lent of a "purchase money
priority." Baird & .Jackson, supra note 10, at 195 -96; see U.C.C. § 9-:3J2(:n (1987) (purchase
money priority for inventory requires similar notification); supra notes 296 -97.
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ing with the detail and structure of a filing and priority scheme. 376
The apparent frequency with which many professional lessors now
make routine precautionary filings under section 9-408 indicates
that at least for those lessors, these costs of compliance or attempted compliance may not be significant. Presumably, however,
there are some nonprofessional lessors who do not file routinely.
For these lessors the educational investment necessary to comply
with a filing requirement, or even to know about it, and the risks of
noncompliance, would be substantial. 377 To the extent such nonprofessionals would be excluded from the filing requirements, the
remaining lessors subject to the requirement might be those who
generally now file anyway.
(ii) Costs of noncompliance.
To lessors: A filing requirement for leases would impose costs
on lessors by increasing the risk of loss from noncompliance. Under
existing law the lessor who fails to file or makes a defective filing
runs the risk of subordination only if the lease is characterized as a
secured transaction. If a filing rule incorporating the Article 9 priority rules were imposed, a lessor would be exposed to the risk of
subordination whether or not the lease would be so recast. The lessor would be exposed not only to the extent of the value
transferred to the lessee (i.e., the lessee's right to use the equipment during the lease term) , but also to the extent of the lessor's
residual interest. 378 Because lessors normally rely more on the
equipment than secured creditors, the effects of nonperfection by
lessors would be more costly than those for secured creditors. 379
To lessees: The increased exposure of lessors to costs resulting
from a filing rule also would impose costs on lessees. A lessor's unsecured damage claim arising from third party priority or
avoidance of the lessor's property interest could exceed the value
ultimately conferred on the lessee or its estate. 3 80 Such a claim
could force the lessee to assume an involuntary obligation for the
entire value of the equipment. 381 Unsophisticated lessees may not
376.
requisites
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

T he lessor would be compelled to determine the proper place of fi ling, the fo rmal
of the filin g, and the like. S ee supra note 241.
See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
/ d.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra note 131 and accompanying t ext.
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be well positioned to deal with this risk by coping with Article 9type rules. 382 Also, increased risk to lessors might be passed on the
lessees, thereby increasing the cost of leasing. 383
(iii) Additional discovery costs.
Another group of costs would flow from the operation of priority rules similar to the Article 9 rules that would, it is assumed,
accompany a filing requirement for leases. These costs would be
imposed on third parties, as illustrated by Example B in Part
IV. 384 A filing requirement for leases would require a prospective
creditor or purchaser to ascertain whether equipment had ever
been subject to a lease in order to determine any potential claims
of secured creditors of a previous lessee. An investigation of a
debtor-transferor's source of title often would not reflect whether
equipment previously had been leased. These costs would offset, to
some extent, benefits that third parties would receive from such a
filing rule.
(iv) Costs of exclusions.
Most commentators have recognized that such a requirement
would not be appropriate for all leases. But exclusions also give
rise to the costs of drawing lines, unpredictability, and litigation. It
is impossible to address the significance of those costs without
knowing exactly what lines would be drawn. 385
(v) Institutional costs.
Some costs of a filing requirement would be widely dispersed
and may be characterized as institutional or systemic costs. First,
it has been argued that imposing a filing requirement for leases
would add additional burdens to an already burdened, and in some
states broken, Article 9 filing system, thus making the existing Article 9 regime less efficient and more risky. 386 Second, any change
382. These risks would be exacerbated in the case of an unsophisticated lessee from a
nonprofessional lessor.
383. From the standpoint of an aggregate cost- benefit analysis, any decrease in the
price of secured credit resulting from a lease filing rule would be offset to the extent that
costs resulting from increased risks to lessors are passed on to lessees.
384. See supra text accompanying note 134.
385. The lines drawn for excluded transactions might or might not be more clear than
the line between true leases and secured transactions. At least the latter dichotomy can be
considered with the benefit of substantial precedent and the new § 1-201(37), which may
lead to increased predictability.
386. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 674. The argument is not persuasive. The burden caused by widespread voluntary filing by lessors probably has already taken its toll. The
Article 9 filing systems are in need of direct therapy. The ABA UCC Committee is studying
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in law which provides for a novel approach to important commercial transactions includes enormous costs associated with drafting,
consensus building, enactment, education, and maintenance of uniformity. Although Article 2A is long and complex, its changes to
existing law are generally modest. The imposition of a filing requirement, especially if accompanying priority rules necessitated
changes to Article 9, could even jeopardize enactment. 387 Finally,
many other issues and problems in commercial law may be in more
need of attention. Given the financial and human resources available to the uniform law process at any point in time, it is important
to consider the foregone opportunity costs of pursuing one project
to the exclusion of another.
(ui) Varianc e Costs.
Some of the costs of a filing requirement for leases could be
reduced by varying priority rules from those which apply to secured transactions under Article 9. 388 Such variations would result
in additional differences in treatment between secured transactions
and true leases. That would reduce the benefits of a filing requirement, particularly the possible reduction of true lease-security
interest disputes. 389
D.

The Balance

I am not prepared to quantify and balance the costs and benefits of subjecting leases to a filing regime such as that provided by
Article 9. Nor has anyone else done so. Previous commentators
have reached conclusions on both sides of the argument, but their
approaches were not thorough enough. This discussion, like other
commentaries, is full of explicit and implicit empirical assumptions
and intuitions concerning the way things are . Most are untested
and uncertain. I have adopted the modest approach of using a
helpful heuristic. I have taken the existing Code rules dealing with
security interests and consignments as a baseline and compared
the performance of the filing and search systems in the various jurisdictions. See Mooney,
In t roduct ion to the Uniform Com m ercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the
Past , Present , and Future of the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1352 (1 986).
387. It also would have been quite anomalous if a filing req uirement had bee n imposed
fo r leases but no t for ce rta in other bailments that might be viewed as even more appropri ate
candidates for filin g. See supra notes 17, 227 and accompanying text.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 370-73.

784

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 39:3:683

the application of those rules with the application of similar rules
to leases. It is comforting that some legal scholars recently have
suggested that a more modest approach sometimes may be more
useful and enlightening. 390
A comprehensive analysis of the relative costs and benefits of
either adopting a filing requirement for leases or of continuing the
existing rule should take into account many variables. Several are
mentioned elsewhere in this article and most are difficult or impossible to quantify. It would be necessary to assign probabilities to
the occurrence of various costs and benefits in the process of
quantification.
Consideration of a plausible, but oversimplified, paradigm may
be illustrative. Assume the following: (i) there exists a filing requirement for leases that generally incorporates the Article 9
perfection and priority scheme; (ii) in the absence of that filing
rule, costs would be imposed (i.e., under existing law, costs are imposed) upon third parties as a class as a result of the absence of
readily available information about lessors' "secret" claims; (iii)
the costs to lessors as a class of minimizing such third party costs,
by filing, are less than the costs to third parties as a class of minimizing their own costs by investigation; and (iv) the costs to lessors
as a class of complying with filing requirements are less than the
costs imposed on lessors as a class resulting from noncompliance
(failure to file or defective filing)-i.e., loss or reduction of lessors'
interests in leased goods. Based on these assumptions one might
conclude that lessors are the lower cost avoiders. Lessors would be
390.
If these arguments are correct, then the standards for judging academic work in economics and constitutional law should be reconsidered. Perhaps the current bias in
favor of brilliant, "paradigm shifting" work should be abandoned. The more pedestrian "normal science," may be the worthier endeavor.
There is a tendency today for high flying theorists to scoff at those whose work
stays closer to the ground. Icarus, too, was undoubtedly scornful of pedestrianism.
Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 929-30 (1986) (footnotes
omitted).
If this hypothetical confessional instinct were translated into legal scholarship, almost
all the theogonies deduced from contemplating the texts of cases and statutes would
disappear, to be replaced by some exceedingly modest suggestions full of self-consciousness about the difficulties of cause and effect between law and society. Although
less dazzling, such a literature would constitute an advance. The assertion that laws
are dictated by some overriding normative principle is paralyzing.
Carlson, supra note 235, at 208.
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encouraged to file in order to avoid greater costs of noncompliance
(assumption (iv)). Their costs of compliance would be less that the
third parties' costs of investigation (assumption (iii)), and such investigation would be necessary in the absence of a filing rule.
These assumptions alone, however, are not sufficient to determine
whether leases should be subjected to a filing requirement (i.e.,
whether efficiency concerns dictate that lessors, through a filing requirement, should bear the costs of eliminating the third party
costs). Another assumption is necessary. Assume, for example, that
(v) the costs to lessors as a class of noncompliance with a filing rule
would exceed both (a) the costs imposed on third parties as a class
by the absence of a filing rule and (b) the costs to third parties as a
class of curing or reducing their costs by investigation. If assumption (v) were true, then lessors as a class should not be required to
incur costs under a filing rule which exceed the costs which would
be imposed on third parties in the absence of a filing rule. 391 As
mentioned elsewhere, it is safe to assume that some portion of the
lessors would fail to file or would make defective filings. 392 The
problem, then, is one of quantification. 39 3
There is some support for a conclusion as to the wisdom of a
filing requirement for leases which has not been reached by any of
the commentators: Perhaps it really does not matter what the rule
is. 394 For example, the costs to third parties inherent in a lessor's
391. Cf. Harri s, supra note 124, at 211- 21 (economi c a nalysis of priorities as between
unperfected secured party and bulk buye r who fails to co mply with requirem ents of Article
6).

392. Sup ra note 124.
:393. No such q uantificati on is attempted he re. One criticism of the exa mple is tha t the
same analys is coul d be ap pli ed to secu red transactions for whi ch filing is required under
current law. H owever, as discussed elsewhere , t he consequ ences of nonperfecti on appear to
be more harsh for lessors t han for secured creditors. See supra t ext accompanying notes
11 4- 25. Assuming a lease filin g requirement were a pplicable only to professional lessors, it is
reaso nable to ex pect t ha t a pprox imat ely the same percentage of defa ults would occur, and
ap proxim ately th e same percen tage of nonperfection would occur, in the cases of secured
transactions and leases alike. If this were so, then the losses incurred by lessors as a class
cou ld be expected to exceed , afte r adjustment for transaction am oun ts and volume of transacti ons, t he losses incu rred by secured parti es as a resul t of nonperfecti on.
:394. Scholars ge nerally take little satisfact ion in bela boring insignificant points (more
correctly, points t hat t hey recogniz e as insign ificant) an d expend much effort explaining
(read defendin g) the im portance of their agendas. Perhaps t his conclus ion fi ts Farber's prototype of a "brilli a nt," but almost inva ri a bly d efective , th eory. See Farber, su p ra note 390.
N evertheless, it is not always easy t o ex plain t hat someone may be beating a dead horse.
Argum ents will always arise as to whether t he conduct constitutes beating, whethe r the
a ni mal is a horse or some thin g else and wh eth er the animal, whatever it is, is dead .
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"secret" interest may be so slight and attenuated that prospective
creditors and purchasers simply do not take them into account. 396
It is also possible, but unlikely, that the various costs to lessors
arising from a filing requirement would be ignored. Or the issue
may be very difficult and closely balanced-one upon which reasonable scholars and lawmakers might disagree and one for which
it is, and will remain, impossible to ascertain the "best" solution. 396
There are four bits of "evidence" which tend to support (or, at
least, are not inconsistent with) this "who cares?" hypothesis.
First, secured credit and leasing have coexisted, indeed prospered,
in spite of the persistence of existing law which generally requires
no public notice for leases. 397 Certainly the expansion of equipment
leasing in recent years has not been the death knell of credit secured by equipment. 398 Second, my observations of the process
395. See Carlson, supra note 235, at 222-23 (arguing that slight increases in prospects
of recovery may be so "infinitesimally tiny" that they are "too unimportant to command
attention" of lenders in pricing credit).
396. See Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 45 (1987):
I argue that variety in the treatment of the good-faith purchaser of stolen property
can be linked to . .. the difficulty of discerning the best solution to a hard question.
Societies may share the goal of minimizing the costs associated with the theft of
property but may disagree over the way to achieve this goal.
To be sure, the poor (or lucky) soul who would suffer (or benefit) in a given circumstance
because of the existence of one rule or the other would not be so sanguine. But such examples will always flow from line drawing in any legal regime.
397. That is not to say that this circumstance refutes the notion that one rule or the
other may be more beneficial at the margin. Rather, the selection of either rule may not
produce material differences in the aggregate costs and benefits.
398. Jackson and Kronman have argued that the principal advantage of secured credit
would be lost without a generally applicable first-in-time priority rule. Jackson & Kronman,
supra note 235, at 1162-63. Baird and Jackson have argued that the existence of secured
credit depends on a "level of assurance of repayment that surpasses that of the unsecured
creditor" and further that this assurance is provided by the Article 9 first-in-time perfection
and priority scheme that is effected, in part, by the public notice perfection requirements.
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 179; see also Baird, supra note 79, at 62. It is apparent
that the "defect" in the level of assurance that results from the general absence of a lease
filing requirement has not been sufficient to eliminate the existence of secured credit. Secured business credit and equipment leasing are both commonplace.
Perhaps the Article 9 public notice-related perfection and priority rules are not essential to the existence of secured credit after all. Yet, I doubt that this is the case; the role of
filing under Article 9 is quite important. See generally supra Part V.B. Alternatively, it may
be that the volume of leased equipment is not substantial enough to impose material risks
on secured parties. I am also skeptical of this explanation, given the staggering volume of
equipment leasing during recent years. See supra note 20. More plausibly, perhaps the incidence and risks of debtor misbehavior or errors resulting in false reliance by secured parties
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resulting in promulgation of Article 2A suggest to me that neither
professional secured lenders nor professional equipment lessors
have convincingly argued that they cannot or could not live with
one rule or the other. Although the NCFA urged a filing requirement, their proposal came somewhat late in the process. 399 Perhaps
they would not have proposed any change in law requiring filing
for leases had not the Article 2A project already been commenced.400 The American Association of Equipment Lessors
strongly opposed a filing requirement for leases, 401 but the apparently routine ·practice of voluntary filing by professional lessors
may belie, at least to some extent, the strength of the opposition.402 Third, no private mechanisms have developed which would
are so minimal that they are regularly disregarded. Se e Carlson, supra note 235, at 222-23;
supra note 395 and accompanying text. Also plausible is the explanation that one reason
such risks are negligible is that lessors almost always file financing statements. See U.C.C. §
9-408 (1987); supra note 46. The risk that the lessee or a third party may assert that a lease
is actually a secured transaction may be sufficient to encourage filing. On the other hand,
secured creditors may be engaged in routine costly investigation of the source of title to
collateral so as to verify that it is not leased, and, perhaps, such investigation would not be
undertaken if the only risks were defects such as a thief in the chain of title. Finally, it is
also possible that the peaceful coexistence of secured credit and equipment leasing belies
the seriousness of the problem-secured creditors may be rou tinely subjected to material
losses which could be greatly reduced by a filing requirement that would lower the cost of
secured credit. But this possibility does not appear likely, assuming that the reported cases
involving assertions that leases were actually secured transactions provide a reliable indication. See supra note 222. All of this conjecture is difficult to sustain without empirical
evidence.
399. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
400. Cf. Phillips, supra note 16, at 46-47 n.182:
Article 9 has never rested its basic test of inclusion and exclusion of transactions on
the doctrine of ostensible ownership. Rather , the basic test is that of an intention by
the parties to create a "security interest." ... For example, Article 9 does not cover
"true" leases even though the debtor possesses property upon which the debtor's
other creditors might rely .. .. Moreover, there has been little dissatisfaction with the
intention test since the Code came into widespread use some 15 years ago. If, instead,
creditors relied predominantly upon what they saw, we would have expected expressions of greater dissatisfaction on the ground that the debtor's recordation habits
would make little difference to observing third parties.
401. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 674.
402. I do not intend to suggest that the leasing industry's opposition to a filing requirem en t was not se rious and strongly felt, but I suspect that the opposition was
overstated. The leasing industry probably would have recognized the benefits of Article 2A
even with a filing requirement and would have le arned to live with it. To the extent that the
costs to lessors would be increased by a filing requirement such costs would, presumably, be
passed on to lessees. Thus, the result might have been that leasing would have lost some of
its competitive advantages over conventional secured fina ncing. That possible result also
may explain in part the NCFA support for a filing requirement.
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indicate a strong need by secured lenders for additional sources of
information about lessor's "secret" interests. Voluntary filing by
lessors no doubt reflects the desire for protection in the event of
recharacterization of leases as secured transactions, not the desire
to provide information needed by third parties. Finally, notwithstanding the careful deliberations by members of the drafting
committee for Article 2A, several of whom initially were disposed
toward a filing requirement, the committee remained unconvinced
that a filing requirement was necessary. 403
None of this "evidence" is even remotely conclusive. But it
does indicate that the issue may burn more brightly for legal scholars than it does for the players affected by the status quo or who
would be affected by a change in law. Perhaps there are bigger fish
to fry.

E.

Denouement

It seems so simple. Most professional lessors appear to file
precautionary financing statements for leases anyway. And filing is
so cheap! Would not the imposition of an Article 9-type filing requirement for leases represent a natural, reasonable next step for
these commercial transactions which have, in recent years, "come
of age" as important " financing" devices? After all, a lessee's possession of goods "looks just like" a debtor's possession. But the
problem is not susceptible to a simple solution grounded on simple
theoretical and historical bases. Assuming that the Article 2A
drafting committee considered some of the troublesome issues
treated herein, it is difficult to fault the drafters for their failure to
depart from longstanding, well-settled law.
It is distressing that we know so little about the "real world"
functions, effects, and operations of the existing Article 9 filing requirements. It is especially troublesome, therefore, to embrace an
expansion of those requirements to other transactions beyond
t raditional bounds. There exist fundamental unresolved issues concerning t he operation of credit markets and the role of possession
of goods and the behavioral relationships between the two. The existing informational base is too thin.
-±ml.

See suora notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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Further study of bailments, including leases, provides an exceptional opportunity for gaining greater understanding of the role
of filing for secured transactions under Article 9. A bailment of
goods and a security interest in goods each usually involves possession by a debtor or lessee. Existing law provides a laboratory for
examination of both the impact of a filing requirement and the effects of an absence of a filing requirement. Absent an adequate
information base, this article has considered areas of critical comparison (i.e., reliance or nonreliance on possession, information,
ordering of priorities, veracity and timing, effects of nonfiling, etc.)
while filling the gaps with assumptions based on personal experience and observations, views of other observers, case law,
conjecture, and intuition. This approach is more a beginning than
an end. Yet, earlier treatments grounded on unproven assumptions
concerning ostensible ownership and historical homilies fare no
better (no matter how often repeated and revived) and, moreover,
are less complete.
The process resulting in Article 2A might have been seized
upon as an opportunity to explore more intensely many of the
matters considered here. One reason that the process did not foster
such an exploration was the failure of those who questioned the
wisdom of a filing requirement for leases to explain why such a
requirement would not be appropriate. This article comes too late
for Article 2A. At an earlier time it might have provoked deeper
and broader expositions supporting the case for a filing rule. Or its
deficiencies might have prompted others to sort out better the
downside to a filing requirement. It is not too late, however, for
continued efforts to understand the Article 9 perfection and priority rules and the wisdom of similar public notice requirements for
nonlease bailments.
The issue is closer and more difficult to assess than the earlier
commentators on either side have seen it to be. Perhaps it is inevitable that strong views are easiest to embrace when the
underpinnings of a position are unknown or unprovable.

